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INTRODUCTION 
My aim in this dissertation is to examine the role that intentions 
to refer should play in a theory of reference. The general question a 
theory of reference is supposed to answer is "How are words connected to 
objects in the world?" The traditional answer is that the connection is 
grounded in a prior connection between minds and objects in the world. 
According to this view, human beings identify objects and entertain 
thoughts about them before they have language. The connection between 
words and objects is made by people who intend to use a word to refer to 
an object which they can already identify and about which they can 
already think. 
This answe.r has been challenged by some twentieth century philoso-
phers. Some have argued that our thoughts about objects in the world 
are mediated and structured by language. Some have argued that any 
attempt to explain reference in terms of intentions to refer are circu-
lar. Perhaps the most serious objection to theories that try to explain 
the connection between words and objects in terms of intentions to refer 
is that such theories cannot adequately account for the normative aspect 
of language, that is, they cannot account for the fact that there are 
correct and incorrect usages. If reference were just a matter of inten-
tions to refer, then, with intentions of the specified kind, a word 
could refer to anything. 
By using a divide and conquer strategy, this dissertation chal-
1 
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lenges the claim that reference is determined by intentions to refer. 
The claim that reference is determined by intentions to refer is divided 
into two claims: one is a claim about how reference is disambiguated; 
the other is about how expressions in a language get their reference 
potential. By dividing the claims in this way, we can see more clearly 
in what contexts, and to what extent, intentions to refer determine ref-
erence. 
The first two chapters of the dissertation are devoted to method-
ology. Chapter One states the explanatory goals of a theory of refer-
ence. In Chapter Two I develop er i ter ia of adequacy for a theory of 
reference. 
Chapters Three through Six are devoted to theories of disambigua-
tion. In these chapters I clarify and defend the claim that reference 
is disambiguated by intentions to refer. In Chapter Three I develop the 
distinction between theories of disambiguation and theories of reference 
potential and reject one type of intentionalist theory. According to 
the theory that I reject, the reference of an ambiguous referring 
expression is the object that satisfies some descriptive or representa-
tional content that the speaker has in mind when she utters the expres-
sion. I reject this account because it is subject to counter examples 
based on fortuitous satisfaction. 
Chapter Four is devoted to theories of disambiguation that claim 
that the speaker's intentions to ref~r do not disambiguate reference. 
According to these theories, contextual features alone determine the 
reference of ambiguous referring expressions. I rule out contextual 
theories of disambiguation because the features to which these .accounts 
appeal are themselves ambiguous. I concede, however, that contextual 
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features are important, even if not all-important, ·non-linguistic deter-
minants of reference. 
Chapters Five and Six argue that a speaker's intentions to refer 
do play some role in determining the reference of ambiguous referring 
expressions. In Chapter Five I examine the role of intentions to refer 
in determining the reference of proper names. I distinguish two types 
of proper names, official and unofficial, and argue that the reference 
of these names, once they are established means of referring, depends on 
causal chains linking the speaker's utterance to the referent. Int en-
tions to refer are important only for breaking these causal chains and 
thus introducing a new referent. 
Chapter Six looks at referring expressions other than proper 
names. It argues that there are reference chains which explain how the 
reference of some ambiguous expressions are determined. It also argues 
that intentions to refer play a role in initiating causal chains with an 
ambiguous referring expression. The reference of ambiguous referring 
expressions which initiate a reference chain is determined by the speak-
er's intentions to refer to the object she has in mind. This object is 
the one that is causally related to the mental representation that is 
referentially linked to the speaker's referring expression. Chapter Six 
concludes that the speaker's intentions do play a role in disambiguating 
reference, but it also concludes that when linguistic and non-linguistic 
determinants of reference are taken into account, the role that a speak-
er's intentions to refer play in determining reference turns out to be 
quite small. 
Chapters Seven and Eight discuss intentionalist theories 0£ refer-
ence potential. Chapter Seven rejects the claim that the reference 
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potential of expressions for singular reference is determined by a 
speaker's intentions to refer. It argues that reference rules which 
state how the reference of singular referring expressions is determined 
can and should avoid mention of a particular speaker's intentions to 
refer. 
Chapter Eight is concerned with theories of reference potential 
which claim that reference potential is determined by speakers' inten-
tions to refer. I argue that Gricean accounts, which try to explain 
semantic reference (or reference potential relative to a language) in 
terms of individual speaker's intentions to refer, are either circular 
or require untenable assumptions about the intellectual abilities of 
pre-linguistic people. I then discuss theories of reference which try 
to explain the reference potential of expressions in a language in terms 
of some group's intentions to refer. I argue that if these intentions 
to refer are formulated in terms of criteria for application of the 
term, such accounts are unacceptable. The kind of intention to refer 
which guides individual speakers (or the sum of individual speakers) in 
their application of a term, (for example, the intention to refer with 
the word 'gold' to all and only shiny, yellow, metallic objects) is not 
the kind of intention that sets the standards of correct and incorrect 
uses of referring expressions. The intentions which do set the stan-
<lards of correctness are more general. In the case of natural kind 
terms, they are intentions to refer to the things that actually belong 
to that kind. With other terms, the standard of correctness may be dif-
ferent, but even with these terms it is a general intention (if any 
intention at all) to use a word correctly that determines a word's ref-
erence and not a specific intention to refer to all and only those 
5 
things that have certain characteristics. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EXPLANATORY GOALS OF A THEORY OF REFERENCE 
This chapter identifies and evaluates three conceptions of refer-
ence: 1) reference as speaker's identification; 2) reference as the 
communication of a referent to an audience; and 3) reference as deter-
mining an object to be the subject of discourse. Since the conception 
of reference plays a role in setting explanatory goals for a theory of 
reference, the results of this chapter will provide a groundwork for 
developing acceptable explanatory goals for a theory of reference. 
Before discussing these three conceptions of reference, a few 
remarks about theories of reference in general are in order. The goal 
of a theory of reference is to account for our ability to refer, our 
ability to talk (and to think in words) about things. As theories of 
reference have developed, two basic models of reference have emerged. 
On one model, reference is a relation between words and the world; words 
in a language refer to objects in the world. On the other model, refer-
ring is an act. A person refers to an object by means of something, 
either a referring expression of a language, a gesture, or perhaps a 
picture or image. The first model, which sees reference as a relation 
between words and objects in the world, is a model of semantic refer-
ence. The second is a model of speaker's reference. 
While it is possible to concentrate on one or the. other type of 
reference, speaker reference or semantic reference, an adequate theory 
6 
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of reference must take account of both. For in order to explain our 
ability to refer it is not sufficient to say that there are connections 
between words in a language and things in the world and to specify what 
these connections are. Such an explanation does not account for our 
ability to exploit these connections in the act of referring. Con-
versely, an account of speaker's reference is inadequate as a theory of 
reference unless it can tell us how the devices used for referring work 
(i.e., how words or images connect with items in the world). 
In this discussion of reference I shall assume that both speakers 
and words or phrases in a language refer. The basic data that a theory 
of reference must account for includes both the fact that speakers refer 
and the fact that words refer. 
In accounting for our ability to refer, a primary task of a theory 
of reference is to identify the factors which determine or fix the ref-
erent of an expression or an act of referring. One basic question for a 
theory of reference is: "How is the referent of an act of referring or 
of a referring expression determined?" A referring expression is one 
which picks out an object or objects as the subject of discourse. For 
example, in the sentence, "Aristotle was a Greek philosopher," the name 
"Aristotle" picks out Aristotle as the subject of discourse. In the 
sentence, "I am drinking coffee now," the word "I" indicates that I am 
the subject of discourse. I am what the sentence is about. In an act 
of referring a person picks out a subject of discourse by using some 
referential device. For example, when I say, "Aristotle was a Greek 
philosopher," I make someone, namely Aristotle, the subject of my state-
ment. I am talking about Aristotle. 
The idea of 'picking out' an object is vague and metaphorical. 
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'Talking about' something also seems vague. Although these phrases con-
vey (approximately) the right idea, they seem ill-suited for the pur-
poses of a theory of ·reference, for saying what someone does when he or 
she refers or what counts as referring. To sharpen the concept of 
referring, we may propose viewing reference either as 1) the identifica-
tion, on the part of the speaker, of some object as the referent of the 
expression or act of referring, 2) the communication of the referent of 
an expression or act of referring to an audience, or 3) determining an 
object to be the subject of the discourse (whether the parties to the 
discourse know that this is the subject of discourse or not). The 
explanatory goals of the theory of reference will then be formulated in 
terms of these conceptions of reference. Those who view reference as 
the speaker's identification of a referent see the theory of reference 
as a theory of identification. They ask a theory of reference to 
explain how the referent of a referring expression or act of referring 
is identified by the speaker. If one takes reference to be essentially 
a part of the communicative act, one requires that a theory of reference 
explain how we communicate the referents of our expressions and acts of 
referring to others. If reference is viewed as the d.etermining of a 
referent for expressions and acts of referring, then the explanatory 
goal should be to account for the way in which the referent of a refer-
ring expression or act is determined. 
In this dissertation, I will take the basic explanatory goal of a 
theory of reference to be that of discovering the determinants of refer-
ence, the mechanisms by which some object is made the referent of an act 
of referring or of a referring expression. That is, I believe a theory 
of reference is a theory of the determination of a referent for an act 
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of referring or for a referring expression. I choose this way of look-
ing at the theory of reference because I believe it is the most neutral 
perspective from which to begin. At the very least, when someone or 
something refers, there is some object (or purported obj~ct) which is 
the referent. What we want to know is what makes that thing the refer-
ent, how is that connection made. 
In the following sections I will discuss the alternative views of 
reference: reference as identification and reference as communication. 
I will argue that the basic explanatory goal of a theory of reference is 
neither just to account for the speaker's identification of a referent 
nor just to account for the ability to communicate one's referent to 
someone else. Rather, these two goals are subsumed under the more gen-
eral goal of explaining how the referent of a referring expression or 
act is determined. 
Reference as Identification 
A more technical sounding word roughly synonymous with 'picking 
out' (as in the phrase, 'Picking out a referent') is 'identification'. 
We might want to equate reference with identification. If we did, we 
would want to say that a speaker refers if she identifies a referent. 
Thus, our theory of reference would be a theory of identification. As I 
have said, I will not adopt this view as it stands. 
One of the problems with equating reference with identification is 
that ihe notion of identification is ambiguous. Identification is some-
times analyzed as recognition of an object by a speaker. Identification 
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can also mean individuation or specification of an object by a speaker. 
Reference is not identification in the sense of recognizing an 
individuated object. · An example taken from Hilary Putnam demonstrates 
that this interpretation of reference is too strict. 1 Putnam confesses 
that he cannot tell the difference between elm trees and beech trees, 
and yet he can refer to elm trees. When he says, "Elm trees are decidu-
ous," he refers to elm trees (not to elm and beech trees) even though if 
he were asked to pick out or identify what he was talking about he could 
not. He would not recognize the elm trees as elm trees (and as distinct 
from beech trees). Such a case is enough to show that reference is not 
a matter of recognizing objects. 
Identification as the individuation or specification of an object 
is very close to what I call determining or fixing a referent. To iden-
tify an object as the referent, in this sense, is to distinguish an 
object as the subject of discourse. To say that a theory of reference 
is a theory of identification, when identification is understood in this 
way, is more acceptable. However, I would reject the view that refer-
ence is merely speaker's identification. When reference is successful, 
some object is identified as the subject of the discourse, but the per-
son or thing doing the identifying need not be the person or thing who 
did the referring. If it is true that both people and words can refer, 
then to speak of reference as speaker's identification would require 
another definition of reference to capture the sense in which words are 
said to refer. 
1 
"The Meaning of Meaning," in Mind, Language, and Reality, pp. 
215-271. See especially pp. 226f. 
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Further, the use of the term 'identification' can be misleading. 
One reason the term 'identification' is misleading is that it has defi-
nite cognitive elements. Identification is primarily a cognitive skill; 
it is something that an intelligent agent does. If this is true, then 
it is difficult to see how words or phrases can refer. On the identifi-
cation model, the referrer, in this case the referring expression, is 
supposed to identify some object. But it seems that words are not the 
kinds of things that are capable of identifying, except derivatively. 
Words identify objects only in the sense that they enable an intelligent 
agent to identify an object. A theory of reference is better off if it 
does not assume without argument that one or the other type of refer-
ence, speaker's or semantic, is primary. It would be better to use a 
neutral concept to characterize reference, a concept such as 'specify' 
or 'determine'. Although 'identification' can be defined as the speci-
fication of an object as the subject of discourse, and is not objection-
able if it is understood in this limited sense, the temptation to ignore 
this stipulation is strong. For this reason I wil 1 avoid the term 
'identification' when characterizing reference and speak instead of 
determining a referent. 
To see reference as identification can also be misleading because 
identification presupposes that the object to be identified is already 
specified in some way. Identification is a success word. That is, one 
can identify the correct object or the wrong object. But to be able to 
identify an object correctly or incorrectly the object must first be 
specified in some way. The identification consists in knowing which 
object matches those specifications or at least in recognizing the spec-
ifications. If we can choose between seeing reference as the determin-
12 
ing of an object to be the subject of discourse and seeing reference as 
the determining of an object to be the subject of discourse along with 
the knowledge or recognition on the part of the speaker that that object 
is the subject of discourse, we sh6uld choose the former, once again 
because it is more neutral than the latter and because it does not cre-
ate difficulties for understanding semantic reference. 
It might be objected that a referent is determined by the very act 
or process of identification, so to identify and to determine a referent 
are actually the same thing. But it should be noted that I am not deny-
ing the possibility that identification of some kind is the mechanism of 
reference. What I am claiming is that even if identification were the 
only mechanism of reference the theory of reference should not presup-
pose without argument that it is. To see the theory of reference as a 
theory of identification at the outset is illegitimate. The explanatory 
goals of the theory should not be defined in terms of a preferred expla-
nation. 
Reference as Communication 
Some theorists view reference as a communicative act. To refer, 
according to this theory, is to communicate to someone the subject of 
one's discourse. And the goal of a theory of reference is to explain 
how the speaker communicates the referent to an audience. This model of 
reference is an identification model which holds that referring is a 
matter of an audience's identification of the subject of discourse. 
It would be wrong to restrict reference to communicative acts, 
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acts with a speaker and an audience. For although in many cases 
reference does serve the purposes of communication, very often a refer-
rer (either a person or a referring expressiorr) does identify an object 
for an audience, nonetheless this is not always the case. The person 
who correctly _says or thinks to himself, "This table sure is wobbly," 
refers to some table, 2 as surely as the person who says the same thing 
to another. Taking the audience out of the picture has no effect on 
reference; it does not make an act of referring or a referring expres-
sion into something else. 
Of course it could be said that there is an audience and a refer-
rer whenever someone talks to himself or thinks out loud. The audience 
in such cases. is the speaker himself. This sounds plausible enough. 
But being one's own audience does not seem to be the same as communicat-
ing with oneself. Real communication, I suspect, requires at least two 
distinct persons. 
Further, if we take reference to be a matter of identifying some 
object for an audience other than the speaker, then we encounter some 
obvious counter-examples. For suppose I say to my student, "The bourse 
in Paris is famous." It would seem that I am referring to the bourse in 
Paris. But if reference is a matter of identifying some object for an 
audience I could have failed to refer. If my student did not know what 
object was being talked about, perhaps she hasn't the slightest idea 
what a bourse is, or she thinks bourse is a kind of· soup, then she would 
not identify the proper object. It would follow, if reference is iden-
tification for an audience, that I had not referred. But this is 
2 The words 'this table' also refer to some table. 
• 
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clearly wrong. Identification, so understood, is not a necessary condi-
tion for reference. 
This counter-example may not be conclusive. For my student may be 
able to identify the object in question in another way; she may identify 
it by aping II!Y referring expression. Thus, she could identify the 
object I was referring to by using the expression, 'the bourse in Par-
is', even though she doesn't know exactly what object that is, or even 
though she thinks the object is soup. However, the counter-example can 
be modified to rule out this type of reply. Instead of saying, "The 
bourse in Paris is famous," to my student I may say it to someone who 
doesn't know English well enough to identify referring terms. Such an 
audience wouldn't even be able to say I was referring to the bourse in 
Paris. Or I may say this to someone who is not paying attention. She 
would not be able to say that I was referring to the bourse in Paris. 
Nonetheless, I would still have referred to the bourse. It follows that 
reference is not primarily a matter of identifying an object for some 
audience other than oneself. 
Reference as Determining a Referent 
Having rejected both the identification and communication models 
of reference, I will understand the primary goal of a theory of refer-
ence to be that of explaining how the referent of an act of referring or 
of a referring expression is determined. A theory of reference should 
tell us what the mechanisms of reference are and how they work. A per-
son's ability to refer and perhaps also her ability to understand the 
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references of others will be explained in terms of these mechanisms. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will develop more fully my con-
ception of a theory of reference as a theory of how reference is deter-
mined. Before doing so I will distinguish two things that the theory of 
reference is concerned to do. Briefly, the theory of reference should 
tell us what things or kinds of things can be used to refer. I have 
already said that people refer and words refer. When people refer they 
do so using some device. Let us call such devices 'referring devices'. 
Some words and combinations of words are referring devices. One task of 
the theory of reference is to identify the types of referring devices. 3 
Another part of the theory of reference, the central part, explains how 
these devices work. It tells us how a referring device (for example a 
definite description) determines a referent. This part of the theory of 
reference is concerned with the mechanisms of reference. 
A referring device is a means of determining a referent (or refer-
ents). The task of identifying the kinds of referring devices is that 
of specifying what kinds of things can or do determine referents, or in 
other words, saying what kinds of things people can and do use to refer. 
What the theory of reference is concerned to do in identifying referring 
devices is to specify the semantically significant elements of a dis-
course, those which affect the truth conditions of a statement. 4 In this 
section I will develop a conception of referring devices that is some-
3 The task of identifying particular devices is left to the linguist. 
They can do so by specifying conditions for a word or phrase's being a 
referring device or by enumerating the devices, or by giving rules for 
generating such devices. 
4 Or satisfaction conditions for a non-indicative sentence. 
16 
what unusual, though not unprecedented. What is unusual about this 
conception is its generality. Theories of reference are often limited 
to an explanation of linguistic reference, to an explanation of how 
pieces of language hook up to the world. The referring devices which 
are considered_ by such theories are linguistic devices. The theory that 
I am developing is not limited to an account of linguistic reference or 
to linguistic referring devices, even though it is primarily concerned 
with such devices. 5 
If something is a referring device, it must satisfy two require-
ments: 1) it must determine or co-determine a referent for a discourse 
and 2) it must affect the truth or satisfaction conditions of a sen-
tence. I shall limit my discussion of referring devices to those that 
are used in a sentence, assuming for the sake of argument that referring 
devices refer only in the context of a sentence. Thus, I will assume 
that the words, 'Winston Churchill' do not refer unless they are used in 
making a statement and, similarly, a photograph of Winston Churchill 
does not refer to Winston Churchill unless the photograph is part of a 
statement. This assumption will help us to form criteria of adequacy 
for a theory of reference. It may turn out that once we understand the 
mechanisms of reference for these devices as they occur in sentences 
that we can drop the restriction. 
It should be noted that the identification of referring devices is 
not an explanation of how referring devices determine a referent. My 
discussion of referring devices does not purport to explain how differ-
5 I will count such things as pictures (in certain contexts), ges-
tures such as pointing, and perhaps even mental images as non-linguistic 
referring devices. 
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ent types of referring devices work. It neither precludes nor presup-
poses explanatory or ontological relations between types of referring 
devices. That is, it.does not presuppose that non-linguistic referring 
devices are the basis for linguistic referring devices, or vice-versa. 
Nor does it pr~suppose that all referring devices are on a par or can be 
explained in the same way. Linguistic and non-linguistic referring 
devices are grouped together on the basis of a functional similarity. 
Both types of devices can determine a referent for a statement or a dis-
course. This functional similarity need not be based on identical mech-
anisms. 
Many kinds of linguistic referring devices have already been iden-
tified. Proper names, definite descriptions, and indexicals are kinds 
of linguistic devices for referring to individuals. 6 Class terms are 
also kinds of linguistic devices for referring. Most of the basic kinds 
of referring terms have already been identified, though there is still 
some controversy over sub-divisions within these general classes. 7 In 
addition to kinds of linguistic referring devices, the theory of refer-
ence should identify any non-linguistic devices for referring that may 
exist. The theory of reference, broadly interpreted, is a theory of how 
referring devices determine a referent, not just a theory of how lin-
guistic devices determine a referent. If non-linguistic devices are 
6 
'Individuals' should be broadly construed. It refers not only to 
individual objects, but also to places, times, events, feelings; in 
short, anything that can be individuated is an individual in this sense. 
7 For example, Keith Donnellan has argued that there are two kinds of 
definite descriptions, attributive and referential. See "Reference and 
Definite Descriptions," The Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp. 
·281-304. 
18 
also used for referring and for making statements, then their 
explanation falls within the scope of the theory of reference. If this 
is. true, there is no non-arbitrary reason for treating non-linguistic 
devices differently from linguistic devices in a theory of reference. 
Non-linguistic devices for referring would be like linguistic 
devices for referring in the relevant respect if they determined a ref-
erent for a statement (or for a segment of discourse). In this section 
I will show that there are such devices by giving examples that fulfill 
this criterion. Later I will argue that a theory of reference which 
recognizes these non-linguistic determinants of reference is in a better 
position to explain linguistic reference than those that do not. 8 
In the following examples, note that sometimes the non-linguistic 
element of the discourse determines the referent of the statement by 
itself. In those cases we see that without the non-linguistic device 
there would be no statement because there would be no referent for the 
discourse. In these examples the function of the non-linguistic refer-
ring device parallels the function of linguistic devices in that 1) 
without the device the discourse has no truth conditions (no statement 
is made); and 2) had the device been different and not co-referential, 
the truth conditions of the statement would have been different. If a 
non-linguistic device fulfills these two conditions, it is semantically 
significant. 
It is possible to determine a referent for a statement without 
using lingusitic devices for referring. For example, an advertisement 
for a Chicago television network consists of a photograph of Alfred 
8 See Chapter Four. 
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Hitchcock and the caption, "is a classic". This combination of photo-
graph and caption makes a statement about something. The subject of the 
statement is determined by the photograph. In this case, the photograph 
is a non-linguistic device which is used to determine the subject of a 
discourse; it is a non-linguistic referring device. Other referring 
devices could have been used to make more or less the same statement. 
Instead of a photograph of Hitchcock the advertisement could have used a 
portrait, or an illustration, or a caricature or Hitchcock. It could 
also have used the words, 'Alfred Hitchcock' . Each of these devices 
would have determined a referent for the statement. 
Gestures, either alone or in conjunction with a linguistic refer-
ring device, can also be used to determine a referent for a statement. 
For example, I stand in front of a classroom waving a book in the air 
and ask, "Red or pink?" I am asking a question about something; there 
is a subject of my sentence. The device I used to determine a referent 
for my sentence was the book-waving gesture. This gesture is another 
non-linguistic referring device. 9 There are other gestures which could 
have determined the same referent. I could have pointed to the book and 
said "Red or pink?" or picked up the book and looked at it while saying 
"Red or pink?" 
Pointing is a gesture that is often used. in conjunction with lin-
guistic referring devices, though it sometimes can determine a referent 
alone. The pointing gesture should be considered semantically signifi-
cant when used with linguistic referring devices if the referent of the 
9 Note that how it determines a referent is not in question here, 
only whether it determines a referent. 
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statement would have been different had the pointing gesture been 
different. For example, if I say "That is pretty," while pointing to a 
picture, the referent would be the picture. Had I said the same thing 
while pointing to something else, say a coffee cup, the referent would 
have been different. The difference in reference, and thus in truth 
conditions is due to the difference in the gesture, not to any differ-
ence in linguistic devices. Since the gesture does directly affect ref-
erence and truth conditions it should be considered semantically signif-
icant. 10 
It might be argued that mental images or other intentional states 
can directly affect the truth conditions of a statement. If this is 
true, then these images and states would also be semantically signifi-
cant. 
In the preceding paragraphs, I have identifed several different 
non-linguistic referring devices. What is significant about these 
devices is that they determine a referent for a discourse. In Chapter 
Four, I wi 11 argue that such devices should be recognized as determi-
nants of reference even within the context of a theory of linguistic 
reference. For if they are not recognized, the linguistic device (espe-
cially in the case when two devices are being exploited) is given the 
full burden of determining reference. In some cases, for example with 
10 Howard Wettstein, in "How to Bridge the Gap between Meaning and 
Reference, Synthese, vol. 58 (1984) 63-84, develops a theory of demon-
stratives in which he agrees that a gesture such as pointing can deter-
mine or at least co-determine a referent. Wettstein calls non-linguis-
tic cues semantically significant if they are the cues that the speaker 
relied on to communicate his referent (p. 72) or the cues which he, to 
all appearances, exploits (p. 73). For further discussion of his 
theory, see Chapter Four. 
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demonstratives and other indexicals, blindness to non-linguistic 
determinants of reference leads to an inaccurate picture of how the lin-
guistic device works. · 
Once we have identified referring devices, we can begin to explain 
how reference is determined. Referring devices are those devices which 
determine a referent for a statement or a segment of discourse. The 
theory of reference is primarily an account of how referring devices do 
this. One way to develop an account of how referring devices determine 
a referent is to formulate a set of reference rules. T~ese rules would 
determine a function from a referring device to the item which is its 
referent. For example, one might explain how proper names determine a 
referent by stating the reference rule for proper names. Some proposed 
rules have been: 1) the referent of a proper name is that individual who 
satisfies the descriptive content associated with that name, 11 and 2) 
the referent of a proper name is that individual who is called by that 
name in the relevant linguistic community. These rules purport to tell 
us how any given proper name determines a referent for a discourse. 
What is presupposed in such accounts is that there is some rule which 
governs the operation of a referring device and that the referring 
device determines a referent because there is a relation of the type 
specified by the rule between the device and its referent. 
An account of reference which attempts to explain how referring 
devices determine reference by discovering the mechanisms of reference 
looks for those relations which underlie the reference relation. The 
reference of referring devices is explained in terms of these more basic 
11 This is (roughly) the descriptivist theory of proper names. 
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relations which are expressed as reference rules. 12 The reference of an 
~ of referring is explained in terms of the device (or devices) the 
speaker uses to make a statement and the reference rule (or rules) for 
that device (or those devices). Sometimes a speaker refers to an obj~ct 
covertly (e.g., by making a statement silently to herself) and then 
refers to another object overtly (e.g., by making a different statement 
out loud). In each case, the referent of the act of referring depends 
on the device that was used to refer. What the referent is, in each 
case, depends on, or is detemined by, how that referring device works. 
We can understand the difference between semantic reference and 
speaker's reference in terms of two different acts of referring. In the 
case of semantic reference, the speaker refers by using publicly observ-
able referring devices (e.g., spoken or written words, gestures such as 
pointing, etc.); in speaker's reference, the speaker refers by using 
non-observable referring devices (e.g., silent words, images, etc.). A 
speaker's intended referent, when it is different from the referent of 
the observable referring devices she uses, is the referent of the non-
observable referring device she uses in making a statement she believes 
is equivalent to the observable sentence she produces. However, the 
situation can be (and usually is) somewhat more complicated than this. 
A person may use two different referring devices in conjunction with one 
act of predication. For example, she may refer to a certain object by 
12 There are other types of theories of reference which do not 
explain reference in terms of mechanisms of reference. For example, 
disquotational theories of reference, although they give rules of refer-
ence, do not account for reference in terms of mechanisms of reference. 
A typical reference rule for a disquotat ional theory would be: "Cat" 
refers to cat. No underlying relation between the referring device, 
"cat", and its referent, cat, is postulated. 
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means of a perceptual image of it while saying out loud, "That tree sure 
b • II is 1g. She uses two referring devices, the perceptual image and the 
words 'that tree' , in conjunct ion with the words 'sure is big' . Here 
also there would be a difference between semantic reference and speak-
er' s reference. The semantic reference of the act of referring is 
determined by the reference rules governing the expression 'that tree'; 
the speaker's reference of the act of referring is determined by the 
reference rules governing perceptual images. 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to discover whether and 
to what extent a speaker's intentions to refer determine the referent of 
the words or expressions she uses. What we want to know is whether, in 
the reference rules for linguistic referring devices, 13 some reference 
should be made to the speaker's intended reference. Whether a speaker's 
intended reference should be part of the reference rule for a linguistic 
referring device depends on whether such a reference rule best explains 
how the referent of that device is determined. 
In the next chapter I will develop criteria of adequacy for a 
theory of reference. I will say under what conditions a reference rule 
for a referring device (or kind of device) is acceptable. In the 
remaining chapters I will consider and evaluate theories of reference. 
The role that intentions to refer should play in a theory of reference 
will be the role they do play in the best explanation of how reference 
is determined. 
13 Or more generally, in the reference rules for publicly observable 
referring devices. 
CHAPTER II 
CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY FOR A THEORY OF REFERENCE 
In Chapter One we argued that a theory of reference should tell us 
how the reference of referring devices is determined by giving reference 
rules for these devices. In the following chpaters we will be examining 
different theories of how reference is determined in order to discover 
whether and to what extent a speaker's intention to refer (or, in some 
cases, speakers' intentions to refer) play a role in determining refer~ 
ence. However, before we evaluate particular accounts of reference, we 
should develop some general criteria of adequacy for a theory of refer-
ence. These criteria will provide general guidelines for criticizing 
the theories we will be considering.· 
In ~eveloping our criteria of adequacy we should look for criteria 
which would be accepted by the proponents of any theory of reference 
which attempts to explain how reference is determined by providing ref-
erence rules for different types of referring devices. These criteria 
should be as uncontroversial as possible. 
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Criterion One 
One criterion for a correct theory of reference that should be 
uncontroversial is as follows: 
A reference rule for expression-type ~ is adequate only if, for any 
expression. ~ of type ~' the rule correctly specifies (or predicts) 
the referent of e. 
The idea behind this criterion is that if one has the correct 
theory of reference, then one will be able to 'predict' the referent of 
each expression for which all the relevant features are specified and 
known. That is, if a theory of reference is correct, it will identify 
the correct referent given the proper information. If one has all the 
relevant information required by the theory and is still unable car-
· rectly to identify the referent, then there is something wrong with the 
theory. 
Failure to meet this specification, however, does not mean that a 
theory of reference is hopelessly misguided. If the theory is incom-
plete, it will not meet this requirement. Of course an incomplete 
theory is not an adequate one, but the theory may be on the right track. 
One should not reject an approach to or a picture of reference just 
because it is incomplete. However, if a theory is purportedly complete, 
then failure to fulfill this criterion would indicate that something was 
amiss. 
Using this criterion to criticize a theory of reference is diffi-
cult because in order to use it we must be able to compare the predicted 
referent to the 'actual' or 'correct' referent. To compare the pre-
dieted referent to the correct one, we must have some independent 
grounds for saying that something is the correct referent. Suppose we 
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were to argue that, according to the theory of reference we opposed, the 
referent of expression E would be ~' but that, in fact, the referent 
is y, therefore the theory must be wrong. For the argument to succeed, 
we must have some theory-neutral way of discovering the correct refer-
ent. If our sole grounds for saying that the correct referent is y 
were that, according to our preferred theory, the referent would be y, 
our argument would fail. There might be other grounds for preferring 
our own theory, but the fact that the two theories have different impli-
cations does not, in itself, provide a justification for rejecting 
either of the theories. 
We might appeal to ordinary linguistic practices or linguistic 
intuitions. We can argue that the man on the street would take the ref-
erent to be y, or that our linguistic intuitions, untainted by commit-
ment to a particular theory of reference or other philosophical hobby-
horse, would lead us to believe that y is the referent. Arguments of 
this sort will work only if the intuitions are clear and uncontroversial 
or the man in the street's response is actually a good reflection of 
common linguistic know 1 edge. And even then, the ar gum en t w i 11 not be 
conclusive. For the man on the street can sometimes give unjustified 
and even bizarre reports and intuitions can unwittingly be tainted by 
theory. 
In summary, failure to meet this first criterion can indicate a 
theory's incompleteness. It can also indicate that the theory is wrong. 
But if we want to argue that a theory picks out the wrong thing as the 
referent of an expression, we must show not only what the correct refer-
ent is, but also why that should be considered the correct referent. 
We can see more clearly the legitimate and illegitimate employment 
• 
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of this criterion in criticizing a theory of reference by looking at 
some cases where it is applied. For example, this criterion is cor-
rectly applied in the criticism of a certain version of the causal 
theory of reference. Gareth Evans argues that the referent of a proper 
name cannot b~ determined by tracing a chain of references to a naming 
ceremony (given that each person in the chain intends to use the terms 
to refer to that individual to which the person from whom he first 
learned the term referred) . 1 For if this type of chain of references 
were what determined the referent of a name, then the name 'Madagascar', 
for example, should refer to some part of the African mainland. How-
ever, 'Madagascar' actually refers to an island off the coast of Africa. 
Since even the proponents of this version of the causal theory of names 
would agree that 'Madagascar' refers to an island off the coast of 
Africa, we may conclude that there is something wrong with this version 
of the causal theory of names. 
A similar criticism can be levelled against a certain descripti-
vist theory of reference. 2 According to this version, the referent of a 
referring expression, as it is used by a particular person, is deter-
mined by what the speaker had in mind when using the expression. This 
version would say that the referent of a natural kind term, as it is 
used by a particular speaker, is the set of objects that fit or satisfy 
that speaker's mental representation of the objects. Now suppose that 
someone who does not know the difference between beeches and elms says, 
1 Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 47, pp. 187-208. 
2 The example is taken from Hilary Putnam. He does not use it in 
precisely this way, but it is apt. 
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"Elm trees are subject to dutch elm disease." In this sentence, 'elm 
trees' refers to elm trees, that seems uncontroversial. But, by 
hypothesis, there are· no ideas, images, concepts or other representa-
tions that the speaker has about elm trees which he doesn't also have 
about beech trees. What satisfies his mental representation of elm 
trees (if anything), are both elm and beech trees. So, according to the 
theory in question, elm trees would refer to beech and elm trees. Since 
'elm trees' refers only to elm trees, there must be something wrong with 
the theory. 
This argument fails. The sense in which it is uncontroversial 
that 'elm trees' refers to elm trees is not the same sense in which it 
is uncontroversial that 'elm trees' as this speaker uses it refers to 
elm trees. It could be argued that the speaker uses the expression 'elm 
trees' to refer to elephants (under certain conditions). Similarly, he 
could use this expression to refer to elm and beech trees. If the 
speaker is not using this expression as an expression of English, then 
our knowledge of what ·'elm trees' refers to in English does not justify 
our saying that the referent of 'elm trees' as this expression is used 
by this speaker is elm trees. In fact, there seem to be no clear intui-
tions about what 'elm trees', as it is used by this particular speaker, 
refers to. Even the speaker may not be able to tell us what 'elm trees' 
refers to as she uses it. 
In applying criterion one, our linguistic intuitions ~bout what an 
expression refers to in English can only be used to discredit theories 
which purport to explain how the reference of English expressions is 
determined. Our linguistic intuitions about what an expression.as used 
by any arbitrary English speaker refers to can only be used to criticize 
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theories which purport to explain how the reference of an expression as 
used by any arbitrary speaker of English is determined. Using criterion 
one; it will be difficult to discredit a theory that purports to tell 
how the reference of a referring expression, as used ~ _§! particular 
speaker, is de~ermined, for we have few, if any, clear, theory-neutral 
intuitions about the reference of such expressions. It will not be 
impossible to apply this criterion. If, for example, it were ascer-
tained that the speaker uses a particular expression as an English 
expression, then we would expect the reference of the expression as the 
speaker uses it to be the same as the reference of the expression in 
English. In that case our intuitions about English will be an indepen-
dent ground for saying that something is the correct referent. 
Criterion Two 
A second uncontroversial criterion of adequacy for a theory of 
reference is taken from Gareth Evans. 3 This criterion states what I take 
to be an (almost) universal view of the relation of reference to truth 
in extentional contexts. The criterion can be stated as follows: 
A theory of reference is adequate only if it is such that for any 
statement of the form '~ is f', if what the theory identifies as the 
referent of the statement actually is f then the statement must be 
true. 
The criterion simply requires that reference play a role in determining 
3 Evans states the criterion differently, and in a more controversial 
form. Evan says that for a statement of the form 's is P' if what the 
speaker refers to is P, then it follows that the statement is true. 
Evans thereby assumes that the speaker's referent and the semantic ref-
erent are always the same. 
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the truth conditions of sentences of this form. This is a requirement 
that intentionalists and non-intentionalists alike would accept. 4 
Criticism of theories of reference which claim that the theory 
fails to meet this requirement are subject to the same kind of limita-
tions as those based on the first criterion. The problem again is find-
ing a neutral position. With the first criterion, what was required was 
some alternative, neutral way of identifying the correct referent. In 
applying this second criterion what is required is a neutral way of 
deciding what statement is made and whether the statement is true. 
It may seem, at first, that the critic is on firmer ground in 
applying this criticism. For there do seem to be ways of determining 
the truth of a statement which are neutral with respect to the theory of 
reference one employs. A competent botanist, for example, can tell 
whether the statement, "Elm trees are subject to dutch elm disease," is 
true without taking any stands on the correct theory of reference. And 
anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of English knows that the statement, 
"Elm trees are elm trees," is true. 
However, one cannot determine whether a statement is true, no mat-
ter how clever one may be, if one does not know what statement is being 
made. What statement is made depends, in part, on what the referents of 
referring expressions within that statement are. So once again, criti-
cizing a theory for failing t~ meet the requirements of the second cri-
terion requires a theory-neutral way of identifying the correct refer-
ent. Here again, whether a theory meets this criterion depends on what 
4 Intentionalist theories would not be as likely to accept Evans cri-
terion because of its equation of speaker and semantic reference. 
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claim is being made. We cannot assume that the statement that is made 
is necessarily the same as the statement that is made by using those 
words as an English sentence. 
Failure to take account of non-standard usages would yield very 
curious result~. For consider the following case. Let us say that two 
spies make up a code according to which 'the big red bear' will refer to 
a certain high-ranking Soviet official. Spy number one makes the state-
ment, "The big red bear is in Washington, D. C." Suppose the Soviet 
official actually is in Washington, D. C. , but that there are no red 
bears, big or little, in Washington. According to the criterion is 
question, can a theory which says that the referent of 'the big red 
bear' is a high-ranking Soviet official be correct? If it can, then the 
truth of the statement must follow from the facts that the speaker was 
referring to a high-ranking Soviet official and that that person was 
indeed in Washington. However, if we do not allow for non-standard 
usages, then the truth of the statement "The big red bear is in Washing-
ton," does not follow from these facts, since there is no big red bear 
in Washington. Therefore, the statement couldn't be true. 
I think that we would want to say that the sentence is true. But 
if we insist that the statement be interpreted literally, that is, in 
accordance with standard, dictionary English, then it will be false. 
However, I doubt that anyone would be tempted to say that any theory of 
reference which identifies the high ranking Soviet official as the ref-
erent of "the big red bear" is inadequate on the grounds that there were 
no big red bears in Washington, D.C. when the statement was made. 
Once again, in applying this criterion we must be careful.to note 
the claim that is being made. Our intuitions about truth conditions for 
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English sentences are irrelebant if we are evaluating theories of refer-
ence for sentences which are not in English. Intuitions about truth 
conditions for sentences which in a private language tend to be less 
clear and less neutral than necessary for a conclusive refutation of a 
theory of reference for that language. 
Criterion Three 
A third criterion of adequacy for a theory of reference might be 
as follows: 
A reference rule for an expression E in a language 1 is adequate 
only if should the rule predict the referent of expression ~ is x, 
then we will find that competent speakers of L use E to refer to x 
and take other competent speakers of 1 to refer to x with E. 
This criterion should be uncontroversial. The idea behind it is that 
competent speakers are those speakers who use the language (including 
its referring expressions) correctly. It is by looking at the linguis-
tic behavior of competent speakers of a language that we discover what 
the expressions of that language refer to. Or, more precisely, it is by 
looking at the linguistic behavior of speakers who are competent in the 
use of a particular referring expression, or who have mastered the use 
of that expression, that we discover the correct referent of that 
express ion. A correct reference rule for an express ion in a language 
should predicat that x is the referent of E if and only if those who 
have mastered the expression refer to ~ when they use it. We might 
also argue that if the mechanism by which a referent of an expression is 
determined is expressed by a reference rule for that expression, then 
understanding that expression's reference potential consists in knowl-
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edge of this rule. For example, if definite descriptions determine a 
referent according to the Russellian rule, i.e., the referent of a defi-
nite description is the unique individual who satisfies the description, 
then my understanding of a definite description consists in my knowledge 
of this rule. 5 But this claim is controversial and we need not make it. 
To test a reference rule for an expression in a language by using 
this criterion, we would compare a competent speakers actual linguistic 
behavior to the behavior we would expect if her understanding of the 
expression consisted in her knowing the proposed reference rule. If a 
competent speaker's understanding of a referring expression conflicts 
with the understandi_ng she would have if her understanding consisted in 
recognition of a proposed reference rule, then the proposed reference 
rule is called into question. That is, we would have grounds for 
rejected a .reference rule if a competent speaker understands an expres-
sion as referring to one thing, while the proposed rule of reference 
specifies some other thing as the referent. 
On the face of it this looks like a perfectly legitimate and 
straightforward way of evaluating a theory of reference for expressions 
in a language. However, in applying this criterion we encounter diffi-
culties, for to do so legitimately, we must be able to identify compe-
tent speakers without begging the question. Depending on how we iden-
tify competent speakers, it may also be necessary to distinguish when a 
5 This is somewhat oversimplified. My understanding of a particular 
definite description would consist in my knowledge of the particular 
rule of reference for that description. For example, I understand the 
expression, "the man in room 29 wearing a flannel shirt," by knowing the 
rule: the referent of 'the man in room 29 wearing a flannel shirt' is 
the unique individual who is the man in room 29 wearing a flannel shirt. 
• 
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competent speaker's linguistic behavior accords with her knowledge of 
the language and when it does not, since even a competent speaker can 
occasionally make mistakes. 
We must avoid begging the question of which theory of reference is 
correct when w~ identify competent speakers. If we identify competent 
speakers as those whose linguistic behavior conforms to our expecta-
tions, and our expectations are, in turn, based on what we take to be 
the correct rules of reference, then we will obviously not get indepen-
dent confirmation of our hypothesis concerning particular mechanisms of 
reference. Unless our hypothesis is so crazy that no one uses referring 
devices the way we expect them to, the hypothesis concerning mechanisms 
will inevitably be confirmed by the linguistic practices of all compe-
tent speakers of the language. They will be confirmed because we have 
ruled out of consideration the people who do not act as the rule pre-
diets by denying that they are competent speakers or that they have mas-
tered the device in question. 
Judgments of linguistic competence or mastery are often made by 
comparing expected linguistic behavior to actual behavior. In his 
paper, "Individualism and the Mental," Tyler Burge tells a story about a 
person suffering from arthritis. 6 This person, let's call him Art, has 
had arthritis for some time and has used the term, 'arthritis' in con-
nection with his own condition, his father's condition, similar condi-
tions of other elderly people, etc. He has made statements about 
arthritis using the term 'arthritis,' and he has interpreted the state-
6 Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental", Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, IV (1979), pp. 73-121. 
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ments of his doctor and others which contained the word, 'arthritis'. 
However, during one of his visits to the doctor, Art remarks that his 
arthritis has spread to his thigh. If we believe that the reference 
rule for 'arthritis' is as follows, "Something is the referent of 'ar-
thritis' if and only if it is an inflammation of the joints," then Art's 
linguistic behavior will indicate that he has not mastered the English 
expression 'arthritis'. If he had, he would not have used this expres-
sion to refer to an ache in his muscle. The important thing to note in 
this case is that if we judge Art's linguistic competence or mastery in 
this way, that is, by noting whether his linguistic behavior conforms to 
predictions of how he should (or should not) behave, then we are basing 
our judgments on some rule of reference. The judgment that he should 
have behaved in such and such a way can only be based on some rule, in 
this case, a rule of reference. 
This method of judging competence or mastery is fairly standard. 
If someone calls a cat a horse, or says, "Horse!" in the presence of 
cats and absence of horses, we tend to think that he has not mastered 
the term, 'horse'. If someone calls Ronald Reagan "Paris, France," or 
says, "The president of the United States is Paris France," we would 
conclude that she has not mastered the name, 'Paris, France' (unless we 
had evidence to indicate that the speaker was mentally unsound or had 
crazy beliefs or had not mastered 'the president of the United States'). 
We may also challenge someone's claim to have mastered a particu-
lar referring device if they cannot do things we would expect a person 
who has mastered that device to do. For example, we may expect a person 
who has mastered the term 'elm tree' not only to make statements about 
elm trees but also to represent truth conditions for statements about 
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elm trees in such a way that his being able to represent these truth 
conditions entails his ability to determine whether there is an elm tree 
in his field of vision. 
What is behind this judgment of mastery is very likely a reference 
rule which sa~s something like: the referent of 'elm tree' is that 
object which matches a certain mental template or satisfies a certain 
descriptive content in the mind. If the reference rule for 'elm tree' 
was quite different, for example, "The referent of 'elm tree' is what-
ever botanists call elm trees," then it would no longer make sense to 
judge a non-botanist's mastery of the term 'elm tree' by whether that 
person could tell there was an elm tree in her field of vision. 
It may well be that comparing actual to expected behavior, espe-
cially linguistic behavior, is a legitimate way of determining whether a 
person has mastered a referring device. In fact, I suspect it is the 
only legitimate way. However, if mastery is tested in this way, then we 
cannot pretend that the actual linguistic practices of speakers who have 
mastered linguistic devices can provide independent empirical evidence 
for the correctness or incorrectness of a particular account of refer-
ence. As long as a particular account of reference is presupposed by 
the judgement of competence or mastery, the practices of competent 
speakers will not be an independent, empirical check on the theory of 
reference. 
What is needed, if the actual linguistic practices of competent 
speakers are to provide conclusive, theory-independent empirical evi-
dence for one account of reference and count as conclusive counter-exam-
ples to some other account, is a theory-neutral way of judging compe-
tence. Can such a way be found? 
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One possibility is to judge the competence of any particular 
speaker by whether her linguistic behavior is similar to most speakers' 
practices. 7 That is, we could define a competent speaker as one whose 
linguistic behavior is the same as that of the majority of other speak-
ers belonging to the same linguistic community and who are in similar 
circumstances. This would be a theory-neutral definition of competence. 
Moreover, with this definition we can judge incompetent the speakers who 
seem obviously incompetent. The person who says "Look at that horse!" 
in the presence of a cat and the absence of a horse has clearly not mas-
tered the use of the English term 'horse', since the majority of Eng-
lish-speakers would not say "Look at that horse!" under those condi-
tions. This criterion has some intuitive appeal. 
However, this criterion will not work. One reason to reject it is 
that it cannot be neutral with respect to rules of reference. It can be 
argued that the bias would be incorporated into the criterion for mem-
bership in a linguistic community. If inclusion in a certain linguistic 
community involves using sounds or inscriptions in the same way as oth-
ers use those sounds or notations, or something similar to this, and if 
the basis for sameness of use is accepting or operating according to the 
same reference rules, then the criterion for mastery fails to be neu-
tral. 
Another reason to reject this majoritarian criterion is that it is 
difficult to apply. Consider this case, for example. Having an elm 
tree in one's field of vision may be a circumstance that many people 
7 This criterion for mastery requires that we assume the majority of 
speakers have mastered the device in question. As we shall see, this 
assumption is problematic. 
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find themselves in. If this is the kind of circumstance we are inter-
ested in, then we would ask, "What do the majority of speakers say in 
such circumstances?" If we were to find some one thing, or even a lim-
ited range of things, that the majority of English-speakers who found 
themselves in this circumstance said, I should be very surprised. The 
mere presence of elm trees in one's field of vision is too undefined a 
situation to prompt any pattern of linguistic behavior common to a 
majority of English-speakers. 
However, it is possible to define the situation more precisely by 
adding to the mere presence of an elm tree in the field of vision the 
question, "Yes or no? do you see an elm tree?" 8 Since there is only a 
limited range of responses to this situation, we might reasonably expect 
a pattern of responses to emerge. The respondents can say either II II yes, 
or "no" or "I don't know," or they could remain silent. It is likely 
that a majority of them, if they are acting in good faith, would respond 
in one of these ways, so we could determine who had mastered the sen-
tence and its referring terms and who had not. 
However, even if we had overcome the difficulty of picking out the 
members of a linguistic community in a neutral way, and had satisfacto-
rily defined the situation, there would still be a problem with the 
majoritarian criterion for mastery. For if it is possible that a major-
ity of speakers in a linguistic community have not mastered some refer-
ring device, then the fact that a person's linguistic practices con-
formed to those of the majority would have no bearing on whether she had 
8 This would be in accordance with Quine' s suggestions in _W_b_r_d _a_n_d 
Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), and _T_h_e _R_o_o_t_s 
of Reference (La.Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1973). 
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mastered that device. 
Consider what could happen, for example, if the majority of Eng-
lish speakers had not ·mastered the use of the term 'elm tree'. Suppose 
for the sake of argument that mastery of the term entails being able to 
identify elm t+ees when they are present, and suppose that most people 
do not know the difference between beeches and elms. Each person polled 
is in the situation described above--that is, there is an elm tree in 
each person's field of vision and the person is asked the question, "Yes 
or no? do you see an elm tree?" It is possible that the result of the 
poll would show that the majority of people do not think they see an elm 
tree. Suppose most of them guessed, and the majority guessed incor-
rectly. The majoritarian criterion would say that those people who 
answered "no" had mastered the use of the expression, when, by hypothe-
sis, they had not. 
It might be objected that such a pattern of responses could not 
arise unless most of the people polled acted in bad faith. If the peo-
ple were truthful, those who did not know whether there was an elm tree 
in their field of vision should have answered, "I don't know," rather 
than "yes" or II II no. 
There are at least two ways of replying to this objection. One is 
to point out the fact that people are often willing to give information 
when they don't really know what they're talking about, and they do so 
sincerely (that is, with no intention to deceive or to play a trick).· 
Many people have found this to be the case when they have asked direc-
tions in a big city. On the basis of experiences like this, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that there are people who would prefer ariswering 
a question incorrectly to admitting ignorance. It is also quite common 
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that people think they know the answer to a question when in fact they 
do not. So it could be that the people being polled about elm trees 
answered in good faith, in the sense that they did not intend to lie and 
were willing to answer the question to the best of their ability. None-
theless, the m~jority happened to answer incorrectly. 
Even if it were not possible that the majority of language users 
would, in good faith, answer incorrectly in a situation like the one 
described above, the majoritarian criterion would still fail correctly 
to identify those speakers who had mastered the referring devices in the 
sentence, "Yes or no, is there an elm tree in your field of vision?" 
Suppose that the majority of speakers did not know whether the tree in 
front of them was an elm tree and they also knew that they didn't know, 
so they responded "I don't know." Could the majoritarian criterion cor-
rectly identify those speakers who had mastered the referring device, 
'elm tree'? If the criterion is applied straightforwardly, then those 
who answered, "I don't know," wil 1 be the ones who have mastered the 
sentence, since their practice corresponds to that of the majority of 
same language users. But, by hypothesis, mastery required being able to 
identify elm trees when they were present. 
If those who answered "I don't know," are dropped from the pool of 
respondents, then it is again possible that those people who think they 
know an elm tree when they see one, but who do not, will outnumber those 
who actually do know an elm tree when they see one. In either case, the 
majoritarian criterion would fail to identify correctly people who had 
mastered the referring device. 
In summary, a majoritarian criterion of mastery which says· that a 
person has mastered a referring device if his linguistic behavior is the 
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same as that of the majority of same language speakers in similar cir-
cumstances will probably not be neutral with respect to rules of refer-
ence. Even if it is",· it will still fail to be an accurate test of mas-
tery if there are referring expressions which the majority of speakers 
have not maste~ed. 
A majoritarian criterion for mastery would also run into difficul-
ties if there were expressions which people would use only in situations 
which occurred very rarely or in situations which were essentially pri-
vate (if the~e are any). In such situations one cannot determine what 
the majority of people actually do say, for the majority never find 
themselves in that situation. 
A criterion for mastery which identifies competent speakers on the 
basis of what the majority of same-language users would say (as opposed 
to what they actually do say) will fail to be neutral. 9 To predict what 
the majority of same language users would say in a well-defined situ-
ation, one must have some notion of the right thing to say in that situ-
ation, or at least of the most ·understandable or appropriate thing to 
say in that situation. The standard of correctness or appropriateness 
must be some kind of prescriptive rule, if the prediction is to have any 
justificaiion. So in this case also a rule of reference is presupposed 
in the criterion for mastery. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the theory 
of reference cannot be understood as a set of hypotheses on one hand and 
a set of linguistic practices on the other, such that we need only to 
9 For a full development of this point see John Biro, "Intentionalism 
in the Theory of Meaning," The Monist, 62 (1979), pp. 238-259. 
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look at linguistic practices to see whether our theory is correct. A 
theory of reference cannot be empirical if being empirical means there 
are theory-neutral observations of actual linguistic practices which 
confirm or disconfirm hypotheses about the rules of reference which 
inform these pr_actices. One cannot observe linguistic practices as lin-
guistic practices without presupposing the correctness of some rules of 
reference. 
Although the actual linguistic practices of competent speakers of 
a language do not provide theory-neutral data against which a proposed 
theory of reference can be tested, the theory of reference obviously 
cannot be evaluated independently of these practices. The relation 
between linguistic practices and hypotheses about the rules of reference 
is much like the relation between any other empirical data and hypoth-
eses. There is a give and take. Actual linguistic practices are the 
bases for provisional hypothese about rules of reference; these hypoth-
eses, in turn, guide us in the evaluation of actual linguistic prac-
tices. In the theory of reference we try to adjust the two to get the 
best possible fit. Neither is given absolute authority. Actual lin-
guistic practices may convince us that our hypotheses about the rules of 
reference are wrong. Generally well-supported hypotheses about rules of 
reference may tell us that a particular linguistic act (either a choice 
of referring device or an interpretation of some device) is incorrect. 
CHAPTER III 
DISAMBIGUATING REFERENCE 
In the preceding chapters I have discussed what an acceptable 
theory of reference is supposed to do and how such a theory can be 
tested. I have argued that we should conceive of the theory of refer-
ence as a theory of reference determination rather than as a theory of 
identification or a theory of communication. I proposed that the theory 
of reference determination be developed in terms of referring devices 
and mechanisms of reference. The mechanisms of reference are to be 
expressed as reference rules of the following form: The referent of 
device D is whatever 'y's, or the referent of Q is whatever stands in 
relation R to D. I then developed my position on how a theory of refer-
ence should (and can) be tested. 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to show what role inten-
tions to refer should play in a theory of reference. In terms of this 
purpose the preceding chapters have merely been stage setting. My gen-
eral strategy for working out the proper place of mental intentions in a 
theory of reference is to distinguish two roles that mental intentions 
have played in theories of reference. By looking at intentions in terms 
of these different roles, we shall get some insight into the motivations 
for and virtues of intentionalist theories. We shall also see where 
criticisms of intentionalist theories are most cogent. It will be help-
ful to look at the role mental intentions play in theories of reference 
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in terms of two explanatory tasks--(1) the task of explaining how refer-
ring expressions get the reference potential they have, and (2) the task 
of explaining how the· referent of an expression which can be used to 
refer to more than one thing actually refers to only one thing on an 
occasion of use--since both the justifications for and the criticisms of 
theories which rely on mental intentions usually relate to one or the 
other of these tasks (but not necessarily to both). 
We can categorize most theories of reference by looking at which 
of these tasks they perform. For example, description theories of names 
such as those of Frege, Russell, and Searle, which claim that there is 
associated with each name a description or group of descriptions which 
the referent must satisfy, are primarily concerned to explain the refer-
ence-potential of proper names. According to these theories, it is 
because there is some description associated with the name 'Aristotle' 
which some individual (namely, Aristotle) satisfies (or satisfies more 
fully than any other individual) that the name 'Aristotle' can be used 
to refer to Aristotle. These theories do not tell us what the actual 
referent of a use of the name 'Aristotle' is when 'Aristotle' is associ-
ated with several distinct sets of descriptions. According to these 
theories, the name 'Aristotle' is associated with a_ description of the 
Greek philosopher and Aristotle is the referent of 'Aristotle' because 
he satisfies that description. 
However, 'Aristotle_' may also associated with a description of my 
cat, and with a description of the Greek shipping tycoon. In each case 
the fact that the referent satisfies most of the descriptions associated 
with the name is supposed to explain why that object is a possible ref-
erent of the name use. These descriptivist theories tell us nothing 
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about which possible referent of an expression is the actual referent of 
a use of that expression. 
Of course an answer in the descriptivist spirit is easy enough to 
produce. We could propose, for example, a limited descriptivist theory 
which says tha~ the actual referent of a use of an expression is the 
object which satisfies the description the speaker had in mind, or which 
the speaker currently associates with the name. However, this elabora-
tion is not an essential part of the description theory of proper names, 
and should be evaluated separately. 
Reference Potential and Reference Disambiguation 
One role that mental intentions play in theories of reference is 
that of providing a principle of disambiguation. Intentions have some-
times been used to explain how a term which could, according to the 
rules of the language, be used to refer to more than one thing, actually 
refers to only one of these things on an occasion of use. Many refer-
ring devices can be used to refer to more than one thing. For example, 
the name 'Aristotle' can refer to the Greek philosopher but also to the 
cat I named Aristotle. When r·say "Aristotle was very good at figuring 
things out," I could be referring to either Aristotle the philosopher or 
Aristotle the cat. What I am referring to, according to intentionalist 
theories, is determined by what I had in mind, which individual I 
intended to refer to, in addition to whatever it is that determines the 
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possible referents of 'Aristotle' (usually, linguistic conventions). 1 
Thus, one of the roles intentions have played in the theory of reference 
is to explain how refe·rence is disambiguated. 
A second role that mental intentions have played in theories of 
reference (and more generally, in theories of meaning) is to explain how 
words and symbols get their significance. Mental intentions are brought 
into the explanation of the linguistic rules themselves. According to 
some theorists, the rules which govern the use of referring devices must 
be explained in terms of intentions to use these referring devices in a 
certain way. An intentionalist theory of reference potential says that 
'Aristotle' can refer to Aristotle the philosopher and Aristotle the cat 
because the speaker uses this name with the intention to refer to these 
objects with the name. 2 Some intentionalist theories leave the notion of 
intending to refer unanalyzed. Others have attempted to analyze it in 
terms of a) the speaker's identifying an object through some mental con-
tent and b) the speaker's trying to communicate to an audience which 
object she had thus identified. 3 When intending to refer is analyzed in 
1 I will leave the two notions, 'having in mind' and 'intending to 
refer' rather vague here. They will be spelled out more fully within 
the discussions of satisfaction theories and causal theories of disam-
biguation as well as in the discussion of reference potential. See the 
remainder of this chapter, Chapter Six and Chapter Eight. 
2 Of course the intentionalist story of how referring expressions get 
their reference potential is much more complicated. Examples of inten-
tionalist theories -Of reference potential would be the view developed by 
David Lewis in Convention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 
and that of H.P. Grice in "Meaning," Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), 
pp. 377-388, and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Word Meaning," 
Foundations of Language, 4 (1968), pp. 225-242. These theories will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
3 One could argue that Searle's position in Intentionality: An Essay 
in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1983), 
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this way, the intentionalist can explain reference potential in terms of 
mental contents associated with the name. These contents may be a sin-
gle identifying description· for each object to which the name can refer, 
along the lines of Russell's theory of names. Or they can be a cluster 
of descriptions which are satisfied by the potential referent, along 
the lines of Searle' s proposal in "Proper Names. 114 The mental contents 
can also be non-discursive or non-conceptual, for example, mental images 
and perceptual images. What is common to all intentionalist theories is 
that the mechanism of reference, the relation which underlies the refer-
ence relation is one in which referring devices are linked to some men-
tal . intention, and it is by virtue of this link that a referent is 
determined for that referring device. 
If we divide the explanatory roles mental intentions have played 
in theories of reference in this way, then we can distinguish two corre-
sponding explanatory tasks for a theory of reference. The two tasks 
that a theory of reference must perform are as follows: (1) it must 
explain how the actual referent of a particular use of a referring 
device is determined and (2) it must explain how the possible referents 
of a referring device are determined. 
What we have then is a two-part theory. We explain how reference 
is determined in terms of linguistic conventions or rules which impose 
constraints on uses of referring expressions. Although there is consid-
erable disagreement about what ·these rules are like and how they oper-
is an example of such a view. 
4 Mind, 67 (1958), pp. 166-173. This is not to say that either Rus-
sell or Searle held such a theory. 
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ate, most theorists would agree that there are linguistic conventions 
which specify the meaning of referring expressions in terms of general 
directions for the use of these expressions. These general directions 
tell us what the expression can be used to refer to. In our terminology 
we would say that they determine the expression's reference potential. 5 
Even those theorists who want to restrict talk of reference to 
uses of referring expressions would recognize that there is some kind of 
relation between expression types and possible referents. The expres-
sion 'John', for example, even in abstraction from any particular use, 
still seems to stand in a certain relation with some objects (namely, 
people named John) and not with others. The expression 'the house' sim-
ilarly stands in a kind of relation with some objects (namely, houses) 
that it does not stand in with others (for example, trees). This rela-
tion is:• established by the meaning of the terms, by linguistic rules, 
habits and conventions. The meaning assigns possible referents to the 
expression. Or in other words, the meaning determines a set of paten-
tial referents. We will say, then, that expressions (types) have a ref-
erence potential. In other words, there are certain things ·which the 
expression can be used to refer to. So one stage of the theory of ref-
erence concerns the form of linguistic rules. What we need to do at 
this stage is to specify the relation which obtains between referring 
expressions and potential referents of those expressions. 
Because many referring expressions in a natural language can be 
used to refer to more than one object, but, on an occasion of use, actu-
5 Reference potential should be understood as relative to a given 
language. 
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ally refer to only one of these objects, the theory of reference 
determination for such languages cannot be simply a theory of the mean-
ing of referring expressions. What is needed, in addition, is an expla-
nation of how a particular referent is determined for a given use of a 
referring expression when that expression can be used to refer to more 
than one thing. We will call this part of the theory of reference 'the 
theory of reference disambiguation', or 'theory of disambiguation' for 
short. What has to be done at this stage of the theory is to discover 
in what relation an object must stand to a use of a referring expression 
in order for it to be the referent of that expression as it would be 
used under these circumstances. So we would have reference rules of the 
form: x is the referent of a use of ~ if and only if ~ is a potential 
referent of a and x stands in relation R to a on this occasion of use. 
In summary, on the model I will be using in the next four chap-
ters, to explain how the referent of a referring expression is deter-
mined we must discover (a) what it is that determines the reference 
potential of referring expressions, and (b) what it is that determines 
the actual referent of a use of a referring expression (given the con-
straints upon possible referents of the term imposed by linguistic 
rules). The virtue of this model is that it allows us to see more 
clearly the distinct roles mental intentions have played in theories of 
reference. By separating these roles we are in a better position to see 
where mental intentions are .problematic and where they are required. 
Although not every theory of reference can be fitted neatly into this 
model, it is, nonetheless, quite helpful. 
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Theories of Disambiguation 
In· the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the role mental 
intentions play in theories of disambiguation. Linguistic conventions 
and rules determine the reference potential of expressions in a lan-
guage, but they do not always provide enough information to tell us 
which potential referent is the. referent of a use of an expression. 
Often, even though an expression could be used to refer to many differ-
ent objects, that expression on a particular occasion of use, refers to 
only one thing. A theory of disambiguation is needed to explain what 
makes that one thing the referent of that use of the expression. 
Accounts of reference disambiguati'on assume that the set of possi-
ble referents is delimited by linguistic conventions. The size of the 
set can vary widely. For some devices (e.g., complete definite descrip-
tions used attributively), there is only one possible referent--namely, 
the object which uniquely satisfies the description. Proper names fall 
in a middle range. Some proper names (e.g., 'William Shakespeare' and 
'Paris, France') have a small number of possible referents, while others 
(e.g., 'John' and 'Bill') have a much larger one. The set of possible 
referents for pure demonstratives ('this' and 'that') is very large. 
These devices can be used to refer to . almost any object, event, or 
activity. 
There are many different accounts of disambiguation. Some 
accounts are limited to a particular kind of linguistic referring 
device. For example, there are accounts of disambiguation for proper 
names that cannot be extended to explain how other referring devices are 
disambiguated. Some accounts are quite general; they apply to all 
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referring devices which potentially refer to more than one object. 
There is no reason to suppose, in advance, that one principle of disam-
biguation should apply to every kind of referring device. It may be 
that there are differences in the principles of disambiguation which 
reflect differences in the form of linguistic rules for various kinds of 
referring device. Proper names, for example, may be a peculiar kind of 
referring device in that the linguistic conventions governing the use of 
proper names are not to be phrased in terms of a single linguistic rule. 
It may be that there are as many reference rules or linguistic conven-
tions for the name 'John', for example, as there are Johns. The princi-
ple of disambiguation in such a case could be formulated in terms of 
which linguistic convention is being followed. This principle would be 
inapplicable to referring devices such as 'the table'. It seems 
unlikely that there are as many different linguistic conventions govern-
ing the use of the words 'the table' as there are tables, and we do not 
seem to have as many distinct linguistic conventions for 'the table' as 
we may have for 'John'. So to disambiguate the referent of 'the table' 
we cannot look to the particular linguistic convention that the speaker 
is following. 
Limited Intentionalist Accounts 
Limited intentionalist accounts are theories of disambiguation 
which hold that the referent of a use of a referring expression (or 
device) is that individual which is a possible referent of the expres-
sion (or device) and which the speaker has in mind or to which she 
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intends to refer. 6 These accounts are limited in that they do not 
explain how linguistic conventions arise. They do not explain how pos-
sible referents are determined, but presuppose that they are. There-
fore, according to limited intentionalist accounts, intentions have only 
a limited role to play in determining reference. Other factors may be 
important in determining reference potential. Limited intentionalist 
theories explain how the referent of a use of a referring expression is 
determined in terms of (a) linguistic conventions which determine refer-
ence potential and (b) the intentio~s of the person using the expres-
sion. In a limited intentionalist theory ~ is the actual referent of a 
use of a referring expression ; if and only if ~ is a potential refer-
ent of E and x is the individual the speaker intends to refer to or has 
in mind. It should be kept in mind that limited intentionalist theories 
do not try to explain how expression get their reference potential; they 
assume that expressions have such a potential. 
Limited intentionalist theories explain the determination of ref-
erence for a particular use of a referring device in terms of possible 
referents and the speaker's intentions. The intuition behind these 
theories is something like this. Suppose someone says "John has all the 
makings of a. good chairman." The person is referring to some John, but 
we cannot tell, from the sentence itself or from the referring expres-
sion that was used, which John the sentence is about. To discover which 
6 In the following chapters I shall be concerned primarily with lin-
guistic devices because most theories of reference deal almost exclu-
sively with these devices. The points made abou~ linguistic reference 
can easily be extended to include non-linguistic referring devices. I 
shall also restrict the discussion, for the most part, to singular ref-
erence. 
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John is the referent of 'John' on this occasion, we need to know which 
John the speaker had in mind, which one she was thinking of when she 
made the statement. The reason we need to know which John the speaker 
was thinking of is alledgedly that the speaker's intentions are what 
determine the referent of 'John' on the occasion of use (granted that 
the person the speaker is thinking of can be referred to by the name 
'John'). 
An alternative to the intentionalist account of disambiguation 
which says the referent of 'John' in the sentence "John has all the mak-
ings of a good chairman" is the John the speaker had in mind or intended 
to refer to would be an account which says that the referent of 'John' 
in this sentence is the object that stands in a certain causal relation , 
to the speaker or to his utterance of 'John' . The referent is whatever 
object is causally related to this utterance of 'John' in the appropri-
ate way. 7 There are also non-intentionalist accounts of disambiguation 
which appeal to contextual features of the utterance to disambiguate 
reference. 8 
There are two basic types of limited intentionalist theories. We 
noted earlier that limited intentionalist theories claim that reference 
is disambiguated by what the speaker had in mind or intended to refer 
to. We can distinguish the two basic types of intentionalist theories 
7 The 'appropriate' way would have to be spelled out in such a way 
that what the speaker 'had in mind' or intended to refer to was irrele-
vant if such an account is to be a real alternative. 
8 See, for example Howard Wettstein, "How to Bridge the Gap Between 
Meaning and Reference," Synthese, 58 (1984), pp. 63-84, and Colin 
McGinn, "The Mechanisms of Reference," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 157-186. 
McGinn tries to account for the disambiguation of demonstratives in 
terms of space-time relations between the utterance and the referent. 
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in terms of how they analyze the concept of 'having in mind' and in 
terms of what they take to be the important relation between what the 
speaker has in mind and objects in the world. One kind of intentional-
ist theory sees the reference relation as a satisfaction relation. The 
referent of som~ referring device is that possible referent which satis-
fies or matches what the speaker has in mind. Because the relation is a 
satisfaction relation the analysis of 'having in mind' is usually formu-
lated in terms of mental or cognitive contents. The other kind of 
intentionalist theory sees the reference relation as a causal relation 
between objects and utterances via mental states. According to these 
theories, the referent of a particular use of a referring device is that 
object which (directly or indirectly) caused the speaker's use of the 
referring device. 9 Causal intentionalist theories need not posit mental 
contents or, for that matter, any particular picture of 'having ill 
mind'. The exact causal mechanisms operating within the speaker's brain 
(or mind) which link the referent to the object need not be spelled out. 
To evaluate limited intentionalist theories I will first present 
some representative satisfaction theories. The merits of these theories 
will be outlined and objections will be discussed. I will then discuss 
general objections to intentionalist theories of disambiguation. These 
objections motivate the search for an account which does not explain how 
reference is determined in terms of speakers' intentions. In the fol-
lowing chapters I will compare the merits of intentionalist theories of 
9 Note that this type of causal theory traces the causal chain from 
the object, through the speaker's mental states, to the use of a·refer-
ring device. A causal theory which by-passed mental states would not be 
an intentionalist one. See note 8, this chapter. 
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disambiguation with those of non-intentionalist (contextual) theories. 
I will argue that non- intentionalist theories cannot account for many 
cases in which determinate reference is mad~. In Chapters Five and Six 
I discuss causal intentionalist theories. I argue that causal inten-
tionalist theo~ies preserve the important insights of satisfaction theo-
ries while escaping some of the most damaging objections to these theo-
ries. Finally, I argue that if we take non-linguistic referring devices 
seriously and take account of the constraints on possible referents 
imposed by these devices as well as by linguistic conventions, the best 
explanation of how reference is disambiguated will be an intentionalist 
one. 
Satisfaction Theories of Disambiguation 
Satisfaction theories see reference determination in terms of sat-
isfaction or fit between mental contents and objects in the world. 
These mental contents might be concepts (in the form of descriptions in 
some language or other), 10 or they could be mental representations (in 
the form of images) or contents of perceptual experiences. 
Some satisfaction theories of disambiguation restrict the analysis 
of 'having in mind' to conceptual contents. The speaker identifies an 
individual _by means of mental descriptions. These descriptions deter-
mine the referent of a use of a referring device in that they set the 
10 Since limited intentionalist theories presuppose the existence of 
linguistic rules and conventions, the language of thought could be 
either a natural language or mentalese or a combination of these. 
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conditions which a possible referent must satisfy if it is to be the 
actual referent of that use. An example of a descriptivist theory of 
disambiguation can be.found in the theory of proper names developed by 
Michael McKinsey. 11 McKinsey defines the denotat;ion of a proper name 
token uttered by a person at a particular time in terms of what the 
speaker is referring to and what the proper name can be used to refer 
to. 
If ~ is a token of a proper name uttered by ~ at !, then a denotes x 
if f x is the one and 
with ~ at t and (ii) 
zation of -S's stable 
same type a; a. 12 
only individual w such that (i) S refers to w 
~' s referring to-~ with ~ at ! is an actuali-
disposition to refer ... to~ with tokens of the 
The second clause states McKinsey's analysis of reference paten-
tial, and since we are only concerned with theories of disambiguation in 
this chapter, we will ignore it. 13 The first clause, "S refers tow with 
a at !, " tells us how the referent of a proper name that can be used to 
refer to more than one individual is determined. According to McKinsey, 
the referent is determined by the speaker's act of referring. 14 Not 
every theory which explains disambiguation in terms of speaker's refer-
ence is an intentionalist one. An intentionalist theory says that the 
11 
"Names and Intentionality," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No. 
2 (April 1981), pp. 171-200. 
12 Ibid., p. 195. 
13 Chapters Seven and Eight will be devoted to intentionalist theo-
ries of reference potential. 
14 This analysis of the principle of disambiguation for proper names 
is similar to Tyler Burge's. Burge, like McKinsey, sees disambiguation 
as a function of a person's act of reference. Disambiguation, for 
Burge, is a matter of what the speaker designates or refers to with a 
particular proper name. For a statement of Burge' s theory of· proper 
names see "Reference and Proper Names, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
70, No. 14 (August 1973), pp. 425-439. 
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referent of a referring expression (for example, a proper name) is,. at 
least in part, determined by the mental states of a speaker or the con-
tents of those states, in other words, by what the speaker had in mind. 
Usually speaker's reference is defined in terms of what the speaker had 
in mind, but i~ need not necessarily be defined that way. For example, 
one could define speaker's reference in causal terms: 
~ refers to ~ with ~ at ! if and only if 
ring device for ~ and the use of a at t 
chain terminating at ~ alone. 
x caused a to be a refer-
- -is the result of a causal 
Thus, not every theory of disambiguation in which speaker's reference 
plays a role is an intentionalist theory. 
McKinsey's account of speaker's reference is clearly an intention-
alist one. McKinsey defines speaker's reference as follows: 
S refers to x with a at t -= (by definition) ~ dominantly satisfies 
f(~,~,!), 15 
where .QC~'~'!) is "the cluster of properties associated with a token i! 
by a speaker ~ at !· 1116 The cluster of properties which a speaker asso-
ciates with a name at a given time is the cognitive content which deter-
mines the referent of the speaker's act of referring. The referent is 
that individual which dominantly satisfies this content. 
A similar theory of disambiguation can be given for incomplete 
definite descriptions. An incomplete (or indefinite) definite descrip-
tion is a definite description which could be used to refer to a number 
of individuals but on an occasion of use refers to only one. 1 r In the 
15 Ibid., p. 193. 
16 Ibid., p. 192. 
17 Definite descriptions are 
consist of the definite article 
devices for 
(in English, 
singular reference which 
'the') and a predicate. 
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sentence, "The cat is an the mat," 'the cat' and 'the mat' are both 
indefinite definite descriptions. 'The cat' can be used to refer to any 
cat, but as it is used~ it refers (or purports to refer) to only one. 
A purely conceptual satisfaction theory of disambiguation for 
incomplete definite descriptions would say that the referent of the 
description ~ is that possible referent which satisfies (or dominantly 
satisfies) the descriptive (or at least conceptual) content C that the 
speaker associates with this use of ~' or associates with a at the time 
of utterance. The incomplete description that the speaker actually 
utters is supplemented by further descriptive content which the speaker 
associates with this use. For example, suppose our speaker says, "The 
cat is on the mat." Every cat is a potential referent of 'the cat' . 
What makes a particular cat the referent of this use of 'the cat' is, on 
this account, further descriptive content which the speaker associates 
with her use of 'the cat' at this time. These descriptions are the ones 
the speaker uses to identify the cat (for herself) and, if querried 
about which cat was meant, would be able to supply to help her audience 
pick out the correct referent. The cat which is being referred to is 
the one which satisfies (or dominantly satisfies or satisfies more fully 
than any other cat, etc.) the descriptive content in the speaker's mind. 
Within the theory of reference, definite descriptions have been classi-
fied in terms of (i) whether they denote anything and (ii) whether they 
uniquely denote something. Definite descriptions which do not denote 
any object are called 'improper definite descriptions'. An example of 
an improper definite description would be 'the present king of France'. 
Definite descriptions which denote something may either uniquely denote 
or denote several objects (but purport to refer to only one). A uni-
quely denoting definite description would be 'the natural number between 
2 and 4'. Definite descriptions which do not uniquely denote are called 
'incomplete' or 'indefinite' definite descriptions. 
59 
It is because the speaker has sufficient descriptive content to identify 
a particular cat (for herself, not necessarily for her audience), that 
this use of 'the cat'. refers to some particular cat. The descriptive 
content which enables the speaker to identify the particular cat she is 
talking about must be satisfied by the cat which is the referent of this 
use of 'the cat' and it is because a particular cat satisfies this 
descriptive content that it is the referent. 
The linguistic rules governing pure demonstratives 18 and some pro-
nouns determine a set of possible referents that is so large that their 
contribution to reference determination is almost empty. The word 
'that' in the sentence "That's nice" could be used to refer to almost 
anything. 19 With these referring expressions, the theory of disambigua-
tion is almost the whole story of reference determination. 20 Perhaps for 
this reason the theory of demonstratives has become a kind of 'test 
case' (or last stronghold) for intentionalist theories. 
It is possible to extend the conceptual satisfaction model to 
account for disambiguation of pure demonstratives. An account of this 
sort would say the speaker identifies (for herself) an individual by 
means of mental descriptions which the individual satisfies. Having 
18 The pure demonstratives of English are 'this' and 'that' without 
further modification. An 'impure' demonstrative would have a modifier, 
for example, 'that man'. 
19 
'Anything' does not mean any object. 'That' might refer to an 
object, a stat:e of affairs, a property, etc. It could refer to any 
individual or feature thereof. 
20 Usually there are other non-linguistic referring devices (demon-
strations) which co-determine possible referents for demonstratives. 
For the present, we will restrict our discussion to uses of demonstra-
tives which are not accompanied by a demonstration. 
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thus identified the individual, the speaker is in a position to refer to 
it. The individual to which she intends to refer with the word 'that' 
is the one she has identified by means of these descriptions. It is the 
one that satisfies (or dominantly satisfies) these descriptions. Thus, 
the referent of her use of 'that' would be the individual she intends to 
refer to, namely, the individual which satisfies the mental content 
associated with this use of the word 'that'. 
In "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," Keith Donnellan 
raised some serious objections to the principle of identifying descrip-
tions. 21 This principle says that a speaker can refer to an object only 
if he is in a position to supply some description whic.h uniquely charac-
terizes that object. Since limited descriptivist theories account for 
disambiguation of reference in terms of the speaker's mental descrip-
tions which determine a particular object to be the referent of the 
expression, they are vulnerable to these objections. 
There are basically three objections which have been raised 
against limited descriptivist theories. 2 2 I will briefly characterize 
these objections here. A more thorough discussion of them will follow. 
One objection is that these theories require that whenever reference is 
disambiguated the speaker must have a mental description which uniquely 
characterizes the referent. It seems unlikely that this is always the 
case. A second objection is that when the speaker has more than one 
mental description which uniquely characterizes the referent, limited 
21 Synthese, 21 (1970) pp. 335-358. 
2 2 Limited intentionalist theories are intentionalist theories of 
disambiguation. 
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descriptivist accounts seem to have no way of saying which description 
is the correct one, the one that should count. The third objection con-
cerns the fallibility· of speakers' beliefs. Speakers can have wildly 
mistaken beliefs about objects and still refer to them rather than to 
some other obj~ct about which their beliefs are true. Let us consider 
these objections in turn. 
The first objection is that it is not the case that a speaker will 
always have some description which uniquely characterizes the object to 
which he wants to refer, but nevertheless he does refer to that object. 
Donnellan offers the following proof. 
Suppose a child is gotten up from sleep at a party and introduced to 
someone as 'Tom', who then says a few words to the child. Later the 
child says to his parents, "Tom is a nice man." The only thing he 
can say about 'Tom' is that Tom was at a party. Moreover, he is 
unable to recognize anyone as 'Tom' on subsequent occasions. His 
parents give lots of parties and they have numerous friends named 
'Tom'. The c'ase could be built up, I think, so that nothing the 
child possesses in the way of descriptions, dispositions to recog-
nize serves to pick out in the standard way anybody uniquely. That 
is, we cannot go by the denotation of his description nor whom he 
points to, if anyone, etc. Does this mean that there is no person 
to whom he is referring? 23 
Obviously not. In fact, it seems obvious that the Tom he is talking 
about is the one who talked to him at the party. If Donnellan is right 
in thinking that the child could refer to Tom even though there are no 
descriptions which enable him to pick out the Tom he means, then the 
descriptivist account of disambiguation must be wrong. The reference of 
'Tom' is disambiguated even though the speaker does not have mental 
descriptions which only one Tom satisfies. 
It is not immediately evident that Donnellan is right. If the 
23 QE. cit., p. 343. 
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child did not think of Tom as the guy who said such-and-such or at least 
as the man his parents introduced as 'Tom' at some time (the child may 
not be able to describe this time in English, but he can identify it in 
terms of a sequence of events), then the utterance is inexplicable. If 
the child does not have some conception of Tom, one which separates this 
Tom from other people he knows, it is not clear how he can make a state-
ment about him, especially since his use is not directly parasitic. 24 
Even though he may not be able to articulate this conception in English 
and even though it may not be adequate for a subsequent recognition of 
Tom, it may still be enough to determine a unique referent for this use 
of 'Tom'. 
What this example might show is that the ability to have something 
in mind need not be a purely conceptual one. The child might not be 
able to think of the Tom he is referring to in terms of descriptions 
which this Tom satisfies, yet he might be able to distinguish this Tom 
from others in his ken by means of, for example, remembered images in 
his own subjective time. If there are other ways of 'having in mind', 
in addition to having mental descriptions, then an account of reference 
disambiguation which includes these ways would be preferable to a purely 
descriptivist account. 
Another problem for descriptivist theories is that sometimes the 
speaker can volunteer several uniquely denoting descriptions, and there 
24 The child's use of the name 'Tom' to refer to Tom may be parasitic 
in the sense that he got this name from someone else. What I mean here 
is that the child did not just borrow his use of 'Tom' from someone who 
was using it in the immediate context. Had his parents been talking 
about Tom and the child said "Is Tom a nice man?" he could be just hook-
ing up to his parent's use without any knowledge of who he was talking 
about. In Donnellan's example he does not seem to be doing this. 
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is no non-arbitrary way to say which one is the 'cor~ect' one or the one 
that actually determines reference. If all the descriptions denote the 
same object, this is riot a serious problem. Any description will do as 
well as any other. But suppose the speaker has some mistaken beliefs 
about the obje~t in question. She may associate several descriptions 
with her use of a referring expression, each of which uniquely denotes 
different objects. For example, suppose I say "That is cluttered." I 
associate the descriptions 'the desk I am now perceiving' and 'the desk 
in Room 357 that belongs to Cliff Wirt' with the word 'that', believing 
that the two descriptions denote the same object. Unbeknownst to me, 
however, Cliff has switched desks with someone else. 
If the descriptivist theory of disambiguation is correct, if the 
referent of 'that' in "That is cluttered" is the individual that satis-
fies the descriptive content I associate with my utterance of 'that', 
then it would follow that my utterance is still ambiguous or that I am 
referring to two different things with the word 'that'. However, nei-
ther of these alternatives seem to be the case. At the very least, the 
descriptivist theory would have to be modified to account for cases like 
this. 
Michael McKinsey attempts to supplement descriptivist theories by 
making a distinction between derivative and primary intentions. He 
defines these terms as follows: "When a person's having a given inten-
tion is a part of the explanation of the person's having another inten-
tion, but not vice versa, I will say that the former intention is pri-
mary with respect to the latter or equivalently, that the latter is 
derivative from the former." 
By making this distinction we might be able to disambiguate my 
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utterance of 'that' by discovering which was my primary inteniton: to 
refer with 'that' to the desk I am now perceiving or to refer to the 
desk that belongs to Cliff Wirt. The explanation of my intentions might 
go something like this. I intend to refer to the desk that belongs to 
Cliff Wirt because I intend to refer to the desk I am now perceiving and 
I believe that this desk belongs to Cliff Wirt. Moreover, my intention 
to refer to the desk I am now perceiving would not change if I did not 
believe it belonged to Cliff Wirt and therefore, did not intend to refer 
to the desk that belongs to Cliff Wirt. Since my primary intention was 
to refer to the desk I am now perceiving, the desk which satisfies this 
description is the referent of 'that'. 
On the other hand, if I intended to refer to Cliff Wirt' s desk 
(believing that any desk which belonged to Cliff Wirt would be clut-
tered) and intended to refer to the desk I was perceiving only because I 
believed it belonged to Cliff Wirt and I intended to refer to Cliff 
Wirt's desk, then the referent would, on McKinsey's a~count, be the desk 
which belongs to Cliff Wirt (even though that was not the desk I was 
perceiving.) This conclusion conflicts with our intuitions. 
A third objection to descriptivist theories of disambiguation is 
that the speaker can have mistaken beliefs about an object, so it satis-
fies none of the descriptive content in the speaker's head, and nonethe-
less refer to that object. For example, suppose a person sees an object 
which he takes to be an antelope, but which is in fact a rock shaped 
like an antelope. The person says "That has been watching us all 
night." The descriptions the speaker associates with 'that' are such 
that the rock satisfies none of them (e.g., the description 'the· antel-
ope standing over there', 'the entity which has been watching us', 
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etc.). Nonetheless, the speaker does seem to be referring to the rock. 
If his mistaken beliefs were revealed, he might say something like, "Oh, 
it couldn't have beeri watching us all night. It's a rock." 'It' in 
these sentences refers to the same thing that 'that' referred to. 
Of course, the proponent of a descriptivist theory could find some 
description that the speaker could have associated with 'that' and which 
would uniquely denote the rock, for example, the description 'the entity 
which I am now perceiving', or 'the entity which is causing my antelope 
perception'. But the fact that one can always come up with such a 
description does not mean that the speaker always has such a description 
in mind. 
Thinking of an object or 'having an object in mind' does not seem 
to be just a matter of having a set of descriptions which uniquely char-
acterize that object. Having a uniquely denoting definite description 
in mind is one way to individuate an object, but it is not the only way. 
We are able to think of an individual even when it would be an effort to 
come up with a description that uniquely and accurately characterizes 
that individual. Often we identify objects perceptually, without an 
accompanying description. 25 Or we can identify the object by remembering 
it through images, rather than through descriptions. 26 
25 Perceptually discriminating some object may provide the basis for 
a description (e.g., 'the object I now see'), but such a description 
need not accompany the perception to make it individuating. Whether a 
perceiver who has no concepts would be able to identify individuals is a 
different question. 
26 Earlier I suggested that the child may have identified Tom in this 
way. The child may not have any descriptions which uniquely character-
ize Tom. It could identify Tom by means of images arranged in a time or 
event sequence. 
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Considerations like those above have led to a revised version of 
descriptivist theories. In the revised version, disambiguation still 
depends on what a person 'has in mind', and the referent of a referring 
device with more than one possible referent is still the possible refer-
ent which sati~fies or fits some mental content. What is different is 
that the mental content need not be a uniquely denoting description. It 
could be the non-propositional content of a perceptual or of a mnemonic 
• 2 7 experience. 
If we add to the ways in which a speaker can be said to have an 
object in mind in this way, we might be able to answer at least one of 
the objections raised against satisfaction theories. Given these addi-
tional mental contents, we need not require that the speaker has a uni-
quely denoting mental description of an object in order for her to refer 
to that object. A perceptual or mnenomic content will do as well. How-
ever, even if satisfaction accounts are supplemented with these non-
propositional mental contents, the problem of mistaken beliefs and for-
tuitous satisfaction remains. The person who said, "That has been 
watching us all night," for example, may have not only mistaken beliefs 
about the thing she is seeing, but also mistaken perceptions. The con-
tent of her perceptual experience may be distorted so that she actually 
sees antelope ears and eyes. Neverth_eless, the thing she is referring 
to is not an antelope at all. Further, even if there were some antelope 
2 7 There is some disagreement about what it means for an object to 
satisfy the content of a perceptual experience. Some would see this 
content as a kind of picture which the referent resembles more closely 
than any other object. A more sophisticated theory is proposed by 
Searle. For Searle, an object satisfies the content of a perceptual 
experience if (a) it resembles that content and (b) it causes that expe-
rience. 
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which corresponded exactly to the content of her visual perception it 
would not be the referent of 'that'. 
Assessment of Intentionalist Accounts 
Limited intentionalist theories have the virtues of intuitive 
appeal and generality to recommend them. Their intuitive appeal is 
based on considerations like the following. When someone says some-
thing, e.g., "Aristotle was good at figuring things out" and we are not 
sure what the referent is because the linguistic rules of our language 
determine more than one possible referent, we generally try to find out 
which one of these possible referents the speaker had in mind. We try 
to find out which one the speaker meant perhaps by asking her to supply 
further identificatory information which we assume she has. The infor-
mation may be in the form of a description, as in 'Aristotle, my cat' or 
in the form of an ostension by means of which the speaker conveys (or 
tries to convey) perceptual information--'That Aristotle' (pointing to 
the cat). Moreover, when we say something which is interpreted incor-
rectly, for example, when I say "John B. has the makings of a good 
chairman," and I find I have been misinterpreted, I base my judgment on 
the fact that my audience did not understand whom I meant. The truth 
conditions for the statement made depend upon the John B. I was thinking 
of. Moreover, these conditions are the truth conditions for the state-
ment that was made no matter who hears the statement, if anyone. Had I 
been thinking of a different John B. at the time, a different statement 
would have been made. If someone else had said the same words with a 
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different John B. in mind, the statement would have had different truth 
conditions, and if he had the same John B. in mind, the truth condi-
tions would have been the same. 
These intuitions are powerful as long as we accept the constraints 
imposed upon P?ssible referents by linguistic rules. When the speaker 
has an individual in mind which does not fall within the range of possi-
ble referents determined by the relevant linguistic rule, intuitions 
about the actual referent are not as strong or as universally shared. 
For example, if I had Cliff Wirt in mind when. I said "John B. has the 
makings of a good chairman," it would not be so clear that the actual 
referent of my utterance was the person I was thinking of. But the 
theory of disambiguation does not handle such cases. It is restricted 
to explaining how an actual referent is determined, given that a range 
of possible referents has already been determined by linguistic rules or 
conventions. The intuitive evidence for intentionalist accounts of 
disambiguation is also weak when there is no strong consensus as to the 
nature of the linguistic rules governing a kind of referring device. 
Disagreement on this level, however, is typically disagreement about the 
extent to which intentions determine reference, not about whether inten-
tions have some role in determining reference. 28 
28 See, for example, the interchange between Rod Bertolet and John 
Biro concerning demonstratives. (Bertolet, "Demonstratives and Inten-
tions," Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), pp. 75-78; and Biro, "Inten-
tion, Demonstration and Reference," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 43, No. 1 (September, 1982), pp. 35-41.) Bertolet argues 
that demonstrations do not determine the reference of demonstratives. 
His view is that the linguistic rule for demonstratives is quite empty 
and the disambiguating principle is the speaker's intentions. Biro's 
view is that the demonstrative and demonstration together determine a 
referent, and Bertolet's alledged counter-examples to such a view do not 
address this possibility. 
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In addition to their intuitive appeal, limited intentionalist 
theories also have the advantage of generality. The principle of disam-
biguation is the same for every linguistic device that requires disam-
biguation. It could be argued that the same principle of disambiguation 
is operative fa~ non-linguistic referring devices as well. For example, 
we noted earlier that the picture of Alfred Hitchcock in the advertise-
ment which consisted of this picture and the words, "is a classic," had 
more than one possible referent. The picture could be referring to the 
man, or to some prominent feature of the man, or to something associated 
with him (e.g., his movies or his television program). The actual ref-
erent of the picture in this use is indeterminate. A limited intention-
alist theory could explain how this picture has a determinate referent 
in terms of the speaker's intentions. 2 9 A similar point could be made 
about gestures such as waving a book and asking "Red or pink?" or point-
ing to something and saying "I love that." In both cases we find a 
restricted range of possible referents. A limited intentionalist thee-
rist could claim that the actual referent is that possible referent 
which the 'speaker' had in mind. 
Although limited intentionalist theories are highly intuitive and 
general they are not universally accepted. In the following paragraphs 
I will briefly characterize the major objections to limited intentional-
ist theories and evaluate these objections. These objections apply to 
any kind of intentionalist theory, not just to satisfaction theories. 30 
29 The notion of a speaker would have to be extended when applied to 
non-linguistic reference. Perhaps we could say the speaker is the per-
son who is primarily responsible for that particular occurrence of that 
configuration of symbols. 
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Some of the reasons for rejecting intentionalist theories actually 
have very little to do with limited intentionalist theories. I sug-
gested earlier that d~viding theories of reference into (1) theories of 
disambiguation and (2) theories of reference potential would be benefi-
cial because some criticisms which would apply to theories of reference 
potential are beside the point when applied to theories of disambigua-
tion. For example, one cannot criticize a limited intentionalist theory 
for failing to recognize the normative force of language, since limited 
intentionalist theories presuppose linguistic rules which set the limits 
on what could be referred to with a certain device. Let us assume, for 
the time being, that limited intentionalist theories are logically inde-
pendent of intentionalist theories of meaning. We shall discuss only 
those objections that are directed specifically to limited intentional-
ist theories. 
One objection to limited intentionalist theories is motivated by a 
particular view of how reference determination and an audience's identi-
fication of the referent are related. The general lines of the objec-
tion are as follows. If reference is determined in part by what the 
speaker had in mind, and it is not possible to observe what someone has 
in mind, how is it possible for an audience to know what the referent 
is? People who are not mind readers often (perhaps even generally) cor-
rectly identify the referent of a use of a referring device. They do 
not need to know what was going on in the speaker's head. Since it it 
very unlikely that their repeated success is the result of a series of 
3 ° For objections that apply only to satisfaction theories see above, 
pp. 60-67. 
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·lucky guesses, something else, something which is publicly accessible, 
must account for their ability to identify the correct referent. What-
ever it is that the audience relies on must at least be related to the 
determinants of reference. 
One way t_o formulate the objection is to say that limited inten-
tionalist theories of reference flout an important methodological prin-
ciple. According to one theorist, Michael Pendlebury, the principle in 
question is that 
a semantic convention which assigns denotations to referring expres-
sions must be such that mastery of that convention would help an 
audience to ascertain the denotation of an utterance of the expres-
sion on the basis of purely public facts about the context of utter-
ance. 31 
Limited intentionalist theories seem to flout this principle since the 
semantic convention (or rule) which they say determines a referent (in 
Pendlebury's terms--assigns a denotation) is: the actual referent of a 
use of a referring device is the possible referent which the speaker had 
in mind (or was thinking of). The question an intentionalist theory 
must answer is this: how is mastery of this rule or convention going to 
help the audience to identify the correct referent? All the audience 
has to go on are the "purely public facts" about the context of utter-
ance (and the publicly accessible linguistic rules which determine ref-
erence potential). These are not facts about what the speaker is think-
ing. In fact, there are no purely public facts which could tell us what 
the speaker is thinking. It is not clear, then, how knowledge of the 
3 1 This expression of the principle is Michael Pendlebury' s. See 
"How Demonstratives Denote," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
22, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 91-104, especially, p. 102. In this.paper, 
Pendlebury develops what he calls a "mental reference" theory for demon-
stratives and he considers (and dismisses) this objection. 
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relevant semantic rule is supposed to "help" the audience identify the 
correct referent. 32 To identify the correct referent she will have to 
rely on those aspects· of the speech situation to which she does have 
access. 
We should look at Pendlebury' s requirement more closely. Why 
should knowledge of the relevant semantic convention help (or enable) an 
audience to identify the correct referent? Pendlebury suggests that 
this requirement derives from the nature of natural languages. He 
accepts the gist of the principle "on the strength of the fact that nat-
ural languages are public institutions which are learnable on the basis 
of public facts about language use." 33 It is difficult to deny that pub-
lie facts about language use are what enable us to learn the semantical 
rules of the language. However, it is not clear what the important con-
nection between learning semantic rules and identifying correct refer-
ents is. Pendlebury seems to think that because we have to rely on pub-
lie facts about language use to learn the semantical rules of the 
language, we must also rely on public facts to apply the semantical 
rules in ascertaining correct referents. However, he does not say why. 
It seems quite possible that on the basis of purely public facts 
about language use we could learn that the reference rule for referring 
expressions with more than one possible referent is something like what 
32 Pendlebury requires only that mastery of the semantic convention 
help an audience identify the correct referent. Some theorists might go 
even further. It could be argued 'that knowledge of the semantic conven-
tion must allow the audience to identify the correct referent, in the 
sense that if one knows the semantic conventions and relevant facts 
about the situation, one knows the referent. 
33 Ibid., p. 102. 
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a limited intentionalist theory says. Intentionalist theorists, after 
all, use public facts about language use to justify their theories. 
There is no reason to suppose that language users could not do the same 
thing. The fact that we must rely on publicly accessible data to learn 
reference rules seems to have little to do with the methodological prin-
ciple which says that mastery of semantic conventions should either 
enable or help an audience to determine the correct referent of a use of 
a referring device. 
The important connection between the determinants of reference and 
what the audience uses to identify the referent is that the two must be 
so related that it is not a matter of luck that the audience gets the 
referent right. If the audie.nce always gets the referent right, then 
there must be an obvious and close relationship between what determines 
reference and what the audience relies on. If it sometimes gets the 
referent wrong, the relationship need riot be so close. The closest 
relationship is that of identity. If what the audience uses to identify 
the correct referent are the same things that determine reference, then 
we would expect the audience to identify the correct referent most of 
the time. 34 If the audience identifies the referent on some other basis, 
it is more likely to fail to identify the correct referent. Since we 
seem usually (but not always) to get the referent right, there should be 
a fairly direct relationship between what the hearer relies on to iden-
tify the referent and what actually determines reference which would 
guarantee that degree of success in identifying the correct referent. 
34 We would want to make some allowances for sloppiness or lapses of 
attention and things of that sort. 
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The real problem, then, is not a problem about how reference rules 
are learned; it is, instead, a problem about how we successfully commu-
nicate reference. Successful communication requires that an audience be 
able to identify the correct referent in some non-arbitrary manner. 
Limited intentionalist theories, by making the speaker's thoughts an 
important determinant of reference, rule out the possibility that cor-
rect identification of a referent is due to an identity between the 
determinants of reference and the information the audience relies on to 
identify the referent. The information an audience has to go on does 
not and can not include knowledge of what the speaker is thinking (at 
least not in the sense of directly accessible knowledge). For there is 
no way for the ~udience to get inside the speaker's head to see what he 
is thinking. This does not mean, however, that the audience's identifi-
cation of the referent must be arbitrary if intentionalist theories are 
correct. 
What Pendlebury is concerned about is the relationship between the 
rules of reference which tell how reference is determined and the audi-
ence's basis for identifying the correct referent. Pendlebury acknowl-
edges that knowing how reference is determined should help the audience 
to identify the correct referent. But it is not clear how it should 
help the audience or how much. We can propose that knowing how refer-
ence is determined should at least suggest a strategy for identifying 
the referent. If reference is determined, in part, by what the speaker 
had in mind, then to identify the referent one should try to find out 
what the speaker was thinking of. This is the answer Pendlebury gives 
to the objection. He notes that we do use this strategy when we· are in 
doubt about the referent of some expression, either by asking the 
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speaker what he meant, or when that is not possible, by trying to recon-
struct what the speaker must have been thinking of on the basis of his 
interests, the preceding conversation, the non-linguistic context, and 
other behavioral cues. 
If it were not possible to figure out what the speaker had in mind 
with some relatively high degree of accuracy, then the de facto ability 
of an audience to identify the correct referent (within a range of pos-
sible referents) would be inexplicable for the limited intentionalist 
theorist. The privacy of thoughts blocks any direct access to the 
determin_pnts of reference, but there do seem to be indirect ways to tell 
what someone is thinking of. The existence of such ways of ascertaining 
what the speaker was thinking of is enough for the limited intentional-
ist theories to account for the possibility of correct identification of 
the referent. The fact that there is some discrepancy between what an 
audience relies on to identify the correct referent and what determines 
reference also explains how it is possible to identify a referent incor-
rectly. Since we do identify the wrong referent often enough, this 
explanatory power should count in favor of limited intentionalist theo-
ries. 
The objection I have considered so far concerns the necessity that 
there be some connection between what determines reference and what an 
audience relies on to identify the referent. We have seen that this 
part of the objection is not a problem for limited intentionalist theo-
ries. Another objection to limited intentionalist theories is that 
there are some cases when the speaker's intentions take a back seat to 
other factors which determine reference. In these cases what the 
speaker has in mind seems to be irrelevant. Howard Wettstein presents 
3 5 
such a case. 
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Suppose that our speaker walks up to Smith, stares straight at him, 
extends his finger right in Smith's face, and says "That is a self-
destructive man."· No one ... could have any doubt that the speaker 
intends to ostensively indicate Smith. Unfortunately ... our speaker 
was merely stretching, his mind was elsewhere, and he intended to 
convey his reference by more subtle background cues, cues that 
indeed identify Jones, his intended referent. In such a case, I am 
strongly inclined to suppose ... that Smith, the individual apparently 
pointed to, is the referent. 36 
The moral Wettstein draws from this story is that the speaker's inten-
tions were not what determined the referent in this case. The speaker 
was thinking of Jones, yet the referent of 'that man' was Smith. 
I am hestiant to accept Wettstein' s conclusions so quickly. I 
agree that the audience has some justification for taking Smith to be 
the referent. However, the fact that it is justified does not entail 
that the correct referent is Smith. The initial plausibility of the 
view that the referent was Smith even though the speaker had Jones in 
mind is seriously compromised if we extend the conversaticn so that it 
becomes clear to the audience that Smith was not the intended referent. 
Suppose Smith' protests, "What makes you think I'm self-destructive?" and 
our speaker says "I wasn't talking about you. I was thinking of Jones." 
Smith might well correct his interpretation of "That man is self-de-
structive." He may challenge the appropriateness of the pointing ges-
ture ("Then why did you point at me?"), and the speaker may have to 
explain his action ("Oh, I'm sorry. I wasn't pointing, I was just 
stretching. 11 ) 37 
35 0 ~· cit. 
36 Ibid., p. 72. 
37 This further interchange might indicate that pointing and saying 
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One reason we cannot conclude that the speaker's intentions did 
not determine the referent of 'that man' is that we do not have any 
theory-independent way· of deciding who was the correct referent of 'that 
man' in.this case. We would agree that the audience has some justifica-
tion for taking Smith to be the referent, but we do not know why it is 
justified. One possibility is that the audience is justified because it 
based its identification of the referent on the very things which deter-
mined the referent. The cues 'that man', looking at Smith, and pointing 
in Smith's face actually determined the referent according to the rule: 
The referent of 'that man' is whatever individual is a possible ref-
erent of 'that man' and is the actual man which is being demon-
strated. 38 
If the audience identifies Smith as the referent because Smith is a pos-
sible referent of that man and he is the man who is being demonstrated, 
and if this is the correct reference rule for 'that man', then the audi-
ence is justified in believing that Smith is the referent. 
However, the audience would also be justified in believing that 
Smith is the referent of 'that man' if the reference rule is a version 
of a limited intentionalist theory. For example, suppose the correct 
reference rule is: 
The referent of 'that man' is whatever is a possible referent of 
'that man' and is the individual the speaker was thinking of when 
she said 'that man'. 
Since the audience cannot get 'inside' the speaker's head to discover 
'that' is a conventional means for determining reference. It may also 
indicate that pointing must be an intentional action--i~ must be used to 
refer--if it is to determine reference, or it may be that the difference 
between pointing and stretching is an observable one. It does seem that 
pointing and stretching do not look the same. 
38 This is Wettstein's position. 
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what she is thinking of, its justification will depend on whether it is 
justified in inferring what the speaker is thinking of on the basis of 
publicly accessible clues. On the basis of the clues available to the 
audience at the time of the utterance the audience is justified in 
believing that the speaker was thinking of Smith. Of course, because 
the evidence an audience has to go on never entails the belief, the jus-
tification is always defeasible. Further evidence may lead the audience 
to revise its hypothesis about what the speaker was thinking of. 
The kind of case that Wettstein cites cannot support the conclu-
sion that the actual referent of a use of a referring device is not 
determined in part by what the speaker had in mind. Even if we accept 
Wettstein' s intuition that the referent was Smith--the person who was 
pointed at--instead of Jones (the person the speaker had in mind), the 
case for an intentionalist theory of disambiguation is not seriously 
compromised. If the correct referent of 'that man' is Smith rather than 
Jones, it cannot be the case that the correct reference rule for demon-
stratives is as follows: The referent of 'that x' is whatever x the 
speaker had in mind. If this were the correct rule, then the referent 
would have been Jones. But an intentionalist theorist need not accept 
this reference rule. 
It is consistent with limited intentionalist theories to say that 
reference is determined by rules governing the use of referring devices 
such that sometimes the speaker's intentions have almost no role in 
determining reference. Looking at Wettstein's case, we find more than 
one referring device at work. There is the linguistic referring device 
'that man' which does not determine a unique referent. Any man could be 
the referent of 'that man' according to the rules of English. But there 
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is also a pointing gesture (or what seems to be a pointing gesture) and 
other, more subtle, gestures. These gestures are also referring 
• 3 9 devices. 
If we take all the referring devices together, the linguistic as 
well as the non-linguistic ones, we find that they do, together, deter-
mine a unique referent. If that is the case, then there is no need for 
a principle of disambiguation which takes into account the speaker's 
intentions. So even if Wettstein is right in thinking that the referent 
in this case is not the man the speaker had in mind, a limited inten-
tionalist theory of demonstratives may be correct. Intentions may not 
have as large a role in determining referents as some theorists have 
supposed. 40 Other non-linguistic devices may, along with linguistic 
referring devices, determine a referent regardless of the speaker's 
intentions. 
We have considered aud dismissed two objections to intentionalist 
theories so far. One objection was that the determinants of reference 
must have some connection with the cues the audience relies on to iden-
tify the referent and this seems impossible if private mental contents 
are determinants of reference. We answered this objection by noting 
that the cues the audience relies ·on enable the audience to make reason-
3 9 I agree with Wettstein that these 'cues' are actually referring 
devices--that they are capable of determining or co-determining a refer-
ent. I am not sure I would call what the speaker did on this occasion 
pointing. I suspect that for a gesture to count as a case of pointing, 
the speaker must do it deliberately--she must intend to single out some 
object with the gesture. To overcome possible objections of this sort, 
let us assume that the speaker was actually pointing at Smith, not just 
stretching his arm. 
40 See, for example, Bertolet, _Q£. cit. 
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ably good inferences about what the speaker had in mind, so that 
successful communication is not a matter of chance. The second objec-
tion was that the referent of some referring devices which require 
disambiguation (e.g., 'that man') is not the individual the speaker had 
in mind, so the speaker's intentions do not determine the actual refer-
ent of a referring device of that type. We answered this objection by 
appealing to non-linguistic referring devices. These devices, such as 
pointing at someone and looking him straight in the eyes (while saying 
"that"), together with linguistic devices, may be capable of determining 
a unique referent, so that there is no need for disambiguation. In the 
absence of these auxiliary referring devices, however, the speaker's 
mental contents do seem important for determining the referent of 'that 
man' and even more so for determining the referent of 'that' when no 
predicate is added. If someone were to say out of the blue "That man is 
self-destructive" or "That is self-destructive" without any accompanying 
demonstrations, the expressions 'that man' and 'that' could still have 
referred. It certainly seems plausible that the individual to whom they 
referred is the one the speaker had in mind. 
Perhaps the most serious objection to the kinds of intentionalist 
theories we. have been considering is that the satisfaction relation is 
more problematic than other types of relations that account for the data 
equally well. The intentionalist accounts in question view the refer-
ence relation as a satisfaction relation between mental contents and 
objects in the world. Alternative intentionalist accounts view refer-
ence as a "causal" relation between objects and the world. 
We have looked at satisfaction accounts of 'having an object in 
mind' and found that they are problematic. For one thing, they require 
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that a speaker have some uniquely denoting description or representation 
for each individual that she refers to. It is unlikely that speakers do 
have such descriptions in mind whenever they refer to an individual. 
Another short-coming of satisfaction theories of having an object in 
mind is that they cannot account for cases in which the speaker has rad-
ically mistaken beliefs about, or representations of an object, but 
nonetheless has that object in mind. Finally, satisfaction theories 
leave open the possibility of fortuitous satisfaction. That is, a 
speaker may have a uniquely denoting representation of an .object (e.g., 
a representation of an antelope) which is not satisfied by the thing the 
speaker 'has in mind' (e.g., a rock that looks like an antelope), but is 
satisfied by some other object about which the speaker knows nothing 
(e.g., an antelope hidden behind the rock). The. weight of the evidence 
goes against the theory that a speaker has an object Q in mind if (and 
only if) she has a mental representation g (either linguisitic or non-
linguistic) such that Q and only Q fits or satisfies R. 
The failure of satisfaction theories adequately to account for 
what is involved in 'having an object in mind' presents us with a 
choice. We can either give up intentionalist accounts of disambiguation 
or develop an alternative account of 'having an object in mind'. The 
reason intentionalist accounts looked attractive in the first place was 
that they seemed to make sense of the fact that when we are not sure 
what a use of a referring expression refers to, we look to what the 
speaker had in mind. But this fact may be misleading. There are many 
things we rely on to discover what a use of a referring expression 
refers to. It may be that these other factors are the real determinants 
Of reference, and that the speaker's intentions to refer to some object 
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are really unimportant. Since 'having and object in mind' has not been 
adequately explained and is difficult to explain without begging the 
question, we might do· better to abandon it altogether and look for a 
less problematic way of explaining how reference is disambiguated. In 
the next chapter we will consider some non-intentionalist accounts of 
disambiguation. These accounts say that features of the context of 
utterance, together with linguistic devices for referring, determine 
reference. What the speaker intends to refer to is irrelevant. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONTEXTUAL THEORIES OF REFERENCE 
We have looked at satisfaction accounts of 'having an object in 
mind' and found that they are problematic. For one thing, they require 
that a speaker have some uniquely denoting description or representation 
for each individual that she refers to. It is unlikely that speakers do 
have such descriptions in mind whenever they refer to an individual. 
Another short-coming of satisfaction theories of having an object in 
mind is that they cannot account for cases in which the speaker has rad-
ically mistaken beliefs about, or representations of an object, but 
nonetheless has that object in mind. Finally, satisfaction theories 
leave open the possibility of fortuitous satisfaction. That is, a 
speaker may have a uniquely denoting representation of an object (e.g., 
a representation of an antelope) which is not satisfied by the thing the 
speaker 'has in mind' (e.g., a rock that looks like an antelope), but is 
satisfied by some other object about which the speaker knows nothing 
(e.g., an antelope hidden behind the rock). The weight of the evidence 
goes against the theory that a speaker has an object Q in mind if (and 
only if?) she has a mental representation g (either linguisitic or non-
linguistic) such that Q and only Q fits or satisfies R. 
The failure of satisfaction theories adequately to account for 
what is involved in 'having an object in mind' presents us with a 
choice. We can either give up intentionalist accounts of disambiguation 
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or develop an alternative account of 'having an object in mind'. The 
reason intentionalist accounts looked attractive in the first place is 
that they make sense of the fact that when we are not sure what a use of 
a referring expression refers to, we look to what the speaker had in 
mind. But this fact may be misleading. There are many things we rely 
on to discover what a use of a referring expression refers to. It may 
be that these other factors are the real determinants of reference, and 
that the speaker's intentions to refer to some object are really unim-
portant. Since 'having an object in mind' has not been adequately 
explained and is difficult to explain without begging the question, we 
might do better to abandon it altogether and look for a less problematic 
way of explaining how reference is disambiguated. In the next chapter 
we will consider some non-intentionalist accounts of disambiguation. 
These accounts say that features of the context of utterance, together 
with linguistic devices for referring, determine reference. 
speaker intends to refer to is irrelevant. 
What the 
Alternatives to intentionalist theories of disambiguation gener-
ally look to contextual features of the use of referring expressions. 
These features might include gestures made by the speaker, the preceding 
conversation, the audience, the physical environment of the speaker, and 
so forth. The contextual theories we will be considering are those 
which hold that features of the context of utterance directly determine 
reference. 
For these contextual theories to be adequate theories of reference 
disambiguation, they must tell us how the contextual features of a use 
of a referring expression systematically contribute to the determination 
of reference when combined with linguistic referring devices. An ade-
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quate account cannot just tell us how an audience uses these contextual 
clues or cues to understand what is being referred to, for in a theory 
of disambiguation we · are interested in explaining how reference is 
determined, not in explaining how reference is communicated. The fact 
that an audience relies on certain contextual cues to discover which 
object is being referred to does not entail that these cues are what 
determine reference any more than the fact that an audience looks to 
what a speaker 'had in mind' entails that intentions to refer to the 
object one 'has in mind' are what determine reference. These facts sug-
gest a way of explaining how reference is determined, but they do not 
prove that reference is determined in that way. 
With these constraints in mind, let us look at some current con-
textual theories of reference according to which reference is not deter-
mined (or disambiguated) by what the speaker had in mind. A non-inten-
tionalist account of disambiguation for proper names was recently 
proposed by Mark Norris Lance. 1 Lance argues that the context of utter-
ance, particularly the audience to whom a sentence containing a proper 
name is addressed, is an important determinant of reference. According 
to Lance, the audience is part of a subcommunity of an entire language 
community, for our purposes--the English-speaking community. Within 
these subcommunities, names that are ambiguous for the English language 
community as a whole, are not ambiguous. Lance argues his case as fol-
lows. 
The statement 'Dick is wearing a green tie' when put before the Eng-
lish language community at large, can be given no truth value for it 
1 
"Reference Without Causation," Philosophical Studies, 45 (1984), pp 
335-351. 
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contains an ambiguous term. Only by considering the context within 
which it was uttered, in particular the other people to whom it is 
intended to communicate information, can it be given a truth value. 
When I am speaking as a member of the linguistic community consist-
ing of my high school friends, 'Dick' refers to a certain balding 
bicycle racer. When I am speaking as a member of the philosophical 
community of Ohio State, it refers to someone else. 2 
The referent of a use of an ambiguous proper name, then, is determined 
by which community the proper name was uttered within. We could formu-
late a reference rule for proper names as follows: 
S refers to x with ·~· (or a 
x is a possible referent of 
~ommunity Q in which ·~· is 
about x and only about x. 
use of 'N' refers to x) if 
·~·, and-~ is speaking as 
(typically) used to convey 
and only if 
a member of 
information 
There seems to be something right about this proposal. We do find 
that when we use names which have a number of possible referents and 
there is no question about who· is meant, usually there is only one 
likely bearer of that name within that conversational context. However, 
there are problems with Lance's way of accounting for this fact. 
One problem is that even in very limited communities there can be 
more than one possible referent of a proper name. In the philosophy 
department at Loyola there are three Davids. Now, when I say to one of 
my colleagues in the philosophy department, "David was in California 
last weekend," it at least seems that 'David' refers to one David. 
Lance's account of disambiguation cannot explain this. In fact, rather 
than explain it, Lance chooses to deny what seems to be obvious, namely, 
that I referred to a particular person. His answer to such an objection 
is this: "I might have intended to refer to one particular person but 
there is a difference between intending to do something and doing it." 3 
2 Ibid. , p. 348. 
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His response to me, then, would be that I had failed to refer to any 
particular person and that, since my use of the name 'David' was irreme-
diably ambiguous, no truth value can be assigned to my statement. The 
only justification he gives for his claim that such uses are ambiguous 
is that, "reference for me is a social matter. My intentions, so long 
as they are not communicated to the rest of the linguistic community, do 
not carry any semantical weight." 4 
I do not find Lance's response very convincing. Surely we can 
believe that reference is a social matter without requiring that for 
every actual reference there must be an audience to whom the reference 
is sucessfully communicated. That is much too strong a requirement. If 
it were true, it would be difficult to explain how a new name could be 
introduced into a sub-community by one person. As long as the audience 
did not know whom this person was talking about, he would not actually 
be referring. Further, our intuitions tend to support the claim that 
'David' referred to one particular person in the sentence "David is in 
California this weekend," and that this statement has a truth value. 
The audience would not dismiss this statement because it lacked a truth 
value. Instead it might ask me which David I meant, or it might take 
'David' to have referred to the David about whom it is reasonable for me 
to believe that he was in California. If we are looking at actual 
social institutions and social practices, we should conclude that the 
audience does take this statement to have a truth value, and it does 
take the name 'David' to have referred even when it is not in a position 
3 Ibid. , p. 348. 
4 Ibid. 
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to know to what or to whom the name was referring. 
There are further problems with Lance's account of disambiguation. 
Lance himself admits that the notion of a community is vague. The basic 
idea is that using a name in a community should be understood in terms 
of transfers of information among members of the community. There is 
some question as to whether this notion can be made precise enough to be 
of much use in a theory of disambiguation. 
However, even if we suppose that communities can be identified in 
some way, there is still a question of which community is relevant for a 
particular use of a name. Each one of us belongs to many sub-communi-
ties of the kind Lance identifies (e.g., the community of his high-
school friends and the philosophical community at Ohio State). Some of 
these sub-communities are nested within larger sub-communities. For 
example, the philosophical community at Loyola University is part of a 
larger philosophical community. Within the philosophical community at 
Loyola there is a smaller community of moral philosophers at Loyola. 
The community of moral philosophers at Loyola is part of a larger commu-
nity of moral philosophers in Chicago, and an even larger community of 
moral philosoph~rs in the Mid-west, etc. For the sake of the argument, 
assume that Lance is correct in saying that the referent of a use of a 
name is determined, in part, by the speaker's relationship to a certain 
community (i.e., the speaker is speaking as a member of that community). 
What community are we to take a speaker to be a member of whep she uses 
a name? Suppose someone is a member of Loyola's philosophical commu-
nity, a member of the community of moral philosopers at Loyola, a member 
of the community of moral philosophers specializing in business ethics, 
etc. Suppose also that 'Dick' refers to one person within the philo-
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sophical community at Loyola, and to another person within the community 
of moral philosophers who specialize in business ethics. If our speaker 
uses the name 'Dick', ·to whom does she refer? According to Lance, it 
depends on which ~ommunity she is speaking as a member of. But which 
community is that? Since the speaker belongs to both communities, mere 
membership cannot provide the principle. Perhaps it depends on the com-
munity membership of the audience. Let us assume that our speaker is 
speaking to two people. One of them, ~, is a member of Loyola's philo-
sophical community but not a member of the community consisting of spe-
cialists in business ethics. The other, ~', is a member of both commu-
nities. If we say that the speaker is speaking as a member of the 
community to which her audience belongs, then we will have to conclude 
that she is making two statements here. To A' she makes a statement 
that is ambiguous, and therefore has no determinate truth value. For ~, 
her statement is about the person referred to with the name 'Dick' in 
the philosophical community at Loyola. Clearly, this cannot be correct. 
The speaker does not make two statements with two different truth values 
just because there are two people with different community memberships 
in her audience. 5 
5 We might want to say that the speaker is speaking as a member oi 
community f if and only if she intends to speak as a member of f, or she 
intends her audience to take her to be speaking as a member of f, but 
this seems to needlessly complicate matters. Why not just take her to 
be referring to the Dick she intends to refer to? 
A more promising tack would be to look to the context to discover 
which community is relevant. For example, if the conversation had been 
about business ethics, the relevant community would be the community of 
specialist:s in business ethics. If the conversation was about depart-
mental politics, the relevant community would be t:he philosophical com-
munity at Loyola. But the context will not always tell which community 
is relevant, and the speaker may abruptly change the subject. 
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If we recognize the fact that sub-communities often either overlap 
or are contained in one another, we find that Lance's account of disam-
biguation will not get us very far. The purpose of the theory is to 
explain how uses of ambiguous names refer to only one potential referent 
of that name. What we end up saying is that most (or at least, many) 
uses of ambiguous names do not refer to only one person or thing. 
Because we often cannot identify which community a speaker is speaking 
as a member of, the number of ambiguous references remains quite high. 
This is one reason to reject Lance's account of disambiguation. It is 
not a conclusive reason, since it is possible that many uses of names 
are irremediably ambiguous. 
Another reason to reject Lance's account of disambiguation is that 
it does not jibe with actual linguistic practices. When someone uses an 
ambiguous name, we do not usually try to find out which community that 
person is speaking as a member of in order to understand to whom the 
name she uses refers. For example, if I say "I saw a book that was ded-
icated to Cathy," you are not likely to ask yourself which community I 
might be speaking as a member of in order to discover to whom 'Cathy' 
refers in my sentence. 
Before we dismiss Lance's account of disambiguation we should con-
sider what seemed right about it. We admitted earlier that a name which 
is ambiguous for the entire E11:glish-speaking community is often not 
ambiguous within a smaller community. This is true not only for names 
·like 'John' and 'Bill' but also for more completely specified names, 
such as 'Kelly Mink'. My friend Kelly has informed me that there are 13 
Kelly Minks in the United States. That means that in the entir~ Ameri-
can English-speaking community the name is ambiguous. There are at 
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least 13 possible referents of the name in American English. Nonethe-
less, when I use the name, and when I hear others use the name, the 
question of which Kelly Mink is being referred to never even arises. In 
some sense, there is only one Kelly Mink that it could refer to. 
Lance would explain the fact that there is only one Kelly Mink 
that my use of 'Kelly Mink' could refer to by relativizing the reference 
potential of the name to a community. According to Lance, in the commu-
nity to which I belong, 'Kelly Mink' is used to convey information about 
a certain Kelly Mink and only about him. Because this is true of . my 
community, when I use the name, it refers to that Kelly Mink. We could 
argue that the reference potential of 'Kelly Mink' is not relative to a 
given linguistic sub-community, for it is clear that anyone who knows 
that there are 13 people named 'Kelly Mink' in the United States, also 
knows that 'Kelly Mink' can be used to refer to 13 different people. On 
the basis of what I know about the bearers of the name, 'Kelly Mink', I 
can refer to one of the other 12 Kelly Minks. I can say, for example, 
"Kelly Mink is a woman," and my sentence will be true, even though the 
Kelly Mink about whom information is typically conveyed in my linguistic 
community is not a woman. 
We can better explain the fact that within certain sub-communities 
of English-speaking people a use of an ambiguous proper name seems not 
to require disambiguation with an intentionalist theory of disambigua-
tion. According to such a theory, the reason we do not usually consider 
names such as 'Kelly Mink' ambiguous is that typically there is only one 
person that the speaker is able to intend to refer to with the name, 6 
6 Assuming that intending to refer to some person with a name 
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and only one person about whom the speaker is likely to have anything to 
say. 
Lance's observation that if he uses the name 'Dick', speaking to 
his high-school friends, 'Dick' refers to someone different from the 
person he refers to when he uses the name 'Dick' at Ohio State, can be 
explained in a similar way. When he is among his high school friends, 
who could be expected to know one Dick that Lance might want and be able 
to talk about, Lance need not, for the purposes of communication, make 
his intentions to refer to that person more explicit. He expects his 
audience to understand that the bicycle racer, Dick, was the one he had 
in mind, because they would normally have no reason to suppose he had 
another Dick in mind or would want to tell them about some other Dick. 
But 'Dick' probably does not always refer to the bicycle racer when 
Lance talks to his high school friends. He could say, for example, 
·"Dick is a person I know at Ohio State." Obviously, 'Dick' in this sen-
tence does not refer to the high-school Dick. Nor will Lance's high 
school friends take it to refer to that person. From the context they 
can tell that he is talking about someone else named 'Dick', someone 
they probably do not know. What makes it the case that he is talking 
about someone else cannot be the fact that he is speaking to his high 
school friends, or is speaking as a member of that community. 
The phenomenon that Lance bases his theory of disambiguation on 
can be better explained by intentionalist theories than by Lance's con-
textual theory. In addition, Lance's theory does not account for many 
cases in which someone seems to make a determinate reference. Lance 
requires that the speaker believes that this person bears this names. 
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would haVe to say that in these cases the reference was ambiguous and 
therefore the sentence lacked a determinate truth value. Further, if 
Lance's account were· correct, we would expect people to use a certain 
strategy to discover to whom a use of a name referred--namely, we would 
try to ascertain which community the speaker was speaking as a member 
of. But we do not seem to use this strategy. Instead, we try to ascer-
tain whom the speaker was thinking of or to whom she intended to refer. 
These reasons together justify our rejecting Lance's account. 
A stronger case can be made for non-intentionalist accounts of 
disambiguation for demonstratives and other indexicals. One such 
account is the contextual theory of demonstrative reference developed by 
Colin McGinn. 7 McGinn argues that the reference of demonstratives is 
determined in part by gestures, e.g., pointing. He suggests the follow-
ing spatio-temporal reference rule for demonstratives: 
the referent of a token of 'that F' is to be the first F to inter-
sect the line projected from the pointing finger, i.e., the Fat the 
place indicated--one might almost say geometrically--by the accompa-
nying gesture. 8 
He arrives at this reference rule by considering cases in which the 
speaker does not perceive the object to which he points and has only 
very general knowledge of it (the speaker may believe that it is an F 
and that it is located in a certain place). In one of these cases a 
factory inspector, while absent-mindedly looking away, gestures towards 
a car and says, "That car is road-worthy." Although the factory-inspec-
tor has no perceptual image of a car which the intended referent might 
7 
"The Mechanisms of Reference," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 157-186. 
8 Ibid., p. 163. 
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satisfy, 9 and even though the car itself is not causally related to his 
utterance, the inspector still refers to the car he is pointing at. 
McGinn's account of demonstrative reference includes 'paralinguis-
tic' gestures among the determinants of reference. I suspect that such 
gestures are institutionalized referring devices, in the same sense that 
some linguistic expressions are. However, there are difficulties with 
McGinn's account of how such non-linguistic devices operate. First of 
all, McGinn' s account can apply only to demonstratives which are accom-
panied by a sortal (e.g., 'that man' rather than simply 'that'). McGinn 
says that the rule according to which the referent of a demonstrative 
'that F' is determined, determines the referent to be the first F which 
intersects the line projected from the pointing finger. If we try to 
generalize this rule to account for 'pure' demonstratives, for example, 
the word 'that' in the sentence, "That has been watching us all night," 
McGinn's spatio-temporal account will not work. We should have to say 
something like, "The referent of 'that' is the first thing (or individ-
ual) to intersect the line projected from the pointing finger." But the 
first thing to intersect that line might be a speck of dust, a molecule 
of oxygen or a mosquito too far away to be seen. In most cases, how-
ever, such things would not be the referent of 'that'. In addition, the 
'thing' which first intersects the line could be described as many dif-
ferent 'things ' . The thing in question could be a complete object, a 
part of an object, a property of an object, an activity, etc. The 
pointing itself is too indeterminate to be able to disambiguate refer-
9 A satisfaction theorist might say that he intends to refer· to the 
car at which he is now pointing. This would be enough to fix the refer-
ence. 
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ence. But certainly we can and do refer to individuals with pure demon-
stratives like 'this' and 'that'. 
McGinn might want to argue that a sortal is always implicit in 
demonstrative reference. When the sorta! is not explicitly stated, as 
in the sentence, "That has been watching us all night" either we have to 
say that the referent is ambiguous and so the sentence has no determi-
nate truth value or we will have to find some principle according to 
which the sortal is supplied. Since in the case of the antelope-looking 
rock it seems that there is a referent for the word 'that', we should 
not accept the first alternative. That means we must find some way of 
determining which sortal is to be supplied. Spatio-temporal factors 
will be of little help here. 
Another reason for rejecting McGinn' s account of demonstrative 
reference is that it limits demonstrative reference to things which can 
be pointed at. But we are able to refer to things with a demonstrative 
of the form 'that F' even when the thing cannot be pointed to. 1 ° For 
example, on hearing a clap of thunder, one can say "That noise was 
loud," even though one could not point to the noise. 
Perhaps the most serious short-coming of McGinn's contextual 
theory is that it falls prey to the problem of fortuitous 'satisfac-
tion'. Suppose our speaker had seen an antelope-looking rock and said, 
"That antelope has been watching us all night 11 while pointing to the 
rock. As he points, an antelope is grazing several miles away but on a 
line with the pointing. On McGinn' s account, the referent of 'that 
1 0 Howard Wettstein makes this point in "How to Bridge 
between Meaning and Reference, 11 Synthese, 58 (1984), pp. 63-84. 
77 for a discussion of McGinn. 
the Gap 
See p. 
96 
antelope' will be the first antelope to intersect the line projected by 
the pointing finger; in this case, the antelope that is several miles 
away. But surely, 'that antelope' does not refer to some antelope that 
the speaker has neither seen nor heard, which is and has been completely 
out of view. It is clear that, in this case, 'that antelope' either 
refers to nothing at all because the speaker has mis-spoken, or it 
refers to the rock the speaker is pointing to. It does not refer to 
the antelope that just happened to be the first one to intersect the 
line projected by the pointing finger. 
Another version of a contextual theory of reference for indexicals 
and demonstratives can be found in Howard Wettstein' s paper, "How to 
Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference." 11 On Wettstein' s view, 
there are contextual cues which the speaker exploits to make his 
intended reference available to his audience. Such cues include point-
ing to something and looking directly at it. One can also narrow down 
the field of possible referents of an expression by taking advantage of 
the fact that one individual is the only one in view (e.g., one relies 
on the fact that there is only one table in the room when one says, "The 
table is too crowded, 11 ). Or one can take advantage of the fact that 
some individual is prominent. The cues that the speaker exploits (or to 
all appearances exploits) not only help the audience to figure out what 
the speaker intends to refer to, they actually determine reference. 
11 Ibid. This is the most complete and recent exposition of Wett-
stein' s contextual theory. For earlier discussions along a similar line 
see Wettstein' s "The Semantic Significance of the Referential-Attribu-
tive Distinction," Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 187-1% and 
"Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Stud-
~' 40 (1981), pp. 241-257. 
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Wettstein characterizes the cues which determine reference as follows. 
One who utters a demonstrative is responsible, from the point of 
view of the natural language institution, for making his intended 
reference available to his addressee, and so he is responsible for 
the cues that a competent and attentive addressee would take him to 
be exploiting. The cues for which he is responsible, those that he, 
to all appearances, exploits, are the cues that determine the refer-
ence. 12 
There is much that is right in Wettstein's paper. In particular, 
it seems right to look at non-linguistic (but conventional or at least 
institutionally recognized) cues as determinants of reference, not 
merely as clues which help the audience identify the object which is the 
referent. 
The intentionalist's alternative to seeing pointing, for example, 
as a co-determinant of reference, is to say that pointing merely pro-
vides a clue to the audience about which object is the referent. The 
referent was determined by the speaker's intentions to refer to that 
object, or by her having that object in mind. To show that the inten-
tionalist account is wrong, we need to find cases in which the speaker 
has one object in mind (and intends to refer to it) but actually refers 
to something else--namely, the thing pointed to. David Kaplan has pro-
vided examples of cases like this. 13 
Suppose that without turning and looking I point to a place on my 
wall which has long been occupied by a picture of Rudolph Carnap and 
I say: 
Dthat (I point as above] is a picture of one of the greatest philos-
ophers of the twentieth century. 
12 
"How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference," p. 73. 
13 
"Dthat," in Peter French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds.}, Con-
temporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp 383-400. 
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But unbeknownst to me, someone has replaced my picture of Carnap 
with one of Spiro Agnew .... I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew 
that it pictures one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth 
century. And my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural 
interpretation to ·the linguistically competent public observer. 14 
, I What we see in these cases is that pointing at some ~ and saying, that 
F' together can override the speaker's intentions. Even though the 
speaker intended to refer to Rudolph Carnap's picture, the actual refer-
ent was not the picture of Rudolph Carnap, it was the picture Kaplan 
pointed to. From cases of this kind, we should conclude that pointing 
at F and saying 'that F' do together determine reference. 15 
Pointing at an F that is in view and saying, 'that F' does appear 
to determine a unique referent at least sometimes. The pointing is not 
merely a cue for the audience; it is actually a determinant of reference 
which can override the speaker's intentions. And pointing is not the 
only cue that operates this way. We can determine a unique referent 
using other gestures in conjunction with ambiguous referring· devices. 
For example, if I pick up a book and wave it in the air while saying, 
"This book is a classic of Western civilization," my waving the book 
co-determines a unique referent for 'this book'. Had I picked up the 
wrong book, my intention to refer to a certain book would be thwarted. 
For example, I may have inadvertently picked up a volume of Copleston's 
~ History of Philosophy. If I did, then I inadvertently referred to 
that volume. To this extent, Wettstein is correct in saying that "ref-
14 Ibid., p. 396. 
15 It is not clear what kind of reference rule governs pointing. We 
have already seen that a purely spatio-temporal one like McGinn's will 
not work. Usually, we can point at something only if it (or some part 
of it) is visible (over a period of time). 
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erence is determined by the very features which make reference available 
to the auditor." 16 
Wettstein does not want to count every cue that helps the audience 
identify the referent as a determinant of reference. He limits the 
semantically significant cues, the ones that count as determinants of 
reference, to those which the speaker is responsible for. According to 
Wettstein, the cues the speaker is responsible for are those which the 
addressee would take her to be exploiting. 
Although I agree with Wettstein that there are non-linguistic 
determinants of reference and that these devices also serve as cues for 
the addressee, I do not accept Wettstein's way of characterizing these 
semantically significant cues. 17 Consequently, some of the cues which he 
accepts as semantically significant I would not accept. 
Wettstein says that the determinants of reference are those cues 
which a competent and attentive addressee would take the speaker to be 
exploiting, rather than those which the speaker actually does exploit or 
intends to exploit. The reason for holding a speaker responsible for 
cues which an addressee would take her to be exploiting is not entirely 
clear. Wettstein introduces this stipulation after considering the case 
cited above, 18 in which the speaker "walks up to Smith, stares straight 
at him, extends his finger right in Smith's face, and says, 'That is a 
self-destructive man' . " What Wettstein notices in this case is that if 
16 
.QE. Cit., p. 64. 
17 Note that semantically significant cues are those cues which actu-
ally determine (or co-determine) reference. 
18 See pp. 40f. 
100 
the speaker does all these things, then he refers to Smith, even if he 
did not do these things in order to make his intended reference availa-
ble to the audience. · In fact, in this case his intended reference was 
not Smith at all. Nonetheless, if one does all these things, one refers 
to Smith. That is the basic intuition. But the intuition alone does 
not count for much unless we can explain why this is the case. Wett-
stein explains it in terms of what the speaker can be held responsible 
for doing. The speaker, whether he wanted to use these cues or not, did 
use them and is thus responsible for using them. In much the same way, 
a speaker is responsible for saying something, or rather, producing cer-
tain sounds which constitute a sentence in the language of his addres~ 
see. What the speaker says, strictly speaking, is a matter of what the 
sentence he produced says. It does not matter, "from the point of view 
of the natural language institution," 19 whether he,meant them or not, or 
whether he intended to say what he said. We could try to explain the 
fact that the speaker said what his sentence said in terms of the cues 
an attentive and competent addressee would take the speaker to be 
exploiting, just as Wettstein explains the fact that the speaker refer-
red to Smith even though he did not mean to, by looking at what cues the 
addressee would take the speaker to be exploiting. But to leave it at 
that is unsatisfactory. The important question is: Why would the compe-
tent and attentive addressee take the speaker to be exploiting certain 
cues? I propose that the answer is that certain cues are conventional 
means for referring. They are part of the natural language institution 
19 This is Wettstein' s phrase. This is a useful point of view to 
take when talking about reference. 
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just as words and phrases are. This means that anyone who uses these 
devices is responsible for their 'effects', whether he intended them to 
have these effects or.not, whether he intended them to be devices or 
not. Because the addressee (and the linguistic community as a whole) 
can be reasonably expected to recognize these conventional means for 
saying something or for referring, it will (or would) take the speaker 
to be exploiting these cues. 
We can formulate the distinction between semantically significant 
cues and cues which merely help the audience identify the referent 
(without actually determining the referent) in terms of conventional 
devices. If we do, there is no need to appeal to an audience to find 
out which cues a speaker is responsible for. We may use the notion of a 
competent and attentive addressee as a heuristic device to help us 
determine which cues are conventional devices and which are not, but the 
emphasis should be placed on the fact that there are publicly recog-
nized, conventional means for determining reference. These non-linguis-
tic devices are on a par with linguistic devices. If one uses these 
devices, either deliberately or inadvertently, then a referent is deter-
mined. 
Not all cues that an audience relies on to identify the referent 
of some expression are semantically significant. Further, not all cues 
that a speaker exploits (or appears to exploit) to communicate his 
intended reference are semantically significant. Some features of a 
context of utterance may help us to communicate reference and to iden-
tify an intended referent, and yet they may fail tci be conventional 
means for determining reference. 
What kinds of cues should we count as conventional means for 
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determining reference? I propose that a conventional means for deter-
mining reference is one which, whenever used, affects what is said. 
Pointing seems to be· a conventional means for determining reference, 
since whenever one points to .an F and says 'that £:' , one refers to the 
F that was pointed to. Other gestures typically used in conjunction 
with demonstratives (or quasi-demonstratives), such as waving an object, 
picking it up and thrusting it into the air, etc., also affect what is 
said, regardless of the speaker's intentions. 
Earlier we mentioned other features of a context that a speaker 
might take advantage of to communicate her intended referent. For exam-
ple, we said that one may take advantage of the fact that there is only 
one table in the room in order to communicate to one's audience the ref-
erent of 'the table' in the sentence 'The table has a wobbly leg'. One 
may also take advantage of the fact that one object is prominent to com-
municate one's intended reference. These cues, however, do not seem to 
be conventional devices for determining a referent. Sometimes they are 
important, sometimes they are not. It is not the case that whenever 
they are (or seem to be) used they affect what is said. 
Suppose someone walks into a room which has one very large table 
(a conference room or seminar room) and says, "The table has a wobbly 
leg." The addressee's first guess might be that the table in question 
is the one in the room. He might examine it to see if it wobbles, and 
finding that it is quite stable, say "It doesn't seem to have a wobbly 
leg." The speaker could reply, "Oh, not that table. The table in the 
other room where I was just working." In this discourse, the audience 
could not respond that the speaker had actually said that the table in 
this room had a.wobbly leg (as he could if the speaker had pointed to 
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the table in this room). Nor could he accuse the speaker of mis-using 
generally recognized means for communicating reference. The fact that 
there is only one table in the room where the speaker says 'the table' 
is only sometimes useful in communicating an intended referent. It is a 
cue, not a determinant of reference. We do not, as a matter of fact, 
hold a speaker responsible for exploiting such a feature of the context 
of utterance, as we do hold her responsbible for saying certain words or 
making certain gestures. 
Similarly, we do not hold a speaker responsible for exploiting the 
fact that one K is prominent when she says, 'the F' or 'that F'. For 
example, suppose the following conversation takes place in front of a 
pig-pen containing several pigs. 
S: The pig over in that corner [points to a corner] is mine. 
A: [Looks in the corner. There are three pigs, but one of them is 
prominent. It is black and big while the others are pink and 
small; it is standing on its snout while the other two are lying 
down.] It sure is a clever one. 
S: No, not that one. The little one lying over there with the 
black markings on its snout. 
The audience would not be justified in saying, "Well, that is not the 
one you were talking about. Strictly speaking, you said that the big, 
black pig was yours, because it was the one which was prominent." Com-
pare this conversation to a similar one in which the speaker said the 
same thing, but had clearly pointed to the big, black pig. In such a 
case the addressee would be justified if he scolded the speaker for 
pointing to the wrong pig and thus for mis-using the conventions of Eng-
lish. 
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Features of the context such as the fact that there is only one 
table in a room or that one pig stands out are cues that a speaker may 
exploit on some occasions to communicate his intended reference, and 
they can be used by an addressee to identify the intended referent, but 
these features of the context do not have the 'force of law' character-
istic of conventional devices. The natural language institution does 
not incorporate such features into its structure, and probably for good 
reason. It is unlikely that features of the context of utterance over 
which the speaker has little or no control will be recognized by the 
linguistic community as a whole as cues that determine what one says. 
The reason for this may be a function of our notion of responsibility. 
At least in English, the conventional devices which a speaker is held 
responsible for exploiting are those which she can deliberately produce, 
such as sounds and gestures. We do not hold the speaker to a statement 
which the speaker would have made had the reference rule incorporated 
contextual features such as the fact that only one I was in sight when 
the speaker said 'the F'. 
Of course, this line of argument is inconclusive. We do have suf-
ficient control over our sound production to be held responsible for 
producing certain sounds in certain contexts. For example, I would be 
held responsible for yelling "Fire!" where there was no fire. Thus, we 
could be held responsible for exploiting certain features of the context 
of utterance in order to communicate our intended referent even though 
we have no control over those features. However, as a matter of fact, 
we are not generally held responsible for such cues. 
To show that such features of the context of utterance are not 
part of the English-language institution, let us imagine a language in 
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which these contextual features do determine reference. In this lan-
guage, there is a reference rule of the form: The referent of 'the F' 
is ~' if x is an F and x is the only I in sight or prominent. If the 
speakers of this language want to observe the conventions of their lan-
guage, they will have to check their surroundings before they use 
expressions with the form, 'the F' . To use these expressions car-
rectly, they have to determine, before they speak, whether there is only 
one object or one prominent object of the kind they wish to refer to. 
If there is, and if that object is not the one they wish to refer to, 
they will have to find some other expression to communicate their 
intended referent. If English were a language in which this reference 
rule was incorporated, we would expect that conscientious speakers would 
pay this kind of attention to the circumstances in which they speak. 
But they do not. English does not require that a speaker look to see 
whether there is only one table in view or one prominent pig before she 
uses the expression 'the table' or 'the pig'. These types of cues cannot 
be counted as semantically significant. 
The features of a context which we will count as determinants of 
reference are those which can be incorporated into reference rules for 
the language which hold under normal circumstances. 2 0 So far we have 
accepted gestures accompanying demonstrative expressions as determinants 
of reference. Wettstein also suggests that grammatical considerations 
should be taken into account. 2 1 For example, if someone says, "That is 
20 These reference rules could be overruled in special circumstances, 
for example in fictional contexts. 
21 QE. Cit., p. 75. 
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the author of an important paper on decision theory," the predicate 
narrows the range of possible referents of 'that'. Not just any indi-
vidual can, according to the rules of English, be the referent. The 
color green, for example, cannot be. The referent must at least be an 
object. 22 Similarly, the referent of 'that' in the sentence, 'The cat is 
on that', cannot be any individual whatever. It must be an object that 
something can be said to be on. We could say that the sentence in which 
a referring expression occurs is a feature of the context of utterance 
which helps to determine reference because it narrows the range of 
potential referents. 
The referent of some referring expressions can also depend on ref-
erence links (or anaphoric chains. 2 3 For example, the referent of the 
'he' pronoun in the following conversation is determined by its link 
with the name, 'Garry Trudeau'. 
S: Garry Trudeau gave the most accurate protrayal of the 
present state of higher education that I've seen all year. 
A: Oh, I saw that. Yes, he certainly seems to have captured 
what's going on in my classes. 
The referent of this use of 'he' depends on its connection with the pre-
ceding sentence. The context in which 'he' was used plays a part in 
determining reference. 
22 It could be argued that the referent must also be an agent, or 
even a person, but that seems too strong. A speaker may have bizarre 
beliefs and predicate something false of some object. English grammar 
does not protect us from this kind of mistake. 
23 For a more complete discussion of anaphora and anaphoric chains, 
see Charles Chastain' s, "Reference and Context," in Keith Gunderson 
(ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1975), pp. 194-269. 
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Of course, features of the context of utterance also play a role 
d · · th f f · d · 1 The referent of 'I ' , in eterm1n1ng e re erence o pure in ex1ca s. 
for example, is normally determined by who uses it, 24 the context also 
determines the referent of 'here' , 'there', I I now , 'tomorrow' , etc. 
Since the importance of the context for determining the referent of 
these indexicals is almost universally recognized, there is no need for 
us to say more about them here. 
In the preceding discussion we argued that certain features of the 
context of utterance should not be considered semantically significant. 
We argued that the fact that someone addresses a statement to a particu-
lar audience does not determine the reference of a proper name. We also 
rejected contextual cues such as the fact that there is only one table 
in the immediate surroundings when one says 'the table'. We argued that 
these cues do often guide the audience's interpretation of what is said, 
but that they do not determine reference in the way that, for example, 
certain gestures used in conjunction with a demonstrative do. 
If we restrict contextual cues that determine reference to those 
which are incorporated into the rules of language, then we will find 
that after we have taken all these cues into consideration, there are 
still a number of sentences in which the referring expression remains 
ambiguous. 
The point of looking at contextual theories of reference was to 
see whether they could serve as alternatives to the more problematic 
intentionalist theories of reference disambiguation. We have seen that 
24 This reference rule does not hold when 'I' is used in direct quo-
tation or in fictional contexts. 
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some features of the context (e.g., pointing and other gestures), 
actually do determine, or at least co-determine, reference. When some-
one says 'that !' while pointing to an f, the referent of 'that F' is 
the f she pointed to. 25 By taking into consideration these conventional, 
but non-linguistic devices for referring, we can explain how reference 
is disambiguated in some cases. But there are many remaining cases 
where these cues, together with a referring expression, are not suffi-
cient to determine a unique referent. 
It seems that there are two likely responses the contextual thee-
rist can give here. He can either supplement the contextual theory with 
an intentionalist one or he can argue that many times when there appears 
to be a determinate reference, the reference is actually ambiguous. 
David Kaplan clearly opts for the first alternative. In cases 
where the gesture and saying 'that' (or in Kaplan's special language, 
saying 'dthat') is not sufficient to determine which object is the ref-
erent, the referent is determined by the speaker's intentions. Thus, he 
25 We have not considered cases in which the speaker says, 'that F' 
but points to something which is not F. For example, when she says, 
"that antelope" but points to a rock. The initial response is to say 
she refers to the thing she is pointing to. But this will not do. For 
one thing, there is the problem of the indeterminancy of ostension. Any 
time one points, there are numerous things that could be the referent of 
the pointing. We might resolve this ambiguity by placing a further 
restriction on the pointing. For example, we could propose that the 
referent is the ~ which is pointed at and which belongs to the same gen-
eral category as F. In the antelope case, the general category might be 
'large, physical ~bject'. Thus in this case, the rock would be the ref-
erent. But there is a further problem. If the truth value of the 
statement, 'That antelope has been there all night' depends on whether 
the predicate is true of the referent, then the statement 'That antelope 
has been there all night' will be true if and only if the rock has been 
there all night. That seems to be wrong. (Here we might want to dis-
tinguish what the speaker meant (or intended to refer to) from what her 
sentence said. 
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writes, 
When I point at my son (and say 'I love dthat'), I may also be 
pointing at a book he is holding, his jacket, a button on his 
jacket, his skin,- his heart, and his dog standing behind him--from 
the surveyor's point of view. NY point is that if I intended to 
point at my son and it is true that I fove him, then what I said is 
true. 26 
Wettstein opts for the other alternative. He argues that when the 
available cues are not sufficient to determine a unique referent, the 
referent is simply ambiguous. 
If the speaker fails to make his reference available, his speech act 
is defective, and not even the best intentions can repair the 
defect. The speaker, strictly speaking, has not asserted anything 
determinate, i.e., anything at all. 27 
Earlier we saw that Lance had the same kind of response. For him, also, 
the speaker's intentions carried no semantical weight if they were not 
communicated to the rest of the linguistic community. And when the 
audience could not tell which David, for example, was in question when I 
said, "David is in California this week-end," the statement containing 
that name had no determinate truth value. 
The problem with contextual theories that do not incorporate 
speakers' intentions into their account of disambiguation is that they 
leave too many uses of referring expressions ambiguous, and too many 
sentences stating nothing determinate. Surely, Kaplan states something 
determinate when he points to his son and says, "I love dthat." And it 
seems just as clear that the person who points to a rock and says, "That 
has been watching us all night" also says something determinate (and 
false). The same thing can be said of the statement "David is in Cali-
26 0 ~· 
27 0 ~· 
cit., p. 396. 
cit., p. 75. 
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fornia this weekend." In all of these cases it at least seems as though 
one particular thing is the referent. 
Although contextual factors play a role in determining reference, 
they do not, by themselves, account for all those cases in which refer-
ence seems to have been made to a particular object by means of ambigu-
ous referring devices. This fact suggests that contextual theories are 
not adequate theories of disambiguation. We should incorporate contex-
tual cues into our theory of disambiguation, but the theory requires 
something more. 
We would reject a non-intentionalist theory of disambiguation, 
then, because such a theory cannot account for many cases in which 
determinate reference seems to be made, even though the referring 
expression and other, contextual, determinants of reference fail to 
determine a unique referent. We find such a case when Kaplan points to 
his son and says "I love that." The word 'that' can, according to the 
rules of English, be used to refer to any individual. The possible ref-
erents of 'that' in the sentence, 'I love that', are objects, properties 
of objects, actions, etc. 28 In addition, the possible referents of the 
pointing gesture are also numerous. We can also suppose that the 
expression is not referentially linked to some other referring expres-
sion in the preceding discourse. The non-intentionalist theorist, find-
ing no way of explaining how a unique referent is determined in this 
case, has to deny that this use of 'that' refers to any particular 
28 The English sentence-form: 'I love ~' takes a wide variety of 
objects. All of the following are well-formed English sentenc.es: 'I 
love Justin,' 'I love green', 'I love the way she stands,' 'I love ski-
• I 1ng , etc. 
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object. According to him, it is irreparably ambiguous. 
Al though the pure contextual theorists' conclusion flies in the 
face of our intuitions· about this sentence, their position is not unte-
nable. The best defense for their refusing to acknowledge what seems 
obvious, for example, that the word 'that' did refer to someone, 
requires making a clear distinction between what the speaker said and 
what his sentence said. Thus, a pure contextual theorist can say that 
in the sentence we were considering, the speaker may have said that he 
loves his son, even though the sentence he used did not. The fact that 
we would take the speaker to have said that he loves his son if we know 
that he intended to refer to his son, does not mean that the sentence he 
used says this. If we are interested in understanding what the speaker 
wants to say, as we generally are in everyday conversation, then we will 
look to his intentions to find out what he meant. This accounts for our 
intuition that Kaplan did say something determinate when he said, while 
pointing to his son, "I love that." But if we are interested in what 
the referents of its referring expressions are, then we will find that 
the sentence lacks a determinate truth-value because one of its refer-
ring expressions is ambiguous. 
Clearly, there is sometimes a difference between what a speaker 
means and what the sentence he uses to say it says. This distinction is 
especially important when the speaker mis-uses the conventions of the 
language, either through sloppiness or because of mistaken beliefs. For 
example, if someone mistakenly believes that the person sitting in front 
of her murdered Smith (and the person to whom she is talking knows that 
the speaker believes this) then when the speaker says, "Smith's murderer 
is insane," we might want to distinguish what the speaker meant from 
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what the sentence said. If it is true that the person sitting in front 
of the speaker is insane, but false that Smith's murderer is insane, we 
can account for our intuition that the speaker 'said' something true 
even though the sentence she uttered seems to be false, by making this 
distinction. When a speaker mis-uses the conventions of the language, 
this is the best way to account for conflicting intuitions about what 
was said. 
It is not quite so clear that this distinction between what a 
speaker says and what her sentence says should be made when the conven-
tions of the language are observed, as they are, for example, in the 
sentence "I love that" where the speaker points to his son (among other 
things). The motivation for making this distinction is not the same in 
these cases. In the former case (Smith's murderer), we needed to dis-
tinguish between what the speaker said and what her sentence said in 
order to account for conflicting intuitions about the truth value of the 
sentence/utterance. But we do not have such conflicting intuitions 
about cases like "the one in which someone points and says, "I love 
that." Suppose Kaplan's son is holding a book which Kaplan believes is 
one he loves (it has the same cover and is approximately the same size), 
but the book is, in fact, one that he dislikes. Kaplan points to the 
book (and his son, and his son's jacket, etc.) and says, "I love that." 
If we know that Kaplan intended to refer to the book, we want to say 
that the sentence is false. This corresponds with our intuition that 
the speaker said something true when she said "Smith's murderer is 
insane." But in this case, there does not seem to be a conflicting 
intuition to the effect that the sentence is not false. Here there 
seems to be no reason to distinguish what the speaker said from what his 
113 
sentence said other than an unwillingness to accept intentions as deter-
minants of reference. Without some further reason for rejecting inten-
tions as determinants< of reference, we should not accept a purely con-
textual theory of reference disambiguation. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CAUSAL THEORY OF NAMES 
In the preceding chapters we rejected both satisfaction theories 
and contextual theories of disambiguation. Satisfaction theories were 
problematic because they required the speaker to have a uniquely denot-
ing description or representation in mind in order for a singular refer-
ring expression to refer to a particular individual. Even more imper-
tantly, satisfaction theories are open to counter-examples involving 
fortuitous satisfaction. Contextual theories were also problematic. 
Although we accepted the contextual theorist's claim that certain fea-
tures of a context of utterance are important non-linguistic determi-
nants of reference, we did not accept the claim that these determinants 
plus linguistic conventions governing reference potential were the o~ly 
factors relevant to disambiguating reference. We argued that when these 
factors are insufficiently determinate to determine a unique reference, 
other factors play a role. We suggested that these other factors 
involve some kind of causal relation between the speaker and the refer-
ent. 1 
1 It should be noted that our case against contextual theories is 
provisional in the sense that it rests on intuitions about cases which 
need not be shared and are certainly not decisive. (For example, it 
seems as though Kaplan refers to a determinate thing when we says, "I 
love that." If he is thinking of his son, then "thc;t" refers to his 
son.) Insofar as we want to accommodate these intuitions we need to go 
beyond a contextual theory. In this chapter I will suggest how we might 
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In this chapter I will develop an alternative account of disambig-
uation along the lines of a causal theory of reference. This account 
avoids the problems of satisfaction theories (especially that of fortui-
tous satisfaction) while accounting for the determinancy of reference 
when conventional linguistic and non-linguistic (that is, contextual) 
referring devices leave the reference indeterminate. 
To develop this account I will first outline the basic tenets of 
causal theories of reference, by concentrating on the causal theory of 
names. 2 The reason for looking at causal theories of names first is that 
the causal theory of reference was first developed as a theory of names, 
at least with respect to singular reference. The early formulations of 
the theory set the stage for the development of causal accounts of other 
types of referring devices. By looking at these early causal theories, 
we can find the motivations for, and basic insights of, causal theories 
of reference in general. 
One of the important features of causal theories is their recogni-
tion of reference chains or parasitic reference; another is the idea 
that primary reference is typically grounded in the referent. Once 
these ideas have been introduced in the context of the causal theory of 
names, we will be in a position to expand the causal account to cover 
disambiguation of other referring devices. 
It should be noted that in the discussion of the causal theory of 
do this. However, it will become clear through this discussion that it 
makes no difference whether we accept a contextual or causal theory of 
disambiguation for the larger issue of explaining how reference poten-
tial is determined. 
2 This emphasis on names is not due to the belief that names are a 
fundamental or basic device for singular reference. 
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names, I presuppose a causal theory of how the reference potential of 
names is determined. I do so in order to illustrate the main features 
of causal theories of· reference, features which characterize not only 
the causal theory of names but also causal theories of disambiguation 
for other types of referring devices. One could hold a satisfaction 
account of the reference potential of names and a causal account of 
disambiguation. 3 
Recall that the overall goal of this dissertation is to show the 
proper role of speaker's intentions in the theory of reference. By 
developing an acceptable theory of reference disambiguation which 
acknowledges speaker's intentions, we will see how and to what extent 
the speaker's intentions are important for disambiguating reference and 
thus provide one part of the answer to our major question: what is the 
proper role of a speaker's intentions to refer in a theory of reference? 
Our results in the next two chapters will have important implications 
for the part of the theory of reference which accounts for reference 
potential. 
In this chapter I will develop the framework for a causal theory 
of names. The account I present here will be based primarily on Saul 
K 0 k I II ' II f 4 b 0 0 11 k • b' 0 rip e s picture o names, ut it wi ta e into account o Jections 
to the causal theory that have been raised since the theory was first 
proposed. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop a complete 
3 David Kaplan proposes such a theory in "Quantifying In," Svnthese, 
19 (1968-1969), pp. 178-214; see especially p. 200. 
4 See "Naming and Necessity," in G. Harmon and D. Davidson (eds.), 
Semantics of Natural Languages, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 2-53-355, 
especially pp. 298-303. Kripke never developed a full-fledged theory of 
names. He called his account a "picture" of how names work. 
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theory of the reference of proper names. What I hope to show is that 
some version of the causal theory is a genuine alternative to satisfac-
·tion theories, and that it is the most plausible account of the refer-
ence of proper names that we have, even though the details have not yet 
been completely worked out. 
The insight causal theories of names have tried to develop is that 
the reference of a proper name depends on the existence of linguistic 
practices within a community rather than on the individual name-user's 
beliefs about the referent. Kripke expresses the basic idea as follows: 
In general our reference depends not just on what we think our-
selves, but on other people in the community, the history of how the 
name reached. one, and things like that. 5 
Keith Donnellan makes basically the same point, with a special emphasis 
on the history of the name-using practice. 
Suppose someone says, "Socrates was snub-nosed," and we ask to whom 
he is referring. The central idea is that this calls for a histori-
cal explanation; we search not for an individual who might best fit 
the speaker's description of the individual to whom he takes himself 
to be referring ... , but rather for an individual historically 
related to his use of the name "Socrates" on this occasion. 6 
If we view the reference of proper names within the framework of 
name-using practices within a community the question, "how is the refer-
ence of a proper name determined?" can be broken down into two ques-
tions: (1) How are the name-using practices within a community estab-
lished and preserved? and (2) Under what conditions is an individual 
5 
"Naming and Necessity," p. 301. 
6 
"Speaking of Nothing," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83 (1974), 
pp. 3-32. Reprinted in Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and 
Natural Kinds, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 216-244. 
See especially pp. 229f. 
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name user participating in a certain name-using practice? 7 The first 
question is a question about the reference potential of names; the sec-
ond concerns the disambiguation of names. 8 According to the caus;:i.l 
theory, a name ~. can be used to refer to an object o if there is a 
practice of using that name to refer to o it can also be used to refer 
to b if there is a practice of using that name to refer to ~. etc. 9 
What a name can be used to refer to (in a given language) is determined, 
then, by what practices are in effect in the linguistic community. 1 ° For 
example, the name 'Kelly Mink' can be used to refer to each of the 14 
Kelly Minks in the U.S. because there are at least 14 distinct practices 
involving that name in the American English-speaking community. 11 Disam-
biguation of reference, according to causal theories is a matter of 
7 A name-using practice is, basically, a practice of using a name to 
refer to a certain individual. This may be one person's practice (e.g., 
a person's using the name 'St. Martin' to refer to Heidegger), or it may 
be the practice of many people within a linguistic community (e.g., the 
practice of referring to Handel with the name 'Handel'). 
8 The notion of a name-using practice only provides an explanatory 
framework for a theory of reference for names; it is not part of the 
actual account of how the reference of names is determined. An accepta-
ble theory of names cannot explain the reference of names simply by say-
ing there are name-using practices (or ways of using a name) within a 
community, and people participate in these practices. This would not be 
an explanation. It would however, permit us to see what needs to be 
explained. To account for the reference of names we shall have to say 
how name-using practices are established and what constitutes participa-
tion in such a practice. Once these questions have been answered, there 
would no longer be any reason to incorporate talk about name-using prac-
tices into the theory. 
9 We will leave the question of how practices are established and 
preserved open for now. 
10 It should be noted that new name-using practices are established 
all the time. The reference potential of names is fluid. 
11 There are probably others which involve people who are dead and 
there will no doubt be additional Kelly Minks in the future. 
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which practice the name, as it is used, is connected with. For example, 
the referent of 'Kelly Mink' in my statement "Kelly Mink is in charge of 
the coffee today," is determined by which 'Kelly Mink' -using practice I 
am participating in. If my use is connected with the practice of refer-
ring to Kelly Mink-1, then I am referring to Kelly Mink-1, if it is con-
nected with the practice of referring to Kelly Mink-2, then I am refer-
ring to Kelly Mink-2, etc. 
Saying that the determination of reference for proper names 
depends on name-using practices and participation in these practices 
gives us the basic framework for a causal theory of names, but it does 
not, of course, explain how reference is determined. 12 Within this gen-
eral framework there are many ways of explaining how reference is deter-
mined, including the account given by satisfaction theorists. To see 
what is unique about causal theories, we should look at how such theo-
ries analyze name-using practices and participation in these practices. 
Causal theories make two basic claims: (1) A name-using practice 
is established by a name-bestowing act which typically involves the 
object named, and (2) participation in a name-using practice involves an 
appropriate causal (or historical) connection between a particular use 
of a name and the name-bestowing act. This connection can be direct, as 
it would be for someone who was present at the name-bestowing "cere-
mony," or it can be indirect, linked to the original name-bestowing act 
through its connection with other uses which are thus linked. So, 
according to the causal theory, the reference of a proper name is deter-
mined by (1) what object(s) that name has been given to (reference 
12 See note 8 above. 
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potential), and (2) which name-bestowing act the use of the name is con-
nected with (disambiguation). 13 
To illustrate the difference between causal theories of names and 
satisfaction theories, let us consider how a satisfaction theory might 
answer our two questions: (1) How are name-using practices established 
and preserved? and (2) Under what conditions is a person participating 
in a certain name-using practice when she uses a name? Satisfaction 
theories would hold that there is a name-using practice in a community 
if and only if there is a representation (or set of representations) 
which members of the community who use the name associate with the name, 
and there is one individual who satisfies these representations (or dom-
inantly satisfies them). 14 Presumably, a practice would be established 
by setting up the association between the representations of the refer-
ent and the name, and it would be preserved if the representations asso-
ciated with the name remained fairly stable or at least continued to be 
satisfied by the same object. A person would participate in a name-us-
ing practice if she associated with the name the same representations as 
did the community (or a subset thereof which is satisfied by the same 
object). Some satisfaction theorists, for example P .F. Strawson and 
John Searle, would include another condition for participating in a 
practice, one which takes account of parasitic or derived reference. 15 
13 This answer is still very general. We have yet to say, for exam-
ple, under what conditions a name is given to a particular object, i.e., 
what constitutes a name-bestowing act. This would be a basic condition 
for the name's referring to an object. 
14 I have attempted to make this characterization general enough to 
admit different interpretation of the conditions, and still do justice 
to actual satisfaction accounts. 
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According to them, a speaker would also participate in a name-using 
practice if she associated with the name an identifying description 
which makes reference to another person's use of that name and that per-
son participates in the practice (in either of these two ways). 16 The 
conjunction of these two conditions would give us the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for participating in a name-using practice. 
Compare this account to the causal account. According to the cau-
sal account, what a speaker (or even a community of speakers) thinks is 
not as important as what actually happened. And what happened? A 
couple of things. One thing that happened was an initial baptism. The 
object was given a name. 17 Another thing that happened was that this way 
of using the name was passed from person to person within the commmu-
nity. 18 This is how the practice is maintained. A person participates 
in a name-using practice only if her use of the name is causally or his-
torically connected with the name-bestowing act either directly (one 
uses the name as a result of having witnessed the 'baptism'), or indi-
15 See Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 181n, and 
Searle, Speech Acts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 
170 f. 
16 We could formulate these conditions in terms of having an object 
in mind. Remember, according to satisfaction theories, a person has an 
object in mind if there is an object which satsisfies her representa-
tions. 
17 Kripke uses the term 'initial baptism' in "Naming and Necessity," 
.QE. cit., p 302. The causal theory has sometimes been criticized on the 
grounds that not all uses of names involve an initial baptism; some-
times, for example with nicknames, the name is just used and it sticks. 
This criticism is, I think misguided. One should not think of the 'bap-
tism' too literally. There are, of course, many ways that an object can 
be given a name. The point is that the object is given that name. 
18 We will consider later how a way of using a name can be transmit-
ted. One condition is that the name is used. But more is needed. 
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rectly (one's use of the name is connected to a use which is connected 
with the name-bestowing act through however many other connections it 
takes)· 
It seems at first glance that these two accounts are quite differ-
ent. According to satisfaction accounts, a name-using practice is 
established by establishing a connection between mental representations 
and a name, whereas according to the causal theory, a practice is estab-
lished by a name-bestowing act. The satisfaction theory claims that a 
practice is maintained in a community if members of that community asso-
ciate roughly the same group of representations with the name or associ-
ate different representations which are satisfied by the same object. 
The causal theory maintains that the practice is sustained by members of 
the community passing the way of using the name from link to link in a 
chain of communication. The two accounts also differ in how they under-
stand participation in a practice. Satisfaction theories understand it 
in terms of representations the speaker associates with the name: causal 
theories understand it in terms of 'historical' or 'causal' connections 
between the speaker's use of the name and the name-bestowing act. 
Although these accounts seem very different on the face of it, 
Searle has argued that Kripke and Donnellan' s versions of the causal 
theory--the very ones from which we derived our characterization--are 
simply variant forms of descriptivism, and thus a kind of satisfaction 
theory. 19 
19 We made a similar, but different claim earlier, namely that both 
satisfaction and causal theories of disambiguation are intentionalist 
theories; that is, they both analyze reference in terms of what speakers 
'have in mind. ' 
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As far as the issue between descriptivism and the causal theory is 
concerned there is no difference: Kripke's theory is just a variant 
form of descriptivism. But what about the causal chain? Doesn't 
the causal theory_ require an external causal chain that guarantees 
successful reference? The external causal chain plays no explana-
tory role whatever in either Kripke's or Donnellan's account. The 
only chain that matters is a transfer of Intentional content from 
one use of an expression to the next, in every case reference is 
secured in.virtue of descriptive Intentional content in the mind of 
the speaker who uses the expression. 20 
Searle points out an important similarity between descriptivist 
(what we called 'satisfaction') and causal accounts, namely that both 
accounts recognize that reference can be parasitic on other people's 
uses of a name. 21 When we discussed the conditions for participating in 
a name-using practice earlier we characterized the satisfaction account 
in this way: 
A person participates in a name-using practice if and only if either 
(a) she associates some of the same representations with the name as 
the members of her community do (and her representatons are satis-
fied by the same thing as those of other community members) or (b) 
she associates with the name an identifying description which makes 
reference to someone else's use of that name and this person partic-
ipates in the practice. 
Clause (b) is the relevant one for our purposes. It says that one can 
participate in a name-using practice (and thus refer to an object by 
virtue of participating in that practice) by associating with the name a 
description of the form 'the individual called that name by S'. Since 
what you refer to with the name depends on what S referred to with the 
name, your reference is 'parasitic' on the other person's. The causal 
20 Intentionality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 
244f. 
21 Of course, there is a difference in emphasis. Satisfaction theo-
ries see this as just one way of participating in a practice, whereas 
for causal theories, unless one was present at the name-giving, it is 
the only way of participating in the practice. 
• 
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theory also defines participation in a practice in terms of parasitic 
reference. According to the causal theory, a person participates in a 
practice if and only if her use of a name is derived in an appropriate 
way from a name-bestowing act, usually through intermediate links. 
According to the causal theory, a speaker's reference is typically para-
sitic on someone else's use, since for most of the names we use we were 
not present when the name was given. 
Even though both satisfaction and causal theories of names define 
participation in a name-using practice in terms of parasitic reference, 
their accounts still seem quite different. Satisfaction accounts 
require that the reference borrower associate a description of the form, 
"The individual §.referred to with~", with the name she borrows. Cau-
sal accounts make no mention of such a description. However, Searle 
argues that at least one account, Kripke' s ;' does involve such descrip-
tions. 22 When Kripke discusses how a name is passed from link to link, 
he notices that reference chains can be broken in a certain way. One 
may hear a name and decide to use it for something else. 23 For example, 
I may overhear a conversation in which the name 'Herkimer Feingruber' is 
used, decide I like the sound of the name, and use it as a name for my 
goldfish. Even if there is a chain of communication linking my use of 
the name to the naming of Herkimer Feingruber (the person), my reference 
is not parasitic. I do not refer to the Herkimer Feingruber that the 
people from whom I learned the name referred to. To account for such 
cases, Kripke suggested that reference is parasitic only if the receiver 
22 Ibid., p. 244. 
23 QE. cit., p. 302. 
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of the name intends to use it with the same reference as the person from 
whom he learned it. 24 Searle interprets this requirement to mean that 
at each link·in the chain of communication the speaker must have the 
intention, "when I utter 'N' I mean to refer to the same object as 
the person from whom I got the name 'N' ."25 
This looks very much like the descriptivist 's requirement that the 
speaker associate with N an identifying description such as "the object 
to whom the person from whom I heard 'N' referred." It looks as though 
satisfaction theories and Kripke's causal account analyze participation 
in a name~using practice by parasitic reference in almost the same way. 
Some causal theorists have claimed that their account of parasitic 
referen~ differs from that of satisfaction theorists because the latter 
requires that the borrower keep track of her borrowing, whereas the cau-
sal theory does not. 26 But Searle has argued that this is not a real 
difference either. There is no reason a speaker cannot associate with 
the name 'N' the description "the object called 'N' by the person from 
whom I learned the name (whoever it may have been)." 
There seem to be two reasons for supposing that satisfaction thee-
ries require a reference borrower to keep track of her borrowing. One 
of these reasons is that according to satisfaction theories, reference 
succeeds only if the description associated with the name is satisfied 
by only one individual (otherwise the reference will be indeterminate). 
24 Ibid., p. 302. 
25 
.QE. Cit., p. 244. 
26 Kripke makes this claim about Strawson's account of parasitic ref-
erence in "Naming and Necessity," p. 299. Devitt makes the more general 
claim in "Singular Terms," The Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), pp. 
183-205; see especially p. 203. 
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In other words, the description must be an identifying description. For 
a description which makes reference to someone else's reference to serve 
as an identifying des.cription, it must be sufficiently detailed to be 
satisfied by only one ·object. Very general descriptions will usually 
not satisfy th.is requirement. For example, the description, "the man 
called 'Jones'," or "the man called 'Jones' by members of this commu-
nity," is not uniquely satisfied, for there are many men called 'Jones'. 
The description must be more specific if it is to link the speaker's use 
of the name with a particular Jones. A description which included the 
source of one's name use would supply the required identifying content. 
This reason, however, is not convincing. Granted that the 
description must be satisfied by only one individual, there may be a 
number of ways of supplying the content even when one has forgotten from 
whom she learned the name. One could supply an identifying description 
such as: "the individual called 'N' by the person from whom I learned 
the name," or one could specify the place or time when one heard the 
name. Any of these descriptions could be sufficently detailed to iden-
tify a referent as long as there was only one object which satisfied 
them. 
Kripke hints at a second argument to show that one must, given a 
satisfaction account, keep track of reference borrowing. This argument 
is directed at Strawson's account of reference borrowing. Strawson, in 
a footnote, observes that one can include reference to another person's 
reference in an identifying description. If one's description is of 
this kind, Strawson continues, then "the question whether it is a genu-
inely identifying description turns on the question, whether the· refer-
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ence it refers to is itself a genuinely identifying reference. 112 7 The 
borrowing may go from one person to another to yet another, but it must 
eventually end up with. an identifying description, if the descriptions 
which included reference to other people's references are to be genuine 
identifying descriptions. 
Kripke's gloss on Strawson's remarks is as follows: 
I may then say, 'Look, by 'Goedel' I shall mean the man Joe thinks 
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Joe may then pass the 
thing over to Harry. One has to be very careful that this doesn't 
come round in a circle .... If you could be sure yourself of knowing 
such a chain, and that everyone else is using the proper conditions 
and so is not getting out of it, then maybe you could get back to 
the man by referring to such a chain in that way, borrowing the ref-
erences one by one .... However, al though in general such chains do 
exist for a living man, you won't know what the chain is. You won't 
be sure what descriptions the other man is using, so the thing won't 
get back to the right man at all. 28 
The conclusion Kripke draws is that if you cannot keep track of your 
reference borrowing through all the links, then "you cannot use this as 
your identifying description with any confidence." 29 In other words, you 
cannot be sure that your description is satisfied by only one person or 
that it is satisfied by the 'right' one. 30 
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that Kripke is right. 
Suppose, that is, that if we do not keep track of reference borrowing, 
2 7 Quoted in "Naming and Necessity" from Strawson' s, Individuals, p. 
181. 
28 Ibid., p. 298. 
2
'3 Ibid. 
3 0 It is not clear what 'the right man' would mean here. Kripke 
seems to assume that the speaker intends to refer to someone who may or 
may not be the one Jones thinks proved the completeness of arithmetic. 
But in that case I am not sure his reference would be parasitic. Why 
not just associate one's own identifying description with the name? 
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we cannot use an identifying description which contains reference to 
another's reference with any confidence. Does it follow then, that sat-
isfaction theories must require that the borrower keep track of his bor-
rowings? This would only follow if satisfaction theories were to 
require that for a name to refer to something (or for a use of the name 
to refer), the speaker must not only (1) have an identifying description 
which she associates with the name, but also (2) she must be sure (or 
know) that the description is an identifying description, and perhaps, 
even further (3) that she must know of whom it is an identifying 
description. But there is no reason for a satisfaction theorist to 
accept anything stronger than (1): the speaker must associate an identi-
fying description with the name. According to the satisfaction theory, 
in order to refer with a singular term, there must be one (and only one) 
object which satisfies the associated description, but it is not neces-
sary that the speaker be sure that there is only one thing that satis-
fies the description in order for her to refer. Neither does she have 
to know what satisfies her description. 
These two reasons are the most likely justification for the claim 
that satisfaction theories require that speakers keep track of their 
reference borrowing. Neither of them supports .that claim. I do not 
believe we can convincingly argue that the difference between causal 
theories and satisfaction theories is that causal theories alone do not 
require that the speaker keep track of her reference borrowing. On 
either account, a speaker can refer to someone with a name by relying on 
someone else's use of that name, even though the speaker has forgotten 
where she got the name from. 
There is, . however, an important difference between satisfaction 
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accounts which incorporate reference borrowing and causal accounts. 
Kripke sums up the difference in this sentence: "On our view, it is not 
how the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of 
~ommunication, which is relevant." 31 Even with respect to reference bor-
rowing, satisfaction theories are vulnerable to counter-examples which 
exploit the speaker's mistaken beliefs. Suppose, for example, I use the 
name 'Tom Jones', knowing nothing about this Tom Jones except that I 
heard someone mention him. I am convinced that it was Ralph who had used 
the name, so I associate with the name 'Tom Jones' the description "The 
person Ralph called 'Tom Jones'." However, it turns out that I am con-
fused. It was not Ralph who used that name; it was a friend of his. 
Ralph has never used that name in my presence. According to the satis-
faction account, I would not be referring to anyone, because no one sat-
isfied the description I associated with the name. According to the 
causal theory, I would be referring to the Tom Jones I heard someone 
refer to with that name. 
We can alter this example slightly to illustrate the problem of 
fortuitous satisfaction. Suppose Ralph had called someone 'Tom Jones' 
but I had completely forgotten about that. My use of the name was based 
on remembering an episode totally unrelated to Ralph's use of the name. 
According to the satisfaction theory, I would be referring to the Tom 
Jones Ralph talked about, the one I remember nothing about, and not to 
the Tom Jones I heard and remembered someone talking about. This seems, 
at best, implausible. 
According to the causal theory, it does not matter what descrip-
31 Ibid., p. 300. 
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tions the speaker associates with the name. What does matter is the 
actual chain of communication. The speaker may be mistaken about whence 
she learned the name~ her identifying description may be tainted by 
these mistaken beliefs, nonetheless she may still borrow her reference 
from someone else, namely the person from whom she actually 'borrowed' 
the name. This is the real advantage of the causal account of reference 
borrowing. 
I want to argue that the requirement that the speaker intend to 
use the name to refer to the same thing as the person from whom she 
learned the name minimizes this difference. The intention to refer to 
the same thing with 'N' as the person from whom one learned 'N' must 
take some particular form. One could, presumably, make this intention 
specific, (e.g. "I intend to refer to the same 'Tom Jones' as Ralph 
did"), or general (e.g., "I intend to refer to the same 'Tom Jones' as 
the person from whom I heard 'Tom Jones"'). In that case, the two theo-
ries are pretty much alike. Both are subject to the same objections and 
counter-examples. If my intentions are specific, then I fail ·to partic-
ipate in the practice (and thus fail to refer to Tom Jones), if they are 
general I succeed. 
Making participation in a practice depend on the speaker's inten-
tions to refer to the same object as the person from whom one learned 
the name referred to minimizes the difference between causal and satis-
faction theories. 32 It also goes against the basic insight of causal 
theories that it is not just what the speaker thinks that is relevant, 
32 There are, of course, further important differences which we will 
discuss later. 
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but also what has actually happened which determines reference. 
further, mere intentions to refer with a name to the same thing as the 
person from whom one learned the name does not guarantee that one is 
participating in that practice. 33 For all these reasons, Kripke's expla-
nation of what constitutes participation in a practice should be 
revised. 
Kripke proposed that speaker's intentions play a role in the link-
ing of one use of a name to another to take care of cases in which a 
person hears a name which refers to one thing (e.g., Herkimer Feingru-
ber, the person) and uses that name to refer to something else (the 
goldfish). Obviously, this person is not participating in the same 
practice as the person from whom she leerned the name. Nonetheless her 
use of the name is derived from (or is causally/historically related to) 
that other person's use of the name. The causal theory claims that a 
necessary condition for participating in a name-using practice is that 
one's use of the name be 'causally' or 'historically' linked to the use 
of that name by someone who is participating in that practice. The fact 
that people sometimes fulfill this condition but nonetheless are not 
participating in the name-using practice shows that this is not a suffi-
cient condition. Something more is needed. Kripke suggested that the 
additional condition should be that the speaker intends to refer to the 
same thing as those from whom her use of the name is derived. We have 
already seen that this condition introduces descriptive elements into 
the account of reference. We will now argue that these two conditions 
33 The detailed argument for this claim will follow in the next para-
graphs along with suggestions for an alternative account of participat-
ing in a practice. 
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are not jointly sufficient for participation in a name-using practice. 
Having established that the speaker's intentions to conform to the prac-
tice are not able to do the job they were supposed to do, I will propose 
a different analysis of participation in a practice. 
Gareth Evans offered the most convincing argument against Kripke's 
account. 34 Evans informs us that the name 'Madagascar' was originally 
used to refer to part of the African mainland. Marco Polo heard this 
name from a group of Malay or Arab sailors and used it, presumably with 
the intention to refer to the same thing as the sailors from whom he 
heard it. However, Marco Polo believed that these people were using 
'Madagascar' to refer to an island off the coast of Africa. Because of 
his mistake, the name has come to refer to an island off the coast of 
Africa. 
If Kripke' s account of proper names were correct, 'Madagascar' 
would not be the name of an island, instead it would refer to a part of 
the African mainland. For if intentions to refer with a name to the 
same thing as the person from whom one learned the name guaranteed that 
one is participating in a particular name-using practice, and if partic-
ipation in that practice determined the reference of one's name uses, 
then Marco Polo would have been referring to a part of the African main-
land with 'Madagascar' and the people who learned the name from him 
(including ourselves) would also have referrred to a part of the African 
mainland wit~ the name 'Madagascar'. But this is not true. We refer to 
an island off the coast of Africa with the name 'Madagascar', and it is 
3 4 
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~. 47, pp. 187-208. Reprinted in Schwartz, .Q.p. cit., pp. 192-215. 
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most likely because of Marco Polo that we do so. 
Some theorists have argued that cases of this sort show that cau-
sal theories are fundamentally misguided. 35 Causal chains linking a name 
to a referent, they would argue, are not what determines reference. If 
a speaker has mistaken beliefs about the referent of a name, as Marco 
Polo did about 'Madagascar', then what he is referring to will be dif-
ferent from what other members of his community refer to with that name. 
This is because the referent of the name is determined not by the chain 
of communication, but by the speaker's intentions, by what he thought he 
was referring to. 
Reflection on the Madagascar case (and on similar cases where two 
individuals are inadvertently or maliciously switched) reveals there is 
someting wrong with the causal theory of names as presented by Kripke. 
It could be that the whole approach is wrong; that the speaker's 
thoughts are terribly important in determining reference. However, it 
might also be the case that the approach is fine but some of the details 
are problematic. Given the difficulties which competing theories face, 
I am inclined to opt for the second alternative: Kripke may have gotten 
some of the details wrong, but his general approach is a move in the 
right direction. 36 
If we assume that the general approach of the causal theory is 
35 See for example, Searle, Intentionality, pp. 237-240. Evans makes 
a more modest claim. He argues that such cases show that "the inten-
tions of the speakers to use a name to refer to something must be 
allowed to count in determination of what it denotes." Ibid., E· 202. 
3 6 We should not be too surprised to find that this is the case. 
Kripke explicitly recognizes that what he has given is not a complete 
theory of reference for proper names. He is instead suggesting a new 
approach, a new "picture" of how their reference is determined. 
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correct, how can we account for the 'Madagascar' case and others like 
it? Let us suppose that there was a practice of using 1 Madagascar{' to 
refer to a part of the African mainland and that this practice was in 
effect in the community to which the sailors belonged. Further, let us 
suppose that were a person to participate in this practice, she would be 
referring to that same part of the African mainland. Thus, had Marco 
Polo been participating in the practice, he would have been referring to 
some part of the African mainland. If he did not refer to the African 
mainland, as appears to be the case, then he was not participating in 
the practice, regardless of his intention to refer to the same thing as 
the sailors. Our question is: How do we account for this fact, asssum-
ing that the causal theory is basically correct, and that it is not what 
the speaker intends to refer to but his connection with a practice that 
determines reference. 
Before answering this question, I would like to make a few obser-
vations about this particular case. First, it should be noted that this 
case involves two separate linguistic communities: the community to 
which the sailors belonged and the European community to whom Marco Polo 
passed along the name. 3 7 This already makes the case atypical. Sec-
ondly, it is not clear at exactly what point 'Madagascar' began to refer 
to an island off the coast of Africa. We can say, with some degree of 
assurance, that before Marco Polo heard the name, it did not refer to an 
island and that after the name was introduced in Europe it did refer to 
37 Although there are problems in giving identity conditions for lin-
guistic communities, we can assume that these linguisitic communities 
are distinct, since they have different languages (as defined by their 
grammar, vocabulary and history) and there is virtually no contact 
between members of each. 
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an island. What it referred to in the intervening time is not so clear. 
Did 'Madagascar' refer to an island when Marco Polo used that name for 
the first time? Suppose his first contact with the name took place this 
way. Marco Polo and some sailors were sitting around after dinner tell-
ing sea stories. One of the sailors says to his friend: "Hey, remember 
the time we landed on/in Madagascar? That was some trip! We were lucky 
to get out of there alive." The two sailors reminisce, as sailors will, 
about the good old days in Madagascar. Eventually Marco Polo asks, "Is 
Madagascar far from here?" To what does Madagascar' refer in this sen-
tence? (Suppose Marco Polo had not yet formed any hypotheses about what 
Madagascar referred to.) Most likely it refers to the place the sailors 
were talking about when they used 'Madagascar' in the previous conversa-
tion. Suppose that on the basis of their answers to this and other 
questions, suppose Marco Polo comes to the conclusion that 'Madagascar' 
is the name of an island off the African coast. Perhaps he even marks 
the is land with the name 'Madagascar' on his charts. The next day, 
Marco Polo asks another sailor, "Have you ever sailed to Madagascar?" 
(What does 'Madagascar' refer to here?) The sailor answers, "Yes." 
Then Marco asks for more information about Madagascar: "Is it inhab-
ited?" "What do the people there do?" etc. We should not pretend that 
it is easy to see what 'Madagascar' refers to in all these different 
uses (the sailor's and Marco Polo's). There are two likely possibili-
ties: either (a) 'Madagascar' refers to part of mainland Africa whenever 
the sailor uses it and to the island whenever Marco Polo uses it, or (b) 
'Madagascar' refers to part of mainland Africa, regardless of who uses 
it, but Marco Polo thinks it refers to an is land (and forms a nu·mber of 
mistaken beliefs because of this). Thirdly, we should note that this 
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case would not be so clear-cut if Marco Polo had died among the sailors 
(and all his documents concerning Madagascar had been destroyed). What 
is obvious is that ou·r name 'Madagascar', which we got from Marco Polo, 
refers to an island off the coast of Africa. If this practice of refer-
ring to an island off the coast of Africa with the name 'Madagascar' did 
not exist, we would be stuck with the uncertainty noted above: Did 'Ma-
dagascar' refer to one thing when Marco Polo used it and to another when 
the sailors used it? or did it always refer to part of the African main-
land, no matter who used it? 
Now, how can we explain the Madagascar case within the framework 
of the causal theory of names? In general terms,· we will say that at 
some point Marco Polo failed to participate in.the practice. Since he 
intended (or we can assume that he intended) to refer to the same thing 
the sailors who used the name referred to, we cannot attribute his fail-
ure to participate in the practice to 'bad' intentions, as we could when 
I called my goldfish 'Herkimer Feingruber'. 
What is common to the 'Madagscar' case and the 'Herkimer Feingru-
ber' case is that in both cases a new name-using practice is estab-
lished. It is perfectly consistent with the main thrust of the causal 
theory to say that because this new practice has been established, the 
name can now be used to refer to two different things, and which thing a 
particular use of it refers to depends on which practice it is connected 
to. What I would propose is that the causal theory should analyze par-
ticipation in a name-using practice in this way: a person participates 
in practice P'N' if and only if (1) her use of 'N' either derives from 
the name-bestowing act or is derived from a use which ultimately goes 
back to the establishment of the practice (the name-bestowing act) and 
• 
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(2) she does not establish a new practice with 'N'. This new criterion 
for participating in a practice does not appeal to the speaker's inten-
tions to participate ·in that practice. What it says is that, whether 
she intends to or not, a speaker participates in a particular name-using 
~ ~ ~ ~-
practice P'N' if and only if her use of 'N' is derived from another use 
which is 'historically' or 'causally' connected with the name-bestowing 
act, unless she establishes a new practice with 'N'. Whether this 
analysis is different from a satisfaction theory and to what extent this 
account makes a speaker's intentions important for determining reference 
depends on how we analyze 'establishing a new practice'. Under what 
conditions is a new name-using practice established? 38 
To develop this account we should first make a distinction between 
official names and unofficial names. Official names are those names 
which are given to individuals according to generally recognized and 
accepted guidelines. Within a society there are naming institutions, 
institutions for giving official names. These institutions say who can 
give a name to whom and under what conditions. For example, in the 
United States (and probably in most Western societies) we now name human 
beings by putting a name on a birth certificate. Names are typically 
given only to infants and only by the infant's legal guardians. 3 9 The 
choice of names is not totally up to the parents. The child's surname 
must usually be the surname of one of its parents. The method of giving 
3 8 Note that my analysis of participation in a name-using practice 
does not complicate matters for the causal theory, since this question 
has to be answered anyway. 
39 It is interesting to note that when there is no legal guardian a 
pseudo-name such as 'Baby Doe' is given until a guardian is found. 
138 
an official name is to write the infant's name on a birth certificate, 
sign it, and register the birth with the state in which the child is 
born. If the child was born in a hospital where there is a possibility 
of mixing up the babies, the infant who is so named will be the one who 
has literally been tagged with the parents' surname. There are, like-
wise, institutionalized means for naming places (cities, countries, 
planets, etc.), species, and pets. These institutions specify who can 
name an individual and under what conditions. Further, it is a feature 
of official names that members of the society in which that institution 
exists are under some obligation to recognize the name as the name of 
the person to whom it was given. 
With official names the speaker's intentions are not important. 
What is important is that the name-giver fulfills the requisite condi-
tions and performs the requisite acts. If I had inadvertently written 
the name 'Aristotle' on my son's birth certificate, signed the document 
and filed it with the state of North Dakota, my son's name would have 
been 'Aristotle', whether I had intended to name him 'Aristotle' or not. 
And if I had signed the birth certificate intending thereby to name the 
neighbor's child 'John', I would not have named the neighbor's child 
'John'. 
Unofficial names fall into many different classes. There are 
nicknames which are derived from official names according to well-known 
formulas. For example, 'Jack' is a nickname for 'John', 'Pat' is a 
nickname for 'Patricia', etc. Other nicknames can be derived from an 
official name in an original way, as 'Ike' was derived from 'Eisenhow-
er'. Some nicknames are given on the basis of an outstanding feature of 
the bearer, e.g., 'Red' for a red-head. What distinguishes unofficial 
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names from official names is that the procedure for giving the name is 
much less strict, and there is no obligation to recognize the nickname 
as a name of the person or thing to whom it was given until the name has 
caught on. There is no guarantee, that is, that the name will catch 
4 0 
on. 
Whether a person is participating in a particular name-using prac-
tice depends in part on whether she establishes a new practice with the 
name. One can establish a new practice by performing those actions 
under those circumstances which a name-bestowing institution requires or 
by introducing a new unofficial name. In both the 'Madagascar' case and 
the 'Herkimer Feingruber' cases, the speaker established a new practice 
by participating in a naming institution. As the discoverer of an here-
tofore unnamed island (at least unnamed within the European community), 
Marco Polo was entitled (within that community) to name the island. 41 
The institutional acts Marco Polo performed most likely involved report-
ing the discovery of the island (identifying the island by conventional 
means, either by depicting it on a map or by giving its coordinates and 
perhaps a description) and calling the island 'Madagascar'. Similarly, 
I am entitled, as a pet goldfish owner, to name my goldfish. In this 
case, my deciding that he should be called 'Herkimer Feingruber' is suf-
ficient to make that his name, whether anyone actually calls him that or 
40 It should be noted that there are some constraints on establishing 
an unofficial name-using practice. For example, no practice will exist 
With the name if it is not consistently used as a name for an individual 
over a period of time. 
41 Note that he was not entitled to name the island for the members 
of the community to which the sailors belonged. 
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not. 4 2 Here the speaker's intentions are important. I make 'Herkimer 
Feingruber' the name of my goldfish by intending to use that name in the 
future to refer to my goldfish. But the speaker's intentions to refer 
are not sufficient. The speaker must fulfill the role required by the 
pet-naming institution--she must be the pet owner or be given permission 
by the pet owner to name the pet. I cannot name my neighbor's bull ter-
rier by deciding to call it 'Miss Piggy' unless the pet-owner authorizes 
me to do so. 43 'Miss Piggy' could, however, become the dog's unofficial 
name. 
Causal theories provide a good account of official names. What 
the name can refer to depends on what individual it was given to in 
accordance with the prevailing name-giving institution. If all names 
were official names we could say that uses of a name which are derived 
from (or causally connected with) a name-giving act refer to the indi-
vidual to whom the name was given, unless the use is itself a name-giv-
ing act. Here a speaker's intention to refer to a particular thing with 
a name is neither necessary nor sufficient for the name to refer to that 
thing. A particular speaker's intention to refer to the same thing as 
the person from whom she learned the name is not even required. Unless 
she establishes a new official name, her use would be parasitic and she 
would refer to whatever the person from whom she learned the word refer-
red to. 44 
42 I may decide to change his name so that 'Herkimer Feingruber' is 
no longer his name. To some extent the name of a pet is up to the whims 
of his owner. 
43 Naming pedigreed dogs is more difficult. The name must be written 
on a document and registered with the kennel. 
141 
Name-using practices involving unofficial names present a problem 
for the causal theory. According to this theory, what a use of a name 
refers to is ultimately determined by the name-giving act which origi-
nates the name-using practice. With official names, this name-giving 
act is usually a discrete, identifiable event, (e.g., the name was given 
when the birth certificate was signed, when the discovery was reported, 
etc.). With unofficial names the case is more difficult. Except for 
those rare cases in which the speaker decides, in first using the name, 
that this shall henceforth be his name for a certain object, the unoffi-
cial name is not given in a discrete act. Instead, it gradually becomes 
a name by virtue of being consistently used to refer to the same object. 
Usually there is no one name-giving act. There seem to be several acts 
which together constitute the name-giving. 
I have argued that with official names, intentions to refer to a 
particular individual with a name play a very small role in determining 
the reference of the name. This cannot be said of unofficial names. 
44 Granted, sometimes the intention to refer to a particular object 
with a name, if it is the intention of a specially situated person and 
if the object fulfills certain requirements, does determine the referent 
of a name. For example, my decision to name my pet goldfish Herkimer 
Feingruber is sufficient to make it the case that my pet. goldfish is 
named Herkimer Feingruber. If what makes my goldfish the referent of 
this name is my intention, however, not just any intention will do. An 
intention to name the goldfish that looks thus and such (followed by a 
representetion of the goldfish) will not work, since the goldfish that 
looks thus and such may not be my pet goldfish. It may be a goldfish I 
am not entitled to name. I cannot give the official name ostensively 
either, by pointing to a goldfish and forming the intention to call this 
goldfish Herkimer Feingruber. For suppose, unbeknownst to me, my chil-
dren had traded goldfish with the neighbors for a day, My decision to 
call that goldfish 'Herkimer Feingruber' would not make 'Herkimer Fein-
gruber' the name of that goldfish. My intention will be sufficient for 
that goldfish's being officially named Herkimer Feingruber' only if the 
goldfish is actually one I am entitled, by the naming institution, to 
name. 
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The establishment of an unofficial name-using practice takes time and 
usually the willing cooperation of other speakers. With official names, 
individual speakers do not decide whether they will recognize a particu-
lar name as the name of some person. As long as they live in the soci-
ety in which this instituion is in force, the force of the institution 
is exerted on their particular name-using practices. 45 With unofficial 
names there is no such institutional force to back up a name-using prac-
tice. If using an unofficial name to refer to a certain individual 
becomes a practice it does so through the force of habit rather than the 
force of law. 
While the causal theory of names is well suited to explain how the 
reference of official names is determined, special difficulties arise 
when we try to account for unofficial names. 46 It seems that the intro-
duction of unofficial names into a community will involve a speaker's 
intentions to refer much more than the introduction of official names. 
We may be tempted to analyze these intentions in terms of satisfaction. 
Moreover, participating in a practice of these sort, especially in the 
early stages of its becoming a practice, seems also to involve inten-
tions to use the name in a certain way. With respect to unofficial 
names, it may seem that satisfaction accounts are more likely to be cor-
45 An individual or group can opt out of the society by becoming her-
mits or forming a cult cut off from the rest of the society. But as 
long as these people maintain some ties with the society the pressure of 
its naming institutions is hard to escape, since official names tend to 
be tied up with one's social identity. 
4 6 It could be argued that accounting for unofficial names is far 
more important than accounting for official names, since official names 
seem to be a cultural modification of unofficial names. The question of 
how words hook up with the world is more likely to be answered in the 
account of unofficial names. 
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rect and that causal mechanisms are unimportant. 
The general idea behind the causal theory of names is that the 
reference of a partic"Lilar use of a name typically depends on what name-
using practice the speaker is participating in. This, in turn, depends 
on where her use of the name came from. By tracing her use back to an 
original name-giving act, and seeing to whom or what that name was 
given, we discover the referent of her use of the name. With unofficial 
names there is not one name-giving act, but many uses of the name which 
together constitute a name-giving. It is incumbent upon the causal 
theorist to give an account of this kind of name-giving. 
One thing that has to be recognized is that there can be unoffi-
cial name-givings that do not catch on, that do not result in a new 
practice. For example, I may use the name 'Pig-face' to refer to the 
neighbor's bull terrier once or twice, thus giving that name to that 
dog. Later I decide that this name is too nasty and I never use it 
again. As long as no one picks up the name from me, I do not establish 
a name-using practice. Nevertheless 'Pig-face' seems to have referred 
to the neighbor's dog the times I did use it. 
Another thing to note is that until the practice is established, 
the referent of an unofficial name can fluctuate. Imagine this case. I 
hear a dog barking, and say to my son, "That dog sure is obnoxious. I 
wish those people would take better care of it. Just today I saw Miss 
Piggy routing around in the garbage." Suppose I am using 'Miss Piggy' 
to refer to the bull terrier I saw routing around in the garbage (her 
official name is 'Spike') and this is the first time I am using the name 
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this way. 47 The next day, on his way to school, my son sees a bull-ter-
rier who looks like Spike, but is actually Spike's sibling, Rover. He 
says to his friend "There goes Miss Piggy," borrowing the name from me. 
His friend then starts using the name 'Miss Piggy' to refer to Rover. 
Other kids pick up the name from him and after a while it is common 
practice to refer to Rover with the name, 'Miss Piggy'. 
Here, before the practice is established, borrowing the name does 
not guarantee that one will refer to the same thing as the person from 
whom one heard the name; even if one does intend to refer to the same 
thing, it does not always happen. My son may have intended to refer to 
the same dog with 'Miss Piggy' as I did, but he did not actually refer 
to the same dog. However, once the practice is established, mistaken 
beliefs about the referent have much less influence on the practice. 
r't, after 'Miss Piggy' has become an establihsed name for Rover, I see 
Spike and say, "There goes Miss Piggy," my unconventional use of 'Miss 
Piggy' will very likely be corrected (especially if there are children 
around). Someone may gently point out that Spike is not Miss Piggy. So 
even with unofficial names the causal theory seems to be on the right 
track. Cases of this sort illustrate the need for a more subtle analy-
sis than has been presented so far. With unofficial names, merely trac-
ing an unbroken chain of communication back to its first link will not 
tell us what the referent of the name is. The history of the use of an 
unofficial name along with some account of how the referent of the first 
use was determined, will not tell us what that use of the name refers 
47 For the culturally deprived, 'Miss Piggy' is the name of a televi-
sion celebrity. 
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to. What we need to find is that use (or those uses) that established 
the practice. These are not necessarily the first uses. 
What we might look for is the first string of uses which were 
derived from each other and which all referred to the same thing. 48 If 
we take this approach we shall have to give an account of how the refer-
ence of a name is determined when there is no name-using practice for 
that name or when the use of the name is not part of some established 
practice. One might be tempted to give a satisfaction account for these 
uses. For example, one might say that the reference of my use of 'Miss 
Piggy' in the story developed earlier was the object I intended to refer 
to with the name 'Miss Piggy'. And further, it was because I intended 
to refer to something that participants in the existing 'Miss Piggy'-us-
ing practice do not refer to with 'Miss Piggy{ that I failed to partici-
pate in the existing practice. But this explanation will not work. For 
suppose I had seen a dog routing around in the garbage and took it to be 
the dog that belongs to the occupants of apartment 1-C (about whom I 
have a great many beliefs, including the belief that it is called 
'Fido'). On the basis of this information I form the intention to refer 
to Fido, the neighbor's bull-terrier, who barks at nights and runs 
freely around the neighborhood, etc., with the name 'Miss Piggy'. As it 
happens, however, the dog I saw routing around the garbage was not Fido 
at all, but Spike (another sibling). When I said, "I saw Miss Piggy 
routing around in the gargage," the dog I actually referred to was not 
Fido, but Spike. How do we explain this? 
48 This is a suggestion which I hope will make the causal theory of 
names more plausible. It is not within the scope of this dissertation 
to develop a full account of the establishment of unofficial names. 
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A satisfaction theorist may simply deny that I referred to Spike 
with the name '~Iiss Piggy'. But this denial seems to have no indepen-
dent justification. If the satisfaction theory is correct, then the qog 
I referred to is the one which satisfies the representations I associate 
with the name. But that is assuming the satisfaction theory is correct. 
A more subtle satisfaction theorist might accept the intuition that I 
referred to Spike and explain my reference by making minor adjustments 
in his theory. For example, Searle might explain my reference to Spike 
rather than Fido by weighting the representations. My representation of 
the visual experience in which the dog was presented to me is more 
important than other representations I may have of the dog. Reference 
is still determined by which object satisfies a certain mental represen-
tation (or Intentional content). 
At least some causal theorists would explain how the reference of 
my use of 'Miss Piggy' was determined in terms of my intentions to refer 
to the dog I had in mind. 4 9 However, their account is different from 
satisfaction accounts. Rather than explaining 'having an object in 
mind' in terms of mental representations (or perceptual presentations) 
which the object satisfies, these causal theorists would say that the 
object the speaker has in mind is the one that caused her mental state 
or caused her use of the name. 50 The success and plausibility of satis-
faction theories can be explained by the fact that usually the represen-
49 For example, Michael Devitt, "Singular Terms" QE. cit., and Desig-
nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 
50 The causal analysis of having an object in mind is mentioned here 
to show that causal theories are different from satisfaction theories 
even respect to unofficial names. In the following chapter we will dis-
cuss the causal account of having an object in mind more fully. 
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tation (or presentation) which the speaker has of an object is satisfied 
by the object which caused it. But the object which satisfies the rep-
resentation and the on·e which causes the speaker to have such a repre-
sentation do not always coincide. It is in those cases where the repre-
sentations are not satisfied by their causes but by something else that 
fortuitous satisfaction creates difficulties for satisfaction theories. 
The intuitions of contextual theories, which say that knowing the 
context of an utterance is sufficient to enable one to know what a 
speaker was referring to, can also be accomodated by the causal version 
of 'having an object in mind'. A detailed description of the context in 
which a name is used often gives us sufficient information about what 
object caused the speaker to 'have~ in mind'. Further, this informa-
tion may put us in a better position to know what the speaker was refer-
ring to than the speaker himself is in. 
Before closing this chapter on the causal theory of names, there 
is one more aspect of the reference of names that must be dealt with. 
We claimed earlier that the reference of a use of a name is determined 
by which practice the speaker is participating in. This, in turn, 
depends on (1) whence the speaker learned the name and (2) whether the 
speaker was giving the name to a new object. 51 Some name-givings are the 
result of the speaker being in a certain position and doing certain 
things which result in the establishment of a new official name. In 
these cases, what the name refers to depends on the particular situation 
and the name-giving institution. The intentions of the speaker to refer 
51 (2) was proposed as an alternative to Kripke's requirement that 
the speaker intend to refer to the same thing as the person from whom 
she learned the name. 
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to a particular object can be totally irrelevant. Unofficial names can 
be given by just about anyone to just about anything. In giving an 
unofficial name to something, the speaker's intentions seem quite imper-
tant, for it seems to be at least a necessary condition for giving a 
name that the speaker intend to refer to a particular object (the one 
she has in mind) with that name. But this is not a sufficient condi-
tion, at least not when the speaker's use of the name is causally con-
nected to or derived from some other use of the name. 5 2 When a person 
uses a name for which there is already a name-using practice in the com-
munity and her use is connected to that practice (she heard the name 
from someone who participated in the practice), opting out of the prac-
tice requires more than intending to refer to something with the name. 
A person would not be giving a new name to some object if she intended 
to refer to the thing which happened to be the same object that the per-
son from whom she learned the word referred to. Neither would she be 
giving a new name if she had mistaken beliefs about the referent of a 
name and so thought she was referring to one thing (the thing she had in 
mind), even though she had no intention of giving something a name. For 
example, I may get Spike and Rover mixed up. When I use the name 
'Spike~, intending to refer to Rover, I am not giving Rover a new name. 
'Spike' still refers to Spike and not to Rover. Intending that a name 
should refer to something different from what the person from whom one 
learned the name referred to does not, by itself, constitute a name-giv-
ing. For a use of a name that is causally connected to an existing 
52 If a person simply makes up a name, e.g., 'Charles Bon' and 
intends to refer with it to the thing she has in mind, this may count as 
an unofficial name-giving. 
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name-using practice to be a name-giving act, it seems necessary that the 
speaker do something to separate this use from the practice. What seems 
to be required is that· the speaker intend to use the name in a new way. 
To do so, she must be aware that what she intends to refer to with the 
name is different from what the person from whom she learned the name 
referred to with that name. So a double intention is necessary, the 
intention to refer to ~ with 'N', and the intention to use 'N' differ-
ently than it is usually used. This turns Kripke's requirement on its 
head. A speaker need not intend to refer to the same thing as the per-
son from whom she learned the name in order to participate in the name-
using practice. Instead, in order to fail to participate in. the prac-
tice one must intend not to use the word to refer to the same thing as 
the person from whom one learned the name. 
There is one more problem. Sometimes when there is confusion 
about the referent of a name, an unofficial name can be given to an 
object on the basis of this confusion. For example, suppose you buy one 
of a set of twin Irish Wolfhounds. When you pick out your puppy, you 
indicate your preference for the one which has been officially named 
'Romulus'. A friend of yours buys the other puppy, Remus. One of the 
conditions for the sale is that you keep the official names. Now sup-
pose that while you ~re signing the papers and paying for the puppy, a 
mischievous semantic theorist, trying to make trouble for causal theo-
rists, switches the puppies so that you take home Remus and your friend 
takes Romulus. You call your puppy 'Romulus', it learns to respond to 
that name, and everything is going fine until one day, about two years 
later, the semantic theorist shows up. He hears you saying to your 
friend, "I'm worried about Romulus. He seems to have lost his appe-
• 
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tite." The semanticist then comes over and says "No, you are wrong. 
Romulus has as good an appetite as ever. Remus, however, may have lost 
his appetite." Then h·e goes on to explain his little experiment, con-
eluding, "So you see, if the causal theorist is right, when you use the 
name 'Romulus' you do not refer to the dog you've known since he was a 
puppy, you are really referring to your friend's dog." 53 
Cases like this do pose a problem for the causal theory. Even 
though no one intended to give a new name to either of the dogs, a new 
name was given. The dog whose official name was 'Remus' is now named 
'Romulus', and Romulus is Remus. To handle such cases, we should first 
recognize that the dogs now have two names each. 54 The official names of 
the dogs have not changed. That is why you could respond to the seman-
ticist 's story by saying, "You mean Romulus is really Remus?" The two 
names refer to the same dog. One refers to the dog by virtue '>of its 
status as an official name. The other has become an unofficial name. A 
practice of referring to that dog with that name has been established. 
What is tricky about such cases is that no one deliberately introduced 
new names for the dogs . There were no intentional name-giving acts. 
Yet the names were given. 
In this kind of case, the unofficial name is not given in a single 
act, but becomes that name over a period of time during which the name 
is used repeatedly to refer to the object. This seems obvious if we 
consider the difference between the case of the mischievous semantic 
53 Since you were obviously not referring to your friend's dog, it is 
easy to draw the conclusion that the causal theory must be wrong. 
54 This fact is sometimes ignored by mischievous semantic theorists. 
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theorist and a similar case involving an innocent mix-up. Suppose the 
person who sold you the dog inadvertently gave you the wrong puppy. You 
take the puppy home, play with it, call it 'Romulus', make statements 
about it using the name 'Romulus', etc. The next day, the previous 
owner, having realized his mistake, calls you and tells you that he gave 
you Remus by mistake and arranges a switch. In that case, 'Romulus' 
would not have become a name for 'Remus'. When you talked about Ramu-
lus, strictly speaking, your statements were not about the puppy you had 
taken home. (You may have been talking about Remus when you said 'Ramu-
lus'. But 'Romulus' did not refer to Remus. Here speaker's reference 
is different from the semantic reference.) 
It may not be possible to identify the exact point at which the 
name 'Romulus' became a name for Remus, 55 so there will be a number of 
uses of the name where we are not certain what the referent actually is, 
though we may know what the intended referent is. 56 I do not find this 
an unacceptable implication of the theory. 
Let us sum up our discussion of the causal 'theory of names. The 
basic idea is that there are name-using practices in a community, based 
on original name-givings. Those who participate in a particular prac-
tice refer to the object that was given that name when the practice was 
established. A name-using practice can be established by an institu-
55 Maybe it becomes the name at the point where, if the owners were 
informed of the mix-up, they would not be willing to start using the 
official name. 
5 6 You may not be too sure about the referent when the dog-seller 
switched the dogs for a day. The number of times the mistake is made 
can be reduced in the example, until your intuitions match mine: (Sup-
pose the dog-owner gave you the wrong dog, but caught you before you 
went out the door.) 
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tional name-giving act. !rt that case, it is only by looking at the par-
ticular institution, at its requirements for someone's giving a name to 
an individual by performing a certain act, etc. that we can discover 
what the referent of the name is. The referent is determined by the act 
performed according to an institution. An unofficial name can be estab-
lished by a string of uses of a name, in which each speaker intends to 
refer to the same object with the name (whether or not he or she knows 
that she is intending to refer to the same object). The referent of the 
name is, then, the one which 'caused' each of the speakers to have a 
certain object in mind which she intended to refer to. 57 
A use of a name typically refers to that thing which was given 
that name when the practice from which this use derived (or to which it 
is causally or historically related) was established. Or in more gen-
eral terms, the reference of a derived use of a name is determined by 
which practice the use is derived from or which one the speaker is par-
ticipating in. A use of a name is derived from a practice if the 
speaker uses that name to refer to some object on the basis of having 
heard the name from someone who was participating in the practice 
(either by deriving the name from some other use or by establishing the 
practice). One can fail to participate in a practice even though one's 
use of a name is derived if either (a) one establishes a new official 
name with this use or (b) one intends not to use the name to refer to 
the same object as the person from whom one learned the name and intends 
to refer to some object which actually is different, or (c) one's use is 
57 See Chapters Six and Eight for a more extensive discussion of this 
point. 
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derived from the establishing of an unofficial name-using practice. 
The causal theory explains how reference is disambiguated as fol-
lows. Suppose someone- says "Romulus has really grown." The reference 
potential of the name "Romulus" is determined by name-giving acts. 
'Romulus' can refer to anything that has been given that name. What it 
refers to in this sentence is determined by which name-giving act (or 
acts) this use of the name is derived from. By tracing the use of this 
name back to an original name-giving, one discovers the referent. 
Sometimes the chain of communication can be observed from the out-
side, simply by looking at who learned the name from whom. This would 
be more likely to be true of unusual names (e.g., 'Paris', 'Madagascar") 
and full names (e.g., 'John D. Jones', 'Cliff Wirt'), than with names 
that are common (e.g., 'Mary Smith') or with first names such as 'Bill'. 
This is because the speaker is more likely to have been exposed to only 
one 'Cliff Wirt'-using practice, and so his use, if it is derived, can 
only be derived from that practice. Many times, however, not even an 
omniscent observer of history could tell, without further information, 
what a name, as it is used in a particular sentence, refers to. 58 A per-
son may have been exposed to two different practices involving the same 
name. It is not possible to see, from the outside, which of these prac-
tices her use of that name in a particular sentence is derived from. 
Nonetheless, if the causal theory is correct, the reference of her name 
is determined by which practice her use is, in fact, connected with. 
The fact that we cannot always tell what practice her use is connected 
58 Donnellan suggests that an omniscent observer of history could do 
this . C.QE. cit. ) . 
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with is no more an objection to the causal theory than the fact that we 
cannot always tell what object satisfies the descriptive content in a 
speaker's mind is an objection to satisfaction theories. The important 
point is that reference is determined by which practice (and ultimately, 
by which name-giving act or acts) the use is connected with. How we 
figure out which one that is, is a different question. 59 
When we turn to referring devices other than proper names, two 
aspects of the causal theory of names as we have developed it will be 
significant. Reference borrowing, or chains of communication, will be 
used to explain how the referents of some referring devices are deter-
mined. For other referring devices, typically those which initiate a 
reference chain, the causal analysis of having an object in mind will be 
used to explain how reference is determined. 
59 The speaker may not even know. 
CHAPTER VI 
CAUSAL THEORIES OF DISAMBIGUATION 
In our discussion of the causal theory of names we saw that the 
referent of certain uses of a name could be determined by the links 
between those uses and other uses which ultimately derived from name-
giving acts. The general idea was of a reference chain in which later 
links derived their reference from the first link. In the case of 
names, uses of the same name (or tokens of the same name-type) were 
linked. When we expand our account to cover other types of referring 
devices, we will use the notion of reference chains to explain how the 
reference of some uses of other types of referring devices are deter-
mined. In the expanded account the terms to be linked need not be uses 
of the same referring device which together constitute a term-using 
practice as they were with names. What we export from the causal theory 
of names is the idea that the reference of some uses of a referring 
device can depend upon the connection between that device and some other 
use of a referring device. 
We shall define a reference chain as a sequence of referring 
devices linked in such a way that if one of them refers to something, 
then all of them refer to that thing. 1 Chastain calls these reference 
1 This definition is taken, with some modification, from Charles 
Chastain' s paper on reference chains, "Reference and Context" in Keith 
Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the 
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chains "anaphoric chai~s." In such chains there is one device that 
refers to an object independently. We shall call this device the pri-
!!!..ary referring device, and reference made with such a device primary 
reference. Other referring devices in the chain refer only by virtue of 
their connection with the primary referring device. We shall call 
devices that have this place in a reference chain secondary referring 
devices and reference made with them, secondary reference. 
The account of disambiguation for referring expressions other than 
names should spell out the general conditions for referential linkage 
and tell us how the reference of ambiguous primary referring devices is 
determined. Spelling out the conditions for referential linkage is 
analogous to spelling out the conditions under which one's use of a name 
is derived from another use of the same name. Explaining how the refer-
ent of an ambiguous primary referring device is determined will follow 
the lines of explaining how early uses of unofficial names get their 
referent. The referent, very roughly speaking, is that possible refer-
ent which·the speaker 'had in mind' in using the term. 
Secondary Reference and Disambiguation 
The basic issues we will address in this section are (1) to what 
extent do linguistic conventions leave the reference of secondary refer-
ring devices indeterminate and thus necessitate a theory of disambigua-
tion; and (2) what kind of reference rule should the theory give for 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1975), pp! 194-270, see especially p. 204f. 
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disambiguation of secondary reference. In our previous discussion of 
reference potential, we noted that linguistic rules or conventions 
determined a set of possible referents for referring expressions. For 
example, the linguistic conventions governing the use of the English 
word 'he' determine the set of possible referents consisting of male 
agents. If we consider the sentence, "He recently proposed a bill in 
the city council," and try to discover how the referent of the word "he" 
is determined, we find that the linguistic convention by which a set of 
possible referents is. assigned to the word 'he' leaves the reference 
quite indeterminate. Any male creature could be the referent of 'he' . 2 
But this is only one of the linguistic conventions governing the use of 
the word 'he'. There are other, syntactical, linguistic rules which 
2 It could be argued that 'he' in this sentence could only refer to 
male human beings, since only human beings can propose bills in the city 
council. However, as I argued earlier (see Chapter Four), semantic con-
straints on possible referents do not prevent us from making false or 
silly statements. 'He' in the sentence, 'He recently proposed a bill in 
the city council,' could, according to the rules of English, be used to 
refer to an animal. In fact, the sentence may even be true. Suppose, 
for instance, that to show his contempt for the council, the mayor 
appointed a donkey to the city council. Suppose also that during a see-
sion of the council the donkey gave to the council president a piece of 
paper on which a bill was written and on which his hoofprint was stamped 
(as a signature). Under these conditions it could truly be said that 
the donkey recently proposed a bill to the city council. 
It could also be argued that 'he' in this sentence could properly 
be used to refer to a female agent, since there is a generic sense of 
'he'. Certainly 'he' in the generic sense can apply to women as well as 
to men, but only in certain kinds of sentences--namely, those which have 
universal import. In those sentences 'he' means any arbitrarily chosen 
person, and it refers to no one. Since we are not dealing with such a 
sentence here, we need not worry about this sense of 'he'. However, I 
might concede that 'he' could refer to a female animal. If the donkey 
who proposed the bill were a female, we might still properly say 'He 
proposed a bill.' I have no clear intuitions about such a case. 
At any rate, the important fact is that the set of possible· refer-
ent for 'he' is quite large when we consider only the sentence in which 
it occurs. 
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also have a bearing on the reference of 'he'. Consider the following 
paragraph. 
Chicago's 49th ward alderman, David Orr, is trying to expand ren-
ter's rights. He recently proposed a bill in the city council. 
In this passage, the referent of 'he' is determinate. 'He' refers to 
David Orr, Chicago's 49th ward alderman. Often, especially in written 
works, syntactic conventions which determine the possible referents of 
secondary referring expressions in terms of their referential links to 
other expressions leave no question about what primary referring expres-
sion a secondary referring device is to be linked with. 3 In those cases 
there is no further need to explain how the referent of the secondary 
expression is disambiguated (unless it is linked to an expression which 
is itself ambiguous). For example, in the following sentences syntacti-
cal rules alone determine which secondary referring devices are linked 
to which primary devices. 
Maria and Mark were both students of mine. 
He only took one. 
She took two courses. 
In this paragraph 'she' can only correctly be linked to 'Maria', and 
'he' to 'Mark'. 
Syntactic rules determine the reference potential of referring 
devices other than pronouns. In the following paragraph there are sev-
eral reference chains involving a variety of referring devices. 
At eleven o'clock that morning, an ARVN officer stood a young pris-
oner, bound and blindfolded, up against a wall. He asked the pris-
oner several questions, and when the prisoner failed to answer, beat 
him repeatedly. An American observer who saw the beating, reported 
that the officer "really worked him over." After the beating, the 
3 Discovering these rules is a task for linguistics. We need only 
note that there are such rules and that they affect the reference poten-
tial of secondary referring devices. 
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prisoner was forced to remain standing against the wall for several 
hours. 4 
Here we have one reference chain linking 'an ARVN officer', 'he' , and 
'the ot°ficer' ; another linking 'a young prisoner', 'the prisoner' , 'the 
' I I h ' I I h ' I d I th ' I f h prisoner , im , im , an e prisoner ; and so ort . 
Linguistic rules alone are not always sufficient to tell us which 
referring expression is linked to which others. Consider the following 
conversation between Smith and Jones. 
"I saw Myra [Jones' wife] and Norma going into the Pump Room today," 
says Smith. 
"That woman! She told me she was going to be home working all 
afternoon." 
'That woman' and 'she' seem to be referentially linked to some other 
referring expression, but the linguistic rules cannot tell us which one. 
(Presumably, they would narrow down the possibilities to either 'Myra' 
or 'Norma'.) Something other than linguistic rules that determine ref-
erence potential determine the reference of 'that woman' and 'she'. 
Here, the same alternative accounts of how reference is disambiguated 
resurface. The reference of Jones' expressions might be determined by 
his intentions to refer to the same thing as 'Myra' or 'Norma' referred 
to. Or perhaps some feature of the context of Jones' utterance makes it 
the case that his expressions are linked to either 'Myra' or 'Norma'. 
Or Jones' referring expressions might refer to 'Myra' or 'Norma' depend-
ing upon which one prompted or caused his utterance. 
At first glance each of these alternatives seems plausible. How-
4 This paragraph is quoted by Chastain, ~· cit., from Jonathan 
Schell's, The Village of Ben Sue. 
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ever, if we vary the example or elaborate upon it somewhat, it will 
become clear that a contextual account will not do. One contextual 
theory, that of Colin McGinn, would propose that the relevant feature of 
the context is the spatio-temporal relation between the referring 
dev~ces. According to this account, the expression in question is ref-
erentially linked to the immediately preceding one. 5 In our example, 
this would be 'Norma'. However, when you read this example, it is quite 
likely that you did not conclude that 'that woman' referred to whomever 
'Norma' referred to. 6 It is also not likely that the only thing you took 
into account was the spatial or temporal order of the names. 
Although spatial or temporal order may not be the important fea-
ture of the context, there may be other contextual factors which do, in 
fact, disambiguate the reference. In this example, the feature of the 
context that does seem to be important is that one of these names refers 
to Jones' wife. This fact and what Jones said are what would guide you 
5 McGinn, "The Mechanisms of Reference," Syn these, 49 (1981), pp. 
157-186. See especially p. 169. 
6 McGinn would protect his claim from counter-examples of this kind 
by saying that his account is an "idealization." However, I do not see 
how this will do much good. It shifts the ground away from ~ounter-ex­
amples based on sound intuitions about language as a way of testing any 
account of reference determination. But if we accept McGinn's account 
as an idealization, why should we not accept other accounts as idealiza-
tions? Then they will be immune to counter-examples also. What we 
would be left with, given the acceptability of such idealizations, would 
be intuitions about 'normal' ca~es, or about 'basic' structures and 
mechanisms. Given the choice between my intuitions about what consti-
tutes a 'normal' case or a 'basic' structure and my intuitions about the 
reference of terms in a particular English sentence, I would put my 
trust in the latter. I suspect this is true for most people. If we are 
going to have a justified theory of reference, we would do well to jus-
tify it on the basis of intuitions about particular expressions ~n par-
ticular contexts and stay away from intuitions about 'normal' cases and 
idealizations based on them. 
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in your interpretation of the sentence. But does this feature of the 
context really determine to which of Smith's expressions Jones' expres-
sions are linked? Suppose it does not matter to Jones where his wife 
is, but Norma had promised him that she would finish a project she was 
working on at home by 5:00 that afternoon, and he believed it would take 
the whole day. In that case, we would take this fact to be important 
for interpreting Jones' utterance. However, even if we do take into 
account what matters to Jones, this will still not be sufficient to 
disambiguate the reference of 'that woman'. For suppose it matters to 
Jones where his wife is and it matters where Norma is, and suppose that 
both women had told him they were going to be at home that afternoon. 
In that case, both women would be likely referents, but the context can-
not tell us which is the actual referent. In cases like this, reference 
seems to depend on whom the speaker meant, or which name he intended to 
link his utterance with. 
Syntactic rules along with other linguistic rules tell us what 
referring expressions can be linked to which others, 7 but they do not 
tell us which ones are actually so linked. Sometimes where there can be 
a referential link, there is none. A speaker can, for example, use a 
pronoun out of the blue (i.e., deictically) in the middle of a conversa-
tion. 
C: I saw General Westmoreland on T.V. last night. He really looked 
old and tired. Sometimes I almost feel sorry for him. 
R: Well, he brought it on himself. He did it again! 
7 For example, in English 'he' can be linked with a man's name, or 
With a definite description of a male, etc. 
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This last 'he' could belong to the chain 'General 
1 d i 'h I 'h' I 'h I b Westmore an - e - 1m - e , ut it need not. Suppose that while this 
conversation was takiri"g place, R had been rummaging through his desk 
looking for his pen. On finding it, he says "He did it again!" As it 
happens, someone had borrowed the pen, not for the first time, and left 
the cap off, not for the first time. When he said "He did it again," R 
intended to refer to the person who borrowed the pen. It seems quite 
likely that this person is the referent of 'he' in this sentence. 
By considering cases of this sort we discover that what a theory 
of disambiguation for secondary referring devices should provide are 
.reference rules which state the conditions under which the expressions 
of a particular language which could (according to linguistic conven-
tions for that language) be linked to other expressions, actually are so 
linked. There are two types of problem cases: (a) cases in which there 
are two different referring expressions to which an expression could be 
linked (e.g., 'Myra' and 'Norma'); and (2) cases in which an expression 
could be linked to another, yet is not so linked. The analogs to these 
cases in the causal theory of names are (1) cases in which there are two 
different practices with the same name from which a use of a name could 
have derived (e.g., 'Romulus' could be derived from the practice which 
originated when the official name was given or from the practice that 
was established after the dogs were switched); and (2) cases in which a 
use of a name was derived from another use connected to a practice 
(e.g., the practice of referring to a person with the name 'Herkimer 
Feingruber') but does not refer to the same thing (e.g., the name refers 
to a goldfish). 
A theory of disambiguation for secondary reference should tell us 
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under what conditions expressions that could be linked actually are 
linked. We find the same kinds of answers here as we did in the casual 
theory of names. We might say that the expressions are linked whenever 
the speaker intends to refer to the same thing with both expressions. 
This intention may make reference to the expression in question. For 
example, Jones may have had the intention: "I intend to refer with 'that 
woman' to the person which 'Myra' referred to." This is similar to 
Kripke's requirement for non-deviant causal chains which says that the 
speaker must intend to use a name to refer to the same thing as the per-
son from whom he learned it. Here we say that the speaker must intend 
to refer to the same thing as some other expression referred to. This 
answer may also be one part of a satisfaction theorist's answer. 
The general answer we would expect from a satisfaction theory of 
di~ambiguation is that, in cases of this sort, the referent of a refer-
ring expression is determined by what the speaker intended to refer to. 
This intention to refer involves identifying the referent by means of 
some uniquely denoting intentional content. This content may be an 
identifying description which makes reference to the reference of some 
other term (e.g., "the person S referred to by 'Myra'), but it need not. 
Jones may have associated with the expression 'that woman' the identify-
ing description "the person who is my wife" 
An intentionalist account of reference chains which says that the 
referent is determined by (1) linguistic rules which determine reference 
potential and (2) the speaker's intentions to refer to an object with an 
expression, will not work. For suppose someone says to you, "My 
friends, Chris and Pat, are coming to visit this week-end. They're just 
now returning from their honeymoon. They got married two weeks ago." 
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y0 u say, "Whom do you know better, the bride or the groom?" Suppose you 
did not know Chris and Pat. On hearing the names you assumed that Chris 
was a woman and Pat a man. When you said, 'the groom' you intended to 
refer to the person 'Pat' referred to in the previous sentence, and you 
intended to refer to the person 'Chris' referred to with 'the bride'. 
However, you were wrong. Pat is the bride and Chris is the groom. 
If it were necessary, in order for two expressions, ~-1 and ~-2, 
to be referentially linked, that the speaker intend to refer with E-2 
to the same thing as ~-1 referred to, then in the preceding example, 
'the bride' would not be referentially linked to 'Pat' and 'the groom' 
would not be linked with 'Chris'. But it seems clear that the expres-
sions are so linked. The speaker's mistaken beliefs do not affect the 
reference of her expressions in this case. 
Nor is intending to refer with E-2 to the thing referred to with 
E-1 sufficient to link the two. Consider the following conversation: 
Ralph: I just saw Cynthia in the hall. Weren't you 
looking for her? [He sees another woman, Vicky, 
in the hall.] Excuse me, I have to go talk to 
her. [He nods his head in the direction of the 
hall as he says 'her', then leaves the room.] 
Cliff: [Calling after Ralph] Tell her to come back 
here when you've finished. I want to ask her 
about a book she borrowed. 
Ralph: [From the hall] Vicky borrowed a book from you? 
We can safely assume that Cliff intended to refer to Cynthia with 'her', 
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yet 'her' in this context referred to Vicky. 8 Even though Cliff intended 
to link his expression to the name 'Cynthia', it did not refer to Cynt-
hia, but to Vicky. 9 
It may be that our requirement that the speaker intend to link 
E-2 to E-1 is overly restrictive. The speaker's intentions should be 
more general. Rather than requiring that the speaker intend to refer 
with E-2 to the same thing as ~-1 referred to, we might simply require 
that the speaker intend to link his discourse with some other dis-
course. 10 By changing the requirement in this way, the preceding count-
er-examples can be avoided. In that case the speaker's intentions to 
refer are not important, what is important is his intention to link his 
whole discourse to another one. Such an explanation avoids the kinds of 
counter-examples we have raised, but it presupposes that speakers actu-
ally intend to link one discourse to another. It is difficult to find 
evidence that they form such intentions. In fact, the discourses seem 
to be linked automatically. Another, perhaps less serious, difficulty 
with this type of account is that it would leave some cases ambiguous 
(e.g., the 'Myra' 'Norma' case). 
An alternative account of refrence linking which does not involve 
the speaker's intentions to refer or to link would look to the 'causes' 
8 That is why Ralph's closing remark makes sense. 
of being too literal, but the basis for his literal 
what we are worried about in semantics. 
We may accuse him 
interpretation is 
9 We might want to argue that syntactic considerations are important 
here. Cliff's {'her' could only refer to what Ralph's 'her' referred 
to, because of certain rules governing the use of pronouns. 
10 We should have to then give some account of the units of dis-
course. These might be sentences, paragraphs, or conversationsal units 
segmented in terms of speakers. 
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of the speaker's utterance. We would see what utterances prompted the 
speaker to say what she did in order to see what she was referring to. 
An expression E-2 wou1d be linked to another ~-1, if and only if E-1 
was in some appropriate way causally responsible for the speaker's using 
E-2. For example, if it was because Jones heard the name 'Myra' that he 
said "That woman!", then 'that woman' would be referentially linked to 
'Myra'. Or again, if Cliff's use of 'her' was prompted by Ralph's 
statement, "Excuse me, I have to go talk to her," then his use of 'her' 
would refer to whatever 'her' referred to in Ralph's statement. This 
account seems more plausible than the hypothesis that one forms inten-
tions concerning linkage in the course of a conversation or within a 
discourse. In the course of an actual conversation, connections between 
expressions seem more a matter of promptings than of intentions. 
One difficulty with a causal-genetic account of reference chains 
arises when we try to specify the appropriate causal relations. 
Clearly, Cliff's saying 'her' was prompted by Ralph's saying 'her', but 
to some extent it also seems to have been prompted by Ralph's saying 
"Cynthia". What is it about the causal relation between Ralph's saying 
'her' and Cliff's saying 'her', as opposed to the one between Ralph's 
saying 'Cynthia' and Cliff's saying 'her', that makes the former the 
appropriate causal relation? Perhaps we could simply make a distinction 
between the proximal cause and more distant ones. We could postulate 
that one feature of the appropriate causal relation is that the expres-
sion E-1 is a proximal cause of ~-2. 11 
11 McGinn' s contextual reference rule for reference chains (E-2 
should be linked with the immediately preceding expression of the appro-
priate kind) is quite similar to the rule that ~-2 is linked with the 
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A more serious problem for causal-genetic accounts has been dis-
covered by Colin McGinn. McGinn argues that the causal-genetic approach 
to reference chains will not work. He imagines a case where a causal 
relationship is not even necessary for a reference chain to be estab-
lished: 
[S]uppose I believe on general grounds at ! that you will say at t 
+ 1 "That man is drunk" at a party, and suppose I know that at t + 
1 my hearing will be blocked. Neverthelss I plan to say at t + 2 
"He will soon be thrown out," intending my pronoun to be anaphori-
cally linked to your demonstrative. It seems to me that I could 
succeed in this plan, even though my own utterance was not causally 
linked to the utterance to which it is referentially chained (cer-
tainly the other people at the party will take my pronoun to be so 
chained). 12 
McGinn seems to be on to something here. It does seem that the 
plan could succeed even though the utterance "He will soon be thrown 
out" was not directly caused or prompted by the prior utterance. 13 Fur-
thermore, the plan could fail and lead to some interesting and perhaps 
unfortunate results. Suppose that McGinn's belief that I will say 'That 
man is drunk' is mistaken. I actually say "That man is the new presi-
dent of the APA." McGinn, thinking that I had said "That man is drunk," 
says "He will soon be thrown out." I would guess that the other people 
at the party would take 'he' in McGinn' s sentence to be referentially 
expression which is the proximal cause of ~-2, since this expression 
will, in most cases, be the immediately preceding one. However, it will 
not always be. For example in the 'Myra' 'Norma' case, the speaker's 
utterance could have been prompted by the first name that was used. 
Thus, we would not accept McGinn' s reference rule. It may happen to 
work for most cases, but, the spatio-temporal factor is not the impor-
tant one. 
12 Ibid., p. 169f. 
13 It may have been indirectly prompted, via my belief that you would 
say that. 
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linked to 'that man', and I suspect that it would be. But why? 
McGinn suggests that it is the speaker's intention that his term 
co-refer to the one in the preceding discourse that determines whether 
the term will be linked. As I said before, the reservation I have about 
his answer is that it is not clear that people typically have this 
intention when their expressions are linked. When I write a paragraph 
containing reference chains I certainly am not aware of forming inten-
tions to link expressions; nor am I aware of forming such intentions 
when I am carrying on a normal conversation. Of course, the fact that I 
am not aware of forming such intentions does not mean that I do not do 
so. I may do so habitually, so that I do not notice; I may sub-con-
sciously intend to link my expressions to other pieces of discourse. 
It seems clear from McGinn's example that reference links do not 
depend on there being a direct causal relation between an expression (or 
utterance) and a speaker's use of a word. The expression (or larger 
utterance) need not have any causal impact on the speaker, and yet the 
speaker's expression may be referentially linked. 14 However, abandoning 
this type of causal account need not force us to accept an intentional-
ist one. Indeed, to do so would be a mistake, for reference chains can 
exist where the speaker has no intentions to link, in fact, where the 
'speaker' has no intentions at all. This point can be illustrated by 
considering exchanges of sentences between human beings and computers or 
computer programs. 
14 In the case McGinn cited we could argue that there was an indirect 
causal connection between E-1 and ~-2 via the speaker's predictions 
about E-1. However, when ~-1 is very different from what the speaker 
predicted, there seems to be no causal link between E-1 and E-2. 
• 
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One such program, "Eliza," was designed to key in on important 
words or phrases and to formulate appropriate responses. For example, a 
person might say to Eliza "I had a very strange dream last night. I 
dreamt my room was infested with rats. What do you think that means?" 
· ld k h "Wh t d th · k i' t means?" Eliza wou ma e a response sue as a o you in 
Although Eliza has no intentions to link her referring expressions to 
the human speaker's, her expressions are linked. 15 Nor does it seem that 
the links depend on causal relations between an expression and a 
speaker. One might be tempted to explain Eliza's reference linking in 
terms of causal relations between a prompting word or expression and 
Eliza's expression. However, we can imagine cases in which this rela-
tion breaks down and Eliza's expression is still referentially linked. 
Suppose, due to some kind of failure in the main computer, your sentence 
"My mother is coming to visit next week," is lost, and by coincidence, 
due to a quirk in the program, Eliza says right afterwards, "Are you 
angry with her?" Even though the causal relation has broken down, 'her' 
would still be linked with 'my mother'. If reference links depend nei-
ther on context, nor on causal relations, nor on the speaker's inten-
tions to co-refer, what do they depend on? 
I would propose that we analyze reference chains in much the same 
way as we analyzed participation in a name-using practice. In the case 
of names, we said that a use of a name is linked to a prior use, unless 
15 Eliza's ability to carry on a 'conversation' (that is, to produce 
sentences appropriate to the conversational context) is largely a matter 
of exploiting the possibilities for reference linking. This ability may 
be derived from the programmer's intentions to link Eliza's discourses 
to those of her conversational partners, but this intention is of·a dif-
ferent kind than the intention which would accompany each linked use of 
a referring expression in normal conversation or writing. 
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a new primary reference is made. With other types of reference chains I 
propose that expressions which could, according to semantic and syntac-
tic rules, be referentially linked, and which satisfy certain other 
structural conditions are referentially linked unless a new primary ref-
erence is made. The structural conditions would be conditions under 
which it is possible to link referring expressions. Although we cannot 
specify all these conditions here, we can mention some of the most obvi-
ous. For example, it is quite clear that some expressions cannot be 
linked: my expressions cannot be referentialy linked to what someone in 
a different part of the city is muttering solely to herself (unless one 
of us is telepathic). On the other hand, my expressions can be linked 
to what someone within earshot says. This might be someone in the same 
room as I, or someone in a different city calling long-distance, or 
someone whom I can hear on the radio or T.V. My expressions can also be 
linked to discourse in printed media. To generalize, the possibility of 
linkage, at least across speakers, seems to exist only when there is a 
certain kind of relation between the speaker and· the utterance. It 
exists only when the person whose expressions are to be linked is in a 
position in which one would be able to take in the discourse either by 
hearing it or seeing it or otherwise receiving it. 16 I suspect that when 
we spell out the conditions under which a person would normally be able 
to take in a discourse, we will find that these conditions involve some 
kind of causal relation between the expression and the speaker. Circum-
16 This is, then, a contextual requirement. I will not even attempt 
to specify the exact conditions under which linkage is possible. I 
suspect they are quite complicated. In addition, there may be special 
circumstances for deaf people, for example. 
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stances in which a speaker can link his referring expressions will be 
those circumstances in which a speaker would typically be causally 
affected by a preceding segment of discourse. Circumstances in which no 
referential linkages are possible are those· in which a normal person 
would not be causally affected (for example, when she is too far away to 
have heard what someone just said, or when the area is so noisy that she 
could not have heard, etc.). 
At any rate, reference links will require that a speaker be in a 
certain position with respect to an expression. When a speaker is in 
this position and uses expressions which semantically and syntactically 
can be linked to expressions in the preceding discourse, then the 
expression is so linked, unless the speaker does something to break the 
chain. So rather than asking under what conditions an expression which 
could be referentially linked actually is linked, we should concentrate 
on the conditions under which an expression which could be referentially 
linked fails to be. Here, as with the case of names, I would suggest 
that the referential chain continues unless it is interrupted by a new 
primary reference. 
Thus, I would argue that reference chains should be explained in 
terms of linguistic rules, context, and primary reference. The linguis-
tic rules would be rules of syntax as well as rules governing reference 
potential. These rules of reference linkage apply only in certain con-
texts, namely in those circumstances in which the person whose expres-
s ions are to be linked is in a position to be causally affected by the 
expressions with which hers are linked whether she is actually causally 
affected by it or not. Reference chains are broken only when there is a 
new primary reference. To illustrate what we mean let us examine the 
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reference chains in one of our test conversations. Consider the conver-
sation that went like this: 
Ralph: I just saw Cynthia in the hall. Weren't you 
looking for her? [He sees another woman, Vicky, 
in the hall.] Excuse me, I have to go talk to 
her. [He nods his head in the direction of the 
hall as he says 'her', then leaves the room.] 
Cliff: [Calling after Ralph] Tell her to come back 
here when you've finished. I want to ask her 
about a book she borrowed. 
There are possible reference chains in Ralph's speech which would link 
'Cynthia'-'her'-'her'. However, the last 'her' is not linked. I sug-
gest that the reason it is not linked is that, by nodding his head 
towards Vicky and saying 'her', Ralph made a new primary reference. 
When Cliff says 'her' under the appropriate conditions (he could have 
and did hear Ralph) his expression can only be linked with Ralph's sec-
ond 'her' according to syntactical rules, and it is so linked because 
Cliff does not make a new primary reference. 17 
In conversations where the syntactic and semantic rules seem to 
permit links with two different expressions, I would suggest that there 
is no reference chain. So in the conversation between Smith and Jones 
where Jones said "That woman!", 'that woman' is not referentially linked 
17 Whether this analysis will ultimately be correct depends on 
whether we can satisfactorily explain primary reference. Notice also 
that I assume here that the syntactic rules state that a pronoun is 
linked to the immediately preceding one, thus agreeing with McGinn. 
with either 'Myra' or 'Norma'. 
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The referent of 'that woman' will be 
determined independently, in whatever way the referent of primary 
expressions is determined. 
At first glance, this answer may seem implausible. After all, it 
seems that if 'that woman' refers to anything it refers to either Myra 
or Norma, and thus would be referentially linked with one or the other 
name. To see what is wrong with this objection, let us look at some 
analogous cases. 
Suppose you are at a party and are in a position similar to the 
one that McGinn imagined. You are talking to someone, and at time ! you 
believe that this person will say at!+ 1, "That man is drunk," and you 
plan to say at t + 2, "He will soon be thrown out." Now suppose this 
person says instead, "Those two men are drunk," and you say, "He will 
soon be thrown out." Your 'he' wi 11 not be 1 inked to 'those two men' . 
There may be an apparent connection between the expressions, especially 
if 'he' refers to one of the men that 'those two men' refers to, but 
this connection is not based on referential linkage. The reason there 
is no linkage is that, syntactically, one may not link 'he' with 'those 
two men'. I suspect there is a similar constraint on linking a singular 
referring expression with a conjunction of such expressions, for exam--
ple, for linking 'he' with 'Smith and Jones'. For imagine you are in 
the situation in which you hearing will be blocked at t + 1, and you 
believe at ! that Rogers will say at ! + 1 -"That man is drunk," but he 
actually says "Smith and Jones have just been appointed to co-chair the 
task force on education." You say, at ! + 2, "He will soon be thrown 
out." The people to whom you are speaking would be puzzled about whom 
You meant. They would have no more reason to take you to have referred 
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to either Smith or Jones, than to assume that you were talking about 
someone else. Your sentence doesn't fit in with the preceding one as it 
would have had you said, "They will soon be thrown out. 18 
Primary Reference 
Up to now we have discussed how the reference of one referring 
expression can depend upon the reference of some other referring expres-
sion. We shall now look at how a causal theory might explain the refer-
ence of expressions whose reference is determined independently. Such 
expressions would include primary expressions in a reference chain and 
first uses of unofficial names. 
In this section we will be concerned primarily with explaining how 
the reference of an ambiguous primary referring expression is disambigu-
ated. We shall restrict our attention to those referring expressions 
that already have an established reference potential. 19 As a first 
approximation we will say that the reference of a referring expression 
of this kind is determined by which possible referent the speaker 
18 This answer suggests that linguistic rules for reference chains 
are quite strict. Although the proof that they are must come from an 
adequate account of anaphora by linguists, the reader can get some indi-
cation of the constraints on reference linking by playing a little 
game. Have six people independently write sentences containing expres-
sions that can be linked (e.g., 'a man'-'he'-'the man'-'him), then try 
to put these sentences together into a coherent paragraph and look at 
what can be linked to what. 
19 Since first uses of unofficial names are not governed by rules 
which establish reference potential, we shall not discuss them here. To 
explain how these names refer we need to talk about how reference poten-
tial is determined. See Chapter Seven. 
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intended to refer to. The account of disambiguation will be an 
intentionalist one. 2 0 We will explain semantic reference (what the 
expression referred to) partly in.terms of the speaker's intended refer-
ence (what the speaker intended to refer to with that expression). Our 
account will be a causal, intentionalist one, as opposed to a satisfac-
tion intentionalist account. As a rough approximation, we can say that 
the referent of an ambiguous referring expression will be determined by 
a certain kind of causal relation between the referent and the expres-
sion, via the referent's effect on the speaker. 
To give a general idea of how this causal explanation accounts for 
disambiguation, let us contrast this explanation with those of satisfac-
tion and contextual theorists. Recall the earlier example in which a 
person, looking at an antelope-shaped rock says, "That has been watching 
us all night." A satisfaction account would say that the referent of 
'that' is the object that satisfies the mental content which the speaker 
associates with the word. A contextual account would say that the ref-
erent of 'that' is the object which the speaker demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by pointing, or nodding his head, or by looking up, and that in the 
absence of such demonstrations (and other semantically significant con-
textual clues) the reference is indeterminate. A causal account would 
say that the referent of 'that' is the potential referent which caused 
the speaker to have a certain object in mind when she said 'that' . 21 The 
potential referent which caused the speaker to have an object in mind, 
20 See Chapter Three for a definition of an intentionalist theory of 
disambiguation. 
21 Recall that we have already said that some contextual factors do 
co-determine reference. 
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in this example, is the rock. Thus, according to the causal theory, the 
rock is the referent of 'that'. 
We will begin our assessment of the causal theory of disambigua-
tion with a summary of two different versions of it. One version, the 
one developed by Michael Devitt, gives a straightforwardly causal analy-
sis of primary reference. 22 The other, developed by Charles Chastain, 
analyzes primary reference in terms of a speaker's knowledge of an 
b . t 23 O JeC · 
Devitt argues that the reference of ambiguous referring expres-
sions is determined by what the speaker had in mind. 24 For example, 
ambiguous definite descriptions such as 'the book' and 'the table' in 
the sentence "The book is on the table," refer to the objects the 
speaker had in mind, 2 5 so do ambiguous demonstratives, with or without 
an accompanyihg demonstration, and other indexicals such as 'he', 'she', 
'it', etc. Insofar as Devitt analyzes disambiguation in terms of what 
the speaker had in mind, his theory is an intentionalist one. It is 
not, however, a satisfaction account, for the relation between the 
object and the speaker's mental states is not that of satisfaction or 
fit. According to Devitt, having an object in mind is to be analyzed in 
22 See "Singular Terms," The Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974), pp. 
183-205, and Designation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 
23 Chastain explains the connection between his theory and the causal 
theory on p. 256, 2£. cit. 
24 When we talk about ambiguous referring expressions in this sec-
tion, we will be referring only to primary referring expressions. 
25 Note: Devitt uses 
have been using 'refer'. 
the same thing. 
the term 'designate' in almost the same·way we 
For our purposes we can take the terms to mean 
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terms of a causal relation between an object and the speaker's state of 
mind. His analysis of having an object in mind is as follows: 
[T]here is an object which a person has in mind if and only if there 
is a certain sort of causal connection between his state of mind and 
the object. 26 
Having an object in mind fs not, of course, a sufficient condition 
for reference. For an expression in some language to refer to some 
object, the speaker must use an expression which can (in the sense of 
reference potential) be used to refer to the object he has in mind. 
Further, his using that expression must be causally related to his hav-
ing a certain object in mind. Because there is this connection between 
the object and the expression, via the speaker's mental states, Devitt 
sometimes speaks of the cause of the utterance or the cause of the 
speaker's linguistic behavior. For example, in handling such cases as 
Kaplan's "I like that [pointing in the general direction of his son]," 
Devitt says, 
What determines that one aspect and not another of the vaguely indi-
cated environment is designated is that the speaker had that aspect 
in mind. We look to what caused the behavior in order to remove 
ambiguities. 27 
Or again, when he is talking about ambiguous definite descriptions such 
as 'the man' or 'the cat', Devitt says, 
[The description] designates the object the speaker had in mind; 
i.e., it designates the object that causally results in the use of 
the description. Our earlier speaker designated this book and that 
table because of their special place in the causal explanation of 
his utterance. 28 
26 Designation, p. 33. This causal connection can be indirect, as it 
is with secondary referring, or direct. We will only discuss the direct 
connections here. 
27 
"Singular Terms," p. 197. 
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Devitt explains the causal relation between the object and the 
speaker's mental state primarily as a perceptual link. For example, 
when he is discussing· definite descriptions, he says, "It would seem 
that, for a speaker to have an object in mind, his use of the descrip-
tion must be based on a perception of it. " 2 9 And when he talks about 
demonstratives such as 'this', 'that', 'I', 'you' 'he', 'she', and 'it', 
when they are used "out of the blue," he says, 
[I]t is clear that there is some causal link between the speaker and 
the object in virtue of which he uses the demonstrative. He is per-
ceiving the object ... or has recently perceived it. It is the causal 
action of the object on him that led him (in part) to do what he 
did. 30 
The virtues of Devitt's account are as follows. First, it 
explains how reference is disambiguated when the expression and its con-
text are not sufficient to determine a unique referent. 31 Secondly, it 
helps to make sense of our ordinary practice of trying to find out what 
a speaker had in mind when we are not sure what she is talking about. 
Thirdly, Devitt's account can explain how a speaker refers to something 
about which she has radically mistaken beliefs (including beliefs based 
on misperception). This is where the causal theory surpasses satisfac-
tion accounts. Not only can it explain this, but the explanation is 
such that it avoids the problem of fortuitous satisfaction, at least 
28 Ibid., p. 195. 
29 Ibid. p. 192. This perception need not be his own. His use of 
the description may be based on what someone else who had perceived the 
object said. 
30 Designation, p. 43. 
3 1 In this respect it is superior to contextual accounts, and on a 
par with satisfaction accounts. 
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when the problem is due to the speaker's misperceiving or misremembering 
the object. 32 
Chastain's account of primary reference is similar to Devitt's in 
many ways, but the terms of his explanation do not necessarily include 
causal relations. A more complete summary of Chastain' s account will 
follow, but to orient the reader I will briefly draw some comparisons 
between Devitt' s account and Chastain' s. Both accounts say that the 
reference of an ambiguous singular term is determined by what the 
speaker had in mind. But whereas Devitt posits some kind of causal 
relation between a speaker's mental states, the referents of his expres-
sions, and his expressions, Chastain uses the notion of referential 
links between expressions in an overt context and elements in covert 
(mental) contexts. Both accounts reject the satisfaction model of hav-
ing an object in mind in favor of a model which downplays the speaker's 
conception of the referent. For Devitt the model is a causal one, usu-
ally involving an object's ability perceptually to affect a speaker. 
For Chastain the model is an epistemic one; primary reference requires 
that the speaker have knowledge of the referent by some means or 
other. 33 This knowledge is often based on perception, but if there are 
other means of having knowledge of an object--including non-causal ones, 
these will also suffice for primary reference. 
Chastain explains reference in terms of connections between ele-
32 Jaegwon Kim has argued that the problem arises for causal theories 
in a different way. See "Perception and Reference without Causality," 
The Journal of Philosophy, 74 (Oct., 1977), pp. 606-620. 
33 This knowledge of the object is not the same as knowledge about 
the object. It is rather like 'having an object in mind'. 
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ments in a context and objects. A context, according to Chastain, is a 
representational system containing elements or having a content: 
In general anything which has content is a context, as I use the 
term. Anything that has meaning or sense is a context. Anything 
which expresses something or { represents something is a context. 34 
some examples may help to illustrate the notion of a context. A lin-
guistic discourse is a context; its elements are words, phrases, sen-
tences, etc. A photograph is a context; its elements are silver depos-
its on photographic paper. A picture is a context. A map is a context; 
its elements are symbols signifying rivers., cities, roads, etc. One's 
visual field is a context. A memory is a context. 35 
A context may be overt or covert. A sentence said out loud would 
be an overt context. The same sentence can be simply thought. In that 
case it is a covert context. Some contexts, e.g., the two just men-
tioned, are linguistic. Others are "quasi-linguistic," for example, 
one's visual field, a map, or a photograph. 
The analysis Chastain gives of singular reference (in the most 
general sense) is as follows: 
[A] singular element in a context ~ possessed or produced by a per-
son P refers to an object 0 if and only if either (i) E in C is 
referentially linked with a~ element E' in an antecedent context C' 
and E' in c' refers to 0 or (ii) P has knowledge of 0 via E in C. 
36 
A primary referring expression in an overt discourse (e.g., 'that 
34 
.QE. cit., p. 195. 
35 Those who are concerned about the ontological status of such con-
texts and their contents (mental images, mental pictures) are advised to 
read Chastain's defense of them. See Ibid., p. 195 and pp. 243ff. 
36 Ibid., p. 251. Thus, we could have two kinds of primary refer-
ence: primary overt reference and primary covert reference. 
181 
couple' in the sentence "I saw that couple again today, 11 ) may be 
referentially linked with another referring expression in a covert dis-
course. For example, before I said "I saw that couple again today," I 
may have said to myself: 
There's Kelly. Last week he told me about this strange couple who 
spend all their time visiting the restaurants along Sheridan Road. 
Yesterday he pointed them out to me. 
According to Chastain 'that couple' in the overt discourse would refer 
to whomever 'this strange couple who spend all their time visiting res-
taurants along Sheridan Road' refers to in the covert discourse if the 
two expressions are referentially linked. 37 The expression, 'this 
strange couple who spend all their time visiting restaurants along Sher-
idan Road', in the covert context, could, in turn, be referentially 
linked with an element in another covert context, in this case it is 
most likely a memory context. Thus, the expression 'this strange couple 
who spend all their time visiting restaurants along Sheridan Road' could 
be linked to an element in the memory context, perhaps an image of the 
couple. What this image refers to is not, as a satisfaction theory 
would say, the couple who satisfies or fits the image most closely, but 
rather the couple which is causally related to the image. One could 
misremember the couple in such a way that some other couple who also 
3 7 I will discuss Chastain' s account of the mechanisms of linking 
below. 
Sometimes Chastain talks as if there is always a covert discourse 
to which an ambiguous referring expression is linked. At one point he 
says of 'the cat' and 'the mat' in the sentence "The cat is on the mat," 
that they "denote no cats or mats uniquely. Instead, they get their 
reference via linkage with singular terms in covert discourses," (p. 
236). However, there is no reason to suppose that this step is· neces-
sary. The expressions could just as well be linked to elements in a 
perceptual or memory context directly. 
• 
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spend all their time visiting restaurants along Sheridan Road more 
closely resembles the image than the couple one's memory is based on. 
Nonetheless, the mental image refers (in the general sense) to the 
couple which is causally related to the image. That couple is the one 
about whom I have knowledge through the image in the memory context. 
A memory may also be referentially linked with an overt discourse. 
For example, before Kelly ever pointed out the strange couple, he may 
have talked about them. I may remember Kelly's talking about this 
couple, and some element in my memory context may refer to these people. 
Once again, it is not because my description or image is uniquely satis-
fied by a certain couple that the remembered description refers to that 
couple, but rather because this description is referentially linked to 
Kelly's overt discourse which, in turn, is referentially linked to his 
memory context. The primary reference in this case is not made in my 
memory context but in someone else's. The reference of all of these 
elements is the object which is causally linked to the appropriate ele-
ments in Kelly's memory context. 
Ambiguous referring expressions may also be disambiguated by vir-
tue of their links with a perceptual context. For example, one might, 
on seeing the couple, say "There's that couple again." The expression 
'that couple' may be referentially linked to one's perceptual context 
which contains the perceptual image of two people. What 'that couple' 
refers to depends on which elements in the perceptual context the 
expression is referentially linked with and what objects those elements 
Yield knowledge of. The object which the speaker has knowledge of 
through the perceptual image is the one which is causally responsible 
for the elements in the perceptual context. 
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Earlier I said that Chastain analyzes primary reference in terms 
of knowledge rather than causation. This is true only for the most pri-
mary of primary referring devices. Some primary ~eferring devices, for 
example, the expression 'that couple' i_n an overt context, are only pri-
mary relative to that context. They are not referentially linked to 
other expressions in that context (though other expressions may be 
linked to them). However, the referent of this expression, if the 
expression is referentially linked to elements in a covert context, 
depends on the referent of those elements, so relative to the covert 
context, the primary referring expression in the overt context is a sec-
ondary referring expression. According to Chastain, the mechanisms for 
linking expressions in overt contexts to elements in covert contexts is 
to be explained in terms of causal connections between contexts. Thus, 
his account of primary referring expressions in overt contexts is much 
like Devitt's. 
Recall that in Devitt's account, there were two causal relations: 
one between a speaker's use of an expression and her having an· object in 
mind, and another, between the object a speaker has in mind and the 
speaker's having that object in mind. For Chastain also there is a cau-
sal relation between a speaker's use of an expression (the primary 
referring expression in an overt context) and her 'having an object in 
mind'. While Chastain does not use the expression 'having an object in 
mind', we could easily translate 'having an object in mind' into the 
language of mental contexts and elements in these contexts. According 
to Chastain, the reference of a primary referring expression in an overt 
context is determined by its causal connection with an element in a 
covert (or mental) context. 
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If an ambiguous primary expression in an overt context has a 
determinate referent, we would expect this referent to be determined by 
a causal link between this expression and some element in a covert con-
text. To this extent, Chastain's account of primary reference is a cau-
sal one. His account of reference for the most primary of primary ref-
erences (e.g., the reference made with mental representations) is not 
strictly a causal one. For this kind of primary reference, when the 
referring element is not referentially linked to any other element, this 
primary element refers to an object 0 if and only if f has knowledge of 
O via E in C. (Chastain makes one exception to this rule: with "terms 
in referentially isolated linguistic contexts" the speaker need not have 
knowledge of the referent. 38 In such contexts there is no "alternative 
route to the thing referred to," "there is nothing left but denotation 
to fix the identity of the referent. 11 ) 3 9 If the context is a perceptual 
or memory context, then the object of which the person has knowledge via 
E is the one to which E is causally related in the appropriate way. 4 0 
One can also have knowledge of an object that is not perceived at all. 
For example, one may detect the presence of a burglar by seeing the mess 
38 Ibid., p. 237. The sentences, "Shoot the first man who comes 
through the door," and "Our one-millionth customer will receive a 
month's free grocieries," are Chastain' s examples of referentially iso-
lated linguistic contexts. Presumably, "The largest whale alive weighs 
over 2, 000 pounds," is also such a context. What seems to be important 
here is that in such contexts, the only way the speaker can refer to the 
object is by using that particular description (p. 236). 
39 Ibid., p. 238. 
40 It should be clear 
knowledge of that this 
pressed to say what the 
that there is an object, 
object it is. 
from this analysis of the object a person has 
type of knowledge is not propositional. If 
person knows, we might venture that she knows 
though she may be mistaken about what kind of 
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he made and discovering that objects are missing. One knows of the bur-
glar by inference from the evidence one does perceive. If the thing 
responsible for the evidence is not a burglar, but instead a sloppy 
detective, then one knows of the detective even though one believes of 
this person that she is a burglar. Or again, a person who is allergic 
to cats may enter a room and detect the presence of a cat by the fact 
that she begins to sneeze. Although she does not perceive the cat, she 
knows of him through his effects. If she says "You must have a cat. 
I'm allergic to it," then 'a cat' and 'it' refer to the cat which the 
speaker knows of via its effect on her. 41 Here again, if what caused her 
to sneeze was not a cat, but a lion, she would be referring to the lion 
who was causally responsible for the sneeze. 
We can summarize Chastain's account of disambiguation in this way. 
The reference of most (overt) referring expression is determined by 
their referential links to elements in covert contexts. 42 Truly primary 
reference (primary reference that is primary relative to all contexts) 
almost always occurs in a perceptual or memory context. In these con-
texts, the element which refers, refers to some object by virtue of a 
causal relation between the object and that element. 43 
Both Devitt and Chastain hold that reference is disambiguated by 
4 1 If there are two cats, does 'a cat' refer to both? to the one 
which is causally responsible for her sneezing? I am not sure that the 
analysis works at this level. 
42 The only exception Chastain makes is for expressions in referen-
tially isolated linguistic contexts. See note 38 above. 
4 3 Chastain leaves open the possibility of our having immediate, 
non-perceptual knowledge of some kinds of objects. If we do, then cau-
sal relations would not be important for such knowledge. 
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what the speaker had in mind when she uttered the ambiguous referring 
expression. Both ultimately analyze having an object (or at least any 
object that exists in space and time) in mind in terms of a causal rela-
tion between the object and the speaker's state of mind. Devitt ana-
lyzes primary reference in terms of a causal relation between an object 
and a state of mind (such that the person has that object in mind) and 
another causal relation between the state of mind and a use of a refer-
ring expression to refer to an object. So, for example, in the antel-
ope-rock case, where the speaker says, "That has been watching us all 
night," the referent of 'that' is the object which caused the speaker's 
perceptual experience, which experience, in turn, led the speaker to say 
what she did. 
Chastain analyzes primary reference in an overt linguistic context 
in terms of reference links with elements in covert contexts. 44 The ele-
ments in ordinary covert non-linguistic contexts (namely perceptual and 
memory contexts) refer to an object by virtue of a causal connection 
between the object and that element. So, for example, in the antelope-
rock case, the word 'that' is referentially linked to an element in the 
perceptual context (e.g., the antelope-rock percept). 45 This element of 
the perceptual context is causally connected with the rock in the appro-
priate way. 
The most important advantage causal theories of primary reference 
have over satisfaction theories is that they involve a real (that is, 
44 These reference links receive a causal analysis. 
45 The mechanisms of referential linkage may be causal or, perhaps, a 
combination of causal and quasi-syntactic factors. 
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physical) connection between the object being referred to and the person 
doing the referring. This connection blocks the possibility of fortui-
tous satisfaction based on the speaker's mistaken beliefs, her misper-
ceptions, or her faulty memories. The object a speaker has in mind, 
accoring to causal theories, is not the one which satisfies her descrip-
tion of the object or the one which fits her conception of the object. 
One's conception (or perception) of an object can be radically mistaken 
and one can, nevertheless refer to that object, and have that object in 
mind by virtue of a causal connection between the object and the speak-
er's state of mind. 
Both Devitt and Chastain explain how the reference of ambiguous 
referring expressions is determined in terms of a prior act of refer-
ring. 46 This prior act of referring may be accomplished by means of lin-
guistic devices, as, for example, when an overt discourse is linked to a 
covert discourse. Or it may be accomplished through 'quasi-linguistic' 
means, for example, by means of a mental image or a perceptual experi-
ence. The reference of the referring expression in the overt discourse 
will be determinate only if the reference of the corresponding covert 
referring device is determinate. 
For both Devitt and Chastain, perceptual experiences play an 
important role in explaining how the reference of ambiguous linguistic 
expressions is determined. A large class of ambiguous referring expres-
46 Referring is here used in the broad sense in which not only lin-
guistic expressions refer, but other things as well. Chastain's account 
of referring by virtue of having an object in mind is less problematic 
than Devitt's in that his analysis of any kind of reference (speaker's 
or semantic) involves the same three terms: a person who refers; an 
object that is referred to; and a means for referring. 
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sions are linked, directly or indirectly, to perceptual contexts. The 
reference of these expressions depends on what the perceptual element to 
which they are referentially linked refers to. The mechanisms by which 
the elements in a perceptual context refer to an object are causal. The 
basic idea here is that an element in a perceptual context refers to the 
object which stands in a certain causal relation to that element, rather 
than to the object which fits or satisfies the content of the perceptual 
experience. So, for example, Chastain writes: 
Denotationism is, of course, false for perceptual contexts. What 
counts is the causal pathway along which information passes from the 
object perceived to the perceptual context; it is this which deter-
mines the identity of the thing which is seen, heard, touched, 
smelled, etc. The information may be degraded or contaminated in 
transit or distorted by the perceiver, but still it is that object 
which is perceived and not some other which, quite accidentally hap-
pens uniquely to fit the content of the perceptual context. 47 
I think that an account of disambiguation along the lines sug-
gested by Chastain and Devitt has some good points. There are aspects 
of such accounts that are problematic. 
One aspect of these accounts, especially of Chastain's, which I do 
not accept is the easy rejection of denotationism. While I accept the 
argument that denotationism is false for elements in perceptual and mem-
ory contexts, I think it is much less clear that denotationism is false 
for referring expressions in a language. Chastain, however, is willing 
to abandon denotationism even for explaining how these expressions 
refer. He believes an expression can refer to something which it does 
not denote, "if there is an alternate route to the thing referred to," 
(p. 238). For example, in the sentence 'Smith's murderer is insane, 
47 Ibid., p. 248f. 
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Chastain seems to think that the expression, 'Smith's murderer', can 
refer to someone who is not denoted by 'Smith's murderer.' In fact, 
from what Chastain says, we can infer that only in the absence of alter-
nate routes to the referent is the reference of 'Smith's murderer' 
determined by the denotation of this expression. Were Chastain correct, 
reference potential would not be determined solely by linguistic rules 
which specify an expression's denotation. Rules of reference linkage 
would also have to be incorporated into the account of reference poten-
tial. Thus, the reference rule for a definite desciption would not only 
say that the possible referents of an expression of the form, 'the F' 
are those things which are E:, it would also have to include a clause 
about what the description could refer to given certain reference links 
with elements in covert contexts. If Chastain were right, even a uni-
quely denoting expression could, according to the rules of English, 
refer to something other than the object it denotes. It would follow 
that even uniquely denoting expressions can be ambiguous. The mere fact 
that an expression uniquely denoted an object would not be sufficient 
for determinate reference, since it could be the case that this expres-
sion was referentially linked to some other expression. 
This claim is false. It would be one thing to say that what the 
speaker intended to refer to when she said 'Smith's murderer' was not 
the person who actually murdered Smith. Chastain provides us with a 
helpful way of discussing speakers' intended reference. Our speaker may 
have covertly referred to some person not denoted by 'Smith's murderer' 
by some means other than the expression 'Smith's murderer'. She may 
have referred by means of a perceptual image or a remembered image to 
someone she believed was Smith's murderer but who actually was not. It 
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does not follow, however, that the expression the speaker used to commu-
nicate her intended referent refers to someone other than the person it 
denotes. Given our second criterion of adequacy for reference rules. 
we should reject Chastain's account of reference potential for definite 
descriptions. If the account of reference Chastain proposes entails 
that the English expression 'Smith's murderer' can refer to someone who 
is not denoted by the expression, then it fails to meet criterion two: 
A theory of reference is adequate only if it is such that for any 
statement of the form '~ is ~', if what the theory identifies as the 
referent of the statement actually is P then the statement must be 
true. 48 
If Chastain's theory identifies the referent of the English expression, 
'Smith's murderer', in the sentence "Smith's murderer is insane," as the 
person the speaker believes is Smith's murderer, say Jones, but who is 
not Smith's murderer, then his theory fails to meet this criterion. For 
the English statement, "Smith's murderer is insane," could be false even 
if Jones (the person the theory identifies as the referent of the Eng-
lish expression 'Smith's murderer') is insane. Suppose that the person 
who murdered Smith is not insane. It is quite obvious that the English 
statement, "Smith's murderer is insane," would be false. 
In this chapter we are primarily concerned with disambiguation and 
not with reference potential. However, my disagreement with Chastain 
about reference potential will lead to disagreement about what referring 
expressions the theory of disambiguation applies to. I would argue that 
there is no reason to explain how the referent of a uniquely denoting 
expression is disambiguated. Chastain would not. I would also say that 
48 See Chapter Two. 
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a uniquely denoting expression is always a primary one; Chastain would 
not. In fact, Chastain holds that a definite description cannot begin a 
reference chain; it must always be linked to some other expression. 
This seems to be true for ambiguous definite descriptions such as 'the 
I 
man . If a person came upon a sequence of sentences beginning with an 
ambiguous definite description, she would, justifiably, assume that she 
had missed something, or that the speaker was linking his expression to 
some element in a covert context. Consider the following sequence of 
sentences: 
The man began to jump up and down, flailing his arms. He could not 
be calmed even by the most soothing and reassuring facts. 
In reading this paragraph, we feel we have missed something. 
The situation is different however, when the definite description 
is uniquely denoting. We need not look at the preceding page or wonder 
who the writer may have had in mind when we read the sequence: 
Smith's murderer began to jump up and down, flailing his arms. He 
could not be calmed even by the most soothing and reassuring facts. 
Recall that Chastain had to make an exception to his reference 
rule in the case of expressions in referentially isolated linguistic 
contexts. The reference of expressions such as 'the first man to walk 
through the door' and 'the largest whale in the ocean' was determined, 
according to Chastain, by their denotation. Chastain seems to think 
that what is special about these expressions is that they occur in iso-
lated linguistic contexts. (Exactly what what makes them isolated is 
not clear.) I would argue that what is special about these expressions 
is that they uniquely denote their referent. In such cases there is no 
reason to inquire of the speaker what he intended to refer to, even when 
there is some object other than the one denoted which he intends to 
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refer to with that expression. There is no need to ask the speaker for 
clarification because it is already quite clear who or what the referent 
is. If the speaker says, in English, "The next person to walk through 
the door will be carrying a book," it makes no difference to the refer-
ence of the expression, 'the next person to walk through the door', 
whether she has a particular person in mind or not. 
refers to the next person who walks through the door. 
The express ion 
If the person 
believed it would be Smith and knew that Smith would be carrying a book, 
her English sentence will still be false if someone other than Smith is 
the first person to walk through the door and this person fails to be 
carrying a book. This will be the case even if Smith walks through the 
door an instant later. 
If we are careful to make the distinction between what a speaker 
intends to refer to (where her intended reference is the reference of 
some element in a covert context) and what her uses of English expres-
sions refer to, there is no reason to reject denotationism as a theory 
of how the reference potential of English expressions is determined. 
What seems to motivate anti-denotationist accounts of reference poten-
tial are cases of charitable and justified interpretations. For exam-
ple, we may know that Smith's murderer is not insane. We may also know 
that Morgenstern believes that Jones is Smith's murderer. When Mor-
genstern says 'Smith's murderer is insane,' we may give her credit for a 
true belief (namely, that Jones is insane). We may even give her credit 
for informing us of something true (namely, that Jones is insane). And 
we are justified in doing so. But the fact that we give Morgenstern 
credit for these things does not mean that we give her credit for· utter-
ing a true sentence. It is quite clear that her sentence is false in 
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this case. 49 
The same arguments that show that the reference potential of uni-
quely denoting descriptions is determined by their denotation can be 
used to show that the reference potential of ambiguous definite descrip-
tions is determined by their denotation. The express ion, 'the antel-
ope', can no more refer to a rock than 'Smith's murderer' can refer to 
someone who is not Smith's murderer. The sentence 'The antelope is 
standing still,' will be false if it is not the case that some antelope 
is standing still. The speaker may believe something true, and may say 
this sentence on the basis of this true belief, but the sentence is not 
true. 
The notion of reference links between expressions in overt con-
texts and elements in covert contexts can help us to explain how the 
reference of ambiguous referring expressions is determined, but we have 
no reason to think that the reference potential of referring expressions 
in a language is determined by these links. 50 We shall accept Chastain's 
account of reference links as an account of disambiguation, but reject 
his view of reference potential. On my view, uniquely denoting expres-
sions require no disambiguation. Any links between these expressions 
49 We are not likely to correct the sentence probably because to do 
so would be impolite. We would, however, correct her statement under 
certain conditions, when it matters whether the sentence is true. If 
Morgenstern were a court-appointed psychiatrist testifying under oath, 
the council for the defense would be remiss if he did not ask her to 
modify the statement. Similarly, a court reporter would (and should) be 
corrected for such sloppy and prejudicial usage. 
50 Links between referring elements in covert contexts and sounds or 
symbols (as physical objects) may help to explain how expressions come 
to have a denotation in the first place. That is a different matter. 
See Chapter Eight. 
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and elements in mental contexts are irrelevant to the reference of the 
expressions. Further, on my view, if a speaker intends to refer to a 
particular object by means of some element in a covert context she may 
succeed in referring to a quite determinate thing via that element. 
Nonetheless, the referring expression she uses may fail to have a deter-
minate reference. If the speaker intends to refer to a determinate 
thing but that thing does not belong to the set of potential referents 
of the ambiguous expression she uses, the reference of that expression 
remains ambiguous. For example, if the speaker covertly refers to a 
rock by means of an element in her perceptual field, and says "That 
antelope has been standing very still," the expression 'that antelope' 
does not refer to the rock (if it did, we should have problems with 
truth conditions). If it refers to anything, it refers to an antelope. 
If no antelope is the intended referent, then the expression has no 
determinate reference. 
Another aspect of causal theories which is problematic is that 
they seem to reduce reference to a purely physical, (i.e., causal) rela-
tion. What is problematical about this reduction is that it seems it 
will not work. Putnam has argued that the problem with reducing refer-
ence to some kind of causal relation is that there are too many causal 
relations. 51 All kinds of objects are involyed in one's having a percep-
tual image, for example, of a rock. To say which ones are relevant to 
the reference of the perceptual image requires that one already have a 
definition of reference. 
51 Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University-Press, 
1981). See especially p. 66. Jaegwon Kim makes a similar point, QE. 
£i!. 
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At this point we should distinguish two distinct claims. One 
claim is that the intentionality or 'aboutnes' of perceptual states (or 
experiences) can be fully explained on a causal model. This would be 
the claim that a perceptual state is about ~ (or is a perception of ~) 
if and only if ~ caused that state. A separate claim is that an element 
in a perceptual context is about ~ rather than y if and only if ~' 
rather than y, caused (at least in part) that state. This second claim 
presupposes that there can be discrete elements within a perceptual con-
text and that at least some of these elements refer, but it makes no 
assumptions about whether reference of any kind can occur without an 
established language. It is consistent with this claim to hold that the 
intentionality of perceptual states (their being about something) 
depends on the existence of a referential framework introduced only by a 
fairly sophisticated natural language. 52 The second claim says only that 
a necessary condition for a perception to be of a particular object o 
is that it is caused by ~· Causal theories, including those of Chastain 
and Devitt, provide evidence that supports the second claim; the first 
claim is much more problematic. 
Criticisms of causal theories that say there are too many causal 
relations for reference to be just a matter of causality are generally 
directed against claims of the first type; the claim that a certain kind 
of causal relation is a necessary and sufficient condition for one kind 
of reference --the reference of elements in a perceptual context to 
items in the world. I will discuss these criticisms in the next chap-
52 Such a framework may be necessary for the individuation of ele-
ments in the perceptual context. 
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ter. But we should note here what is at stake. If this claim were 
true, then we would have a basic reference relation whose explanation 
does not require any linguistic or semantic notions of reference, and in 
terms of which these semantic notions could be analyzed. Primary refer-
ence could ultimately be explained in terms of simple physical causa-
tion, and we could explain how words come to refer by showing how their 
use is related to these basic referential devices and connections. In 
the next chapter I will argue that claims of this type are.false. Gau-
sal relations between an object and a perceiver are n9t sufficient for a 
perceptual state to refer to that object. 
To explain how reference is disambiguated we need not claim that 
certain kinds of causal relations are necessary and sufficient for ref-
erence. We can assume that there are distinct elements in a perceptual 
context and that they can refer, and only ask under what conditions they 
refer to one possible referent rather than another. With respect to the 
elements in a perceptual context, what we should take theories like 
those of Devitt and Chastain to claim is that the reference of percep-· 
tual 'images, 153 is determined by causal relations rather than by rela-
tions of satisfaction or fit. Assuming that perceptual images can be 
about or refer to things in the world, the set of things they can be 
about is limited to the set of things that caused the perceiver to have 
this perceptual experience. We could argue for such as claim as fol-
lows: The relationship between a referring device and its potential 
referents is such that if no potential referent is the referent of the 
53 I will use the term 'perceptual images' as short-hand for elements 
in a perceptual context. 
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device, then nothing is. If the referring device is a perceptual image 
and the potential referents were those objects which satisfied or fit 
the image, then if the image did not refer to any of the things which 
satisfied it, it would refer to nothing. However, one can in fact have 
a visual image with the content described as, for example, an antelope 
(which might be satisfied by some antelope), but which is not a percep-
tual experience of any antelope at all, but rather an experience of a 
rock which, because of the lighting and the perceiver's position, looks 
like an antelope. If the reference potential of visual experiences was 
determined by a relation of satisfaction between the object and the vis-
ual image, then we could not perceive rocks as antelopes. Our visual 
experience would be an experience of nothing, if not of an antelope. 
This conclusion is at best implausible. 
On the other hand, if the reference potential of visual images is 
determined by which objects caused the image, no such implausible 
results issue. If nothing playing a causal role in the production of 
the image is the referent of the image, then the image fails to refer. 
There actually are cases when none of the things causing a visual image 
are the referent of the image, for example, when someone is hallucinat-
ing. In such cases the image refers to nothing. This is exactly what 
we would expect if the reference potential of the visual experience 
depends on causal connections between the image and the thing it refers 
The advantage causal theories of primary reference have over sat-
isfaction theories is that they involve a real connection between the 
object being referred to and the person doing the referring. This con-
nection blocks the possibility of fortuitous satisfaction based on the 
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speaker's mistaken beliefs, her mis perceptions, or her faulty memories. 
The object a speaker has in mind, according to causal theories, is not 
the one which satisfies her description of the object or the one which 
fits her conception of the object. One's conception (or perception) of 
an object can be radically mistaken and one can, nevertheless refer to 
that object, and have that object in mind by virtue of a causal connec-
tion between the object and the speaker's state of mind. 54 
The account of disambiguation I propose explains how the reference 
of referring expressions is disambiguated in terms of what the speaker 
had in mind. The reference potential of a referring expression as it is 
used is not merely a matter of the meaning or denotation of the expres-
sion, taken out of context. Referring expressions can be used in con-
junction with gestures which limited the range of potential referents of 
the expression-demonstrative combination. They can also be referen-
tially linked to other expressions such that their potential referents 
are the same as the potential referents of the expression to which they 
are linked. These factors may be taken as co-determinants of reference 
potential for an expression which is actually used, if the unit of anal-
ysis is the expression as it is used. If the unit of analysis is the 
referring expression token considered outside of any use of it, then we 
might say that these contextual factors serve to disambiguate the refer-
ence. 
Once we recognize referring expressions as devices which can be 
,/~sed in conjunction with other referring devices (either gestures or 
'/ 
other overt expressions) and recognize the role these other referring 
54 At least up to a point. There may be further constraints. 
l 
" '/ 
199 
devices play in determining the reference of the expression as it is 
used, we find that many seemingly ambiguous referring expressions have a 
quite determinate ref·erence. However, a significant number of cases 
remain for which contextual factors and reference links do not uniquely 
determine a referent. In such cases, if there is a determinate refer-
ent, what the expression referred to is the potential referent that the 
speaker intended to refer to, or the one the speaker had in mind. 
To explain how the reference of these expressions is determined I 
have adopted Chastain's model of reference links between the expression 
and some element in a covert context based on a causal relation between 
the two. The elements in a covert context may, in turn, be referen-
tially linked to other elements in other contexts, or they may be uni-
quely referring on their own and thus terminate the reference chain. 
This approach presupposes that elements in a covert context (e.g., a 
perceptual or memory context; 'words' in a mentalese sentence, etc.) 
refer. I have suggested that the reference relation between these men-
tal elements and their referents is, in part, a causal one. 
0 
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CHAPTER VII 
REFERENCE RULES FOR SINGULAR TERMS 
The general question throughout this dissertation has been: To 
what extent do intentions to refer determine reference? In the preced-
ing chapters I discussed the role a speaker's intentions to refer play 
in disambiguating the reference of the expressions she uses. I argued 
that the speaker's intentions to refer with a certain expression do co-
determine what that expression refers to when the reference is ambigu~ 
ous. I concluded that the referent of an ambiguous English expression 
is that potential referent which the speaker intended to refer to. 1 
In the following chapters I shall discuss the role intentions to 
refer play in a theory of reference potential. When we are discussing 
reference potential, or what some referring device could refer to, it is 
important to note that there are at least three senses in which it can 
be said that an expression could be used to refer. In one sense, the 
reference potential is relative to a natural language. The expression, 
'the blue pen', as an expression of English, could be used, in English, 
to refer to one of the members of the set of blue pens. In the preced-
ing discussion of disambiguation this was the sense in which we used 
reference potential. In the next chapters also we will be primarily 
1 Note that a number of factors were involved in determining poten-
tial referents: semantic, syntactic and contextual factors all set lim-
its on the range of potential referents for an expression. 
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concerned with reference potential relative to a language. There is 
another sense in which we say an expression could be used to refer to an 
object. In this sens~ reference potential is relative to a particular 
speaker's idiolect. 2 'The blue pen', as an expression in someone's idio-
lect, could be used in that person's idiolect to refer to something 
other than a blue pen. A third sense in which an expression could be 
used to refer to an object is in the sense that any physical object 
(including expressions, mental states or events, and salt-shakers) could 
be used to refer to some other object on a particular occasion. In this 
sense, reference potential is not relative to anything. 
When we talk about the reference potential of expressions in Eng-
lish, what we are looking for are rules, presumably linguistic rules and 
conventions, according to which the reference potential of particular 
referring expressions is determined. An example of a rule of this kind 
would be the rule for definite descriptions in English which says, "the 
potential referents of an expression of the form, 'the £:', are those 
individuals which are F." This rule says how the reference potential of 
any definite description in English is determined. According to this 
rule, the potential referents of the English expression, 'the blue pen' 
will be blue pens. 
Note that a theory of reference potential for expressions in a 
language presupposes that there is such a thing as a language (even if 
i 
l 2 An idiolect is an individual speaker's language. Within an idio-
'.' lect words have a determinate reference potential, as they do within a 
language, but the reference potential of the expressions in an idiolect 
may be totally idiosyncratic. This reference potential may be deter-
mined be the speaker's intentions to use the word in a certain way or by 
the force of the speaker's past uses of the word, setting a pr~cedent 
for future uses. 
202 
this is understood as a theoretical construct or as an idealization of 
actual linguistic practices), and tries only to describe the conventions 
governing the correct use of referring expressions in that language. A 
theory of reference potential for expressions in a language is, basi-
cally, a description of correct usage of referring expressions in that 
language. If someone were to deny that there is such a thing as a lan-
guage, or that there is correct (and incorrect) usage, then this person 
would deny the possibility of formulating an acceptable theory of refer-
ence potential for expressions in a language, for there would be nothing 
to describe. 
The same kinds of comments can be made about a theory of reference 
potential for expressions in an idiolect. Such a theory would presup-
pose that there were rules governing the use of expressions in the idio-
lect and try to describe these rules. (A person who denies the exis-
tence of natural ·languages may attempt to explain linguistic behavior in 
terms of intersecting idiolects.) Here also one presupposes that there 
is correct and incorrect usage of expressions; in this case, however, 
the standards of correctness apply only to expressions in the idiolect 
and not necessarily to a shared language. 
The most general theory of reference potential, the one that tries 
to explain how any physical object could be used to refer, does not pre-
suppose a language (either a natural language or an idiolect). It asks 
the more general question: Under what 
-J 
conditions can any physical object 
,/refer. 
'/ 
This theory is not a description of correct (or incorrect) 
usage; it describes, instead, the general conditions under which any 
object can be used to refer to some other object. 
In this chapter our main concern will be with reference potential 
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for English epressions for singular reference. 3 We shall be asking 
whether and to what extent intentions to refer determine the reference 
potential of such expressions in a language (in this case, English). To 
ascertain the proper role of intentions to refer in a theory of ref er-
ence potential we shall look at the reference rules for these English 
expressions to see whether the correct rules contain reference to inten-
tions to refer. Since the reference of these expressions is, by 
hypothesis, determined according to these rules, it will follow that if 
the correct rules mention intentions to refer, then intentions to refer 
play some role in determining the reference potential of those expres-
sions. In this chapter I will argue that once we distinguish a theory 
of disambiguation from a theory of reference potential, we find that the 
reference rules for English expressions for singular reference need not 
mention intentions to refer. 
An adequate reference rule for (at least attributive uses of) def-
inite descriptions, for example, would be: 
x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form 
'the f' (used attributively) if and only if x is an individual and 
x is F. 
The reference rule for demonstratives without a sortal would be: 
x is a potential referent of the English expression 'this' or 
'that' if and only if x is an individual; 
and for demonstratives with a sortal a reference rule like the following 
will suffice: 
i 
x is a potential referent of an English expression of 
'that F' or 'this F' if and only if x is an individual and 
the form 
x is F. / 
'/ 
3 For ease of exposition we will use the term reference pote~tial to 
refer to reference potential relative to English unless otherwise indi-
cated. 
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Reference rules that do not mention intentions to refer also govern the 
use of pure indexicals such as 'I', 'here', 'today', and 'tomorrow', as 
well as pronouns such ·as 'he', 'you', 'it', 'they', etc. Even the ref-
erence rule for names could be formulated without mentioning intentions 
to refer. For example, the reference rule for names might be: 
x is a potential referent of 'NN' just in case x is an NN. 4 
With each of these kinds of expressions not only can a reference 
rule be formulated without mentioning anyone's intentions to refer, but 
rival theories which do mention intentions to refer are wrong. It is 
easy to provide counter examples to intentionalist theories of reference 
potential. Suppose the claim is that the reference rule for the English 
word 'I' (in ordinary contexts) 5 is as follows: 
~ is a potential referent of the English expression 'I', spoken by 
~ if and only if~ is the individual S intends to refer to with 'I'. 
Ordinarily the persons we intend to refer to with the word 'I' is our-
selves. But suppose a person, let us call him Harry, believed he was 
Napoleon, and when he used the word 'I' he intended to refer to Napo-
leon. According to the proposed reference rule, 'I' in this case would 
refer to Napoleon. But clearly it does not. Suppose Harry had said, 
"Unfortunately, I lost my last battle." If 'I' referred to Napoleon in 
this sentence, and Napoleon did, in fact, lose his last battle, then the 
• 
4 This rule is suggested by Tyler Burge in "Reference and Proper 
J II 
I .Names, The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), pp. 425-439. His version 
,, of the rule is formulated in terms of truth. Thus, he says, "O'Hara is 
., true of any object y just in case y is an O'Hara," (p. 435). 
Whether x is an NN will depend on whether the name 'NN' has been 
given to x. W~ will discuss the conditions under which a name is given 
to an individual later. 
5 Extraordinary contexts would be fiction and direct quotation. 
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English sentence would be true, but it is not. 
Similar counter examples can be constructed for intentionalist 
reference rules which explain how the reference potential of other kinds 
of English referring expressions is determined. In each case we simply 
suppose that the speaker has a false belief about some individual and 
that her intention to refer is based on this false belief. When this 
occurs, what she intends to refer to with some English expression, ~' 
will often fail to be what our intuitions tell us the English expression 
refers to. 
Of course such exaggerated intentionalist theories are only a lim-
itting case. I know of no one who actually holds that the reference 
potential of such expressions in English is determined by a particular 
speaker's intentions to refer to something with a certain English 
expression. When intentions to refer are actually incorporated into the 
reference rules for these expressions in English they are used either to 
explain how reference is disambiguated or to otherwise supplement a 
non-intentionalist rule. I have already discussed theories of disambig-
uation at length, and have argued that intentions to refer do play some 
role in disambiguating reference. What we want to know now is whether 
they also play a role in theories of reference potential for expressions 
in English, and if so, what role they do play. 
Some theorists have thought that intentions to refer figure in the 
r,eference rules for a certa.in kind of definite description, namely, ref-
" 
,(erential uses of definite descriptions. In his paper, "Reference and 
Definite Descriptions," Keith Donnellan proposed that there are two dif-
ferent kinds of definite descriptions: definite descriptions that are 
used attributively; and definite descriptions that are used referen-
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tially. 6 In using a description of the form, 'the F' attributively, the 
speaker attributes to an individual the property of being I· In such 
Cases' What 'the F' f t · d t · d b 't d tat' re ers o is e ermine y i s eno ion. The 
potential referents of such uses of definite descriptions are those 
things which are F. Definite descriptions· can also be used referen-
tially to single out an individual. According to Donnellan, a speaker 
may use a definite description, for example, 'the blue pen', merely to 
enable her audience to identify her intended referent, without thereby 
attributing the property of being a blue pen to the referent. 
There are several different ways of understanding the importance 
of this distinction for theories of reference potential for English. 
One would be to say that it has nothing to do with the semantics of Eng-
lish. 7 If Donnellan' s distinction does have something to do with the 
reference potential of English expressions, we might formulate rules for 
the reference potential of referential uses of definite descriptions in 
any of the following ways: 
(1) x is a potential referent of an English expression with the form 
'the- F' used referentially by S, if and only if, S intends to refer 
to x with 'the F'. - -
(2) x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form 
'the- F' used referentially by S if and only if S believes xis F 
and S intends to refer to x with-' the F'. - -
/ 6 The Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp. 281-304. Reprinted in 
~tephen Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, (Ithaca: 
~,Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 42-65. 
7 This is Kripke' s position. He argues that the distinction is 
important only for pragmatics, not for semantics. See "Speaker's Refer-
ence and Semantic Reference," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.), 
Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 6-27. 
• 
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(3) ~ is a potential referent of an English expression of the form 
'the F' used referentially by S if and only if ! is K and S 
intends to refer to ~ with 'the F 1 . 
Any of these versions is a plausible interpretation of Donnellan's char-
acterization of referential uses of definite descriptions. 
Donnellan rejects our second reference rule for referential uses 
of definite descriptions. He argues that a person could use a definite 
description, for example, 'the king' to refer to someone she does not 
believe is the king. She may believe that he is a usurper. What the 
English expression 'the king' refers to in her sentence, "The king is a 
usurper," is not the person the speaker believes to be the king. This 
argument is sufficient grounds for rejecting our second reference rule 
for referential uses of definite descriptions. 
The reference rule that Donnellan seems to support is (1): The 
referent of a definite description used referentially is the individual > 
the speaker intends to refer to, whether this individual fits the 
description or not. In the preceding chapter we saw that Chastain also 
accepted this reference rule. In that chapter we argued that this ref-
erence rule was incorrect. There we considered the sentence "Smith's 
murderer is insane." We argued that, if Jones is not the murderer, 
then, even if the speaker did intend to refer to Jones with the expres-
sion 'Smith's murderer', the English expression itself does not refer to 
Jones; instead it refers to the person who murdered Smith, if anyone . 
.;The problem with the intentionalist analysis of 'Smith's murderer' is 
1/that it fails to get the truth conditions right for the sentence 
"Smith's murderer is insane." 8 
8 This is also true of reference rule (2). 
208 
This same argument cannot be used for the expression, 'the king' 
in the sentence "The king is a usurper." In this case, it seems that 
the sentence would be true if the speaker intended to refer to a certain 
person (the usurper) and that person was a usurper. Since we have 
already established that a speaker's intentions to refer play some role 
in disambiguating reference, and the expression 'the king' is ambiguous, 
it may be that the plausibility of the intentionalist account in this 
case is a result of the ambiguity of the expression. However, even if 
the expression were uniquely denoting, it would still appear that the 
speaker's intention to refer to a certain person with that expression, 
rather than the denotation of the expression, determined the referent. 
Suppose someone who lived in Northumbria when it was a monarchy had 
said, "The present king of Northumbria is a usurper." Even if the usur-
per was not truly the present king of Northumbria, the English sentence 
would be true if the person the speaker intended to ref er to was a usur-
per. 
I argued earlier that the reference potential of any ·definite 
description was determined by its denotation. The present case seems to 
be a counter example to this claim. Here, it seems that 'the present 
king of Northumbria' could correctly be used to refer to someone who is 
not actually the present king of Northumbria, and thus is not denoted by 
this expression. Nonetheless, given the number of cases in which an 
Jntentionalist account of reference potential for definite descriptions 
,/is wrong and denotationism is correct, I am hesitant to accept the for-
mer on the basis of an isolated counter example. Rather than accept 
'the present king of Northumbria' as a valid counter example to denota-
tionism, we should examine this case more closely to see why it seems to 
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work when other, similar examples do not. 
'The present king of Northumbria' example is a counter example to 
denotationism only if· ( 1) 'the present king of Northumbria' does not 
denote the usurper and (2) the usurper could still be the referent. It 
would be difficult to deny that the usurper could be the referent. If 
he could not, then it would not be possible correctly to say, in Eng-
lish, "The present king of Northumbria is a usurper," since we could 
never correctly refer to the usurper with that expression. But it is 
clear that this is a correct English sentence and that the sentence is 
true if the alleged usurper is actually a usurper. If denotationism 
were true, and 'the present king of Northumbria' did not denote usur-
pers, then the sentence, "The present king of Northumbria is a usurper," 
would be analytically false, or at least it would lack a truth value. 
We cannot dismiss this counter example to denotationism by denying 
that the usurper could be the referent of 'the present king of Northum-
bria'. If there is some ground for dismissing it, there must be some-
thing wrong with the claim that 'the present king of Northumbria' does 
not denote usurpers. I think there is. What is presupposed in the 
argument against denotationism is that 'the present king of Northumbria' 
denotes only those individuals who satisfy certain, very rigid criteria; 
they must have a special kind of entitlement to the title of king. 
Usurpers are people who have seized the title but lack the proper justi-
1 fication for doing so. For example, in a society where the rights of 
1~ succession are specified such that the proper heir to the throne is the 
oldest living male descendant of the king and his official consort, the 
only person entitled to claim the throne is the person who satisfies 
this condition. A person who seizes the throne but fails to satisfy 
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this condition is a usurper. 
To deny that usurpers are denoted by the expression 'the king' is 
to suppose that 'the king' denotes only those rulers who are entitled to 
be king. If this were correct, it would follow that even if someone 
were to exercise all the powers, privileges and responsibilities of a 
monarch, and even if he were to officially perform all those ceremonies 
necessary for claiming the title of king, 9 he would still not be denoted 
by 'the king' unless he was entitled by the customs and laws of his land 
to claim that title. That is, 'the king' would denote only rightful 
kings. This seems clearly false. If a person officially performs all 
the ceremonies necessary for claiming the title of king, exercises all 
the powers, privileges and responsibilities of monarchy, and induces his 
subjects to permit him to exercise these powers, then he is the king, 
even though he may not be the rightful king. In English we make a dis-
tinction between kings and rightful kings; 'the rightful king' denotes 
fewer individuals than 'the king'. 
If 'the present king of Northumbria' denotes not only the rightful 
king but also the usurper, then Donnellan's purported counter example to 
denotationism is not a counter example at all. 10 The weight of the evi-
dence goes against intentionalist accounts of definite descriptions in 
favor of denotationist accounts. We can conclude that the potential 
I 
,/ 
9 For example, coronation by the proper authority. 
'/ 
10 I suspect that any half-way plausible counter example to denota-
tionism can be explained away in a similar manner. For example, another 
purported counter example is found in the sentence, "Jones' wife lives 
in Los Angeles," where the woman the speaker intended to refer to-is not 
Jones' lawful wife because Jones married her while he was still married 
to someone else. 
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referents of any definite description, those used attributively as well 
as those used referentially, is determined by the denotation of the 
description. Thus, we·reject proposed reference rule (1). 
Reference rule (3), 
x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form 'the 
~' used referentially by ~ if and only if ~ is E and S intends to 
refer to ~with 'the E', 
accepts the truth of denotationism (~ must actually be .£:), but adds a 
futher condition for ~' s being a potential referent of a referential 
use of expressions of the form 'the F'. 11 
To evaluate this reference rule, we should compare what it does 
with what a straightforward denotationist analysis does. We should see 
whether and how this rule is better than a rule which does not mention 
the speaker's intention to refer. The speaker's intentions to refer to 
~ with 'the ;[' may serve to disambiguate the reference of 'the F' . 
Thus, when someone says, "The king is a usurper," the reference of 'the 
king' is determined not only by the denotation of 'the king' but also by 
the speaker's intention to refer to a certain person with 'the king'. I 
have already argued that this is the case. However, we are concerned in 
this chapter only with reference potential. We want to know what the 
speaker's intention to refer to x with 'the F' contributes to a theory 
of reference potential for expressions of the form 'the E'. 
We should accept the denotation-plus-intention reference rule, as 
ppposed to a simple denotation rule, only if there are.cases in which 
l 
11 Howard Wettstein interprets the referential-attributive distinc-
tion this way. See "The Semantic Significance of the Referential-At-
tributive Distinction," Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 187-196 
and "Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical 
Studies 40 (1981), pp. 241-257. 
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what an English expression could refer to depends on denotation plus 
intentions to refer. Since intentions to refer are used to distinguish 
referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, we would 
expect that there would be a difference between the reference potential 
of attributive uses of definite descriptions (whose reference potential 
is determined solely by denotation) and referential uses of definite 
descriptions (whose reference potential is purportedly determined by 
denotation and intentions to refer). So, for example, the reference 
potential of 'Smith's murderer' used attributively should be different 
from the reference potential of 'Smith's murderer' used referentially. 
The reference potential of both is, by hypothesis, determined by denota-
tion, so if there is indeed a difference in reference potential between 
the two, it must be that the intentions-to-refer clause narrows the 
range of potential referents for referential uses of definite descrip-
tions. 
What a referential use of a definite description could refer to in 
English would be a subset of the set of things an attributive use of a 
definite description could refer to in English. For example, what 
'Smith's murderer' could refer to when it is used referentially would 
have to be, under some conditions, only a subset of the set.of things 
'Smith's murderer' could refer to when it is used attributively. Sup-
pose Mr. Spock is Smith's murderer. 'Smith's murderer, used attribu-
~ively, could only refer in English to Mr. Spock. (An example of an 
'!attributive use of 'Smith's murderer' would be if the coroner, on exam-
ining Smith's mangled body, said "Smith's murderer [whoever he may be] 
is insane.") What could 'Smith's murderer', used referentially, refer to 
in English? It could refer to Mr. Spock, but, by hypothesis, only if 
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the speaker intends to refer to Mr. Spock. Suppose the speaker does not 
intend to refer to Mr. Spock with 'Smith's murderer', but intends to 
refer to Jones. Is it then the case that 'Smith's murderer' could not 
refer to anyone, since the speaker lacks the requisite intention? This 
is what reference rule three requires, but this seems clearly wrong. 
'Smith's murderer' could still be used in English to refer to Mr. Spock. 
The speaker may not be able to use this expression correctly to express 
his beliefs because he has false beliefs about the referent of Smith's 
murderer, but these beliefs do not seem to affect the potential refer-
ence of the English expression, 'Smith's murderer'. Even if no one 
knows that Mr. Spock i.s Smith's murderer, and so no one ever .tntended to 
refer to Mr .. Spock with 'Smith's murderer', the potential referent of 
this expression would still be Mr. Spock. 
To conclude, intentions to refer seem to play no role in determin-
ing the reference potential of definite descriptions, not even in d~ter-
mining the reference potential of definite descriptions used referen-
tially. Reference rules for definite descriptions as well as for the 
other singular terms can and should avoid mention of intentions to 
refer. 
i 
l 
'/ 
• 
CHAPTER VIII 
REFERENCE POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS OF A GROUP 
In the previous chapter I rejected specific reference rules which 
mention a speaker's intention to refer. I will now examine theories of 
reference potential that attempt to explain how the reference potential 
of English expressions is determined in terms of a group of speakers' 
intentions to refer. I will first discuss Gricean accounts of semantic 
reference. I will then examine accounts which try to explain the refer~ 
ence potential of class terms in terms of some group of speakers' inten-
tions to refer to all and only those objects that have certain charac-
teristics by means of which objects of that kind are identified . 
. :• 
While an individual speaker's intentions to refer may be irrele-
vant to a theory of reference potential for singular referring expres-
sions in English, the intentions of some group of speakers may be imper-
tant for determining the reference potential of English expressions. 
Such intentions may also provide the basis for the reference rules that 
we have considered so far. 1 To examine the importance of intentions to 
refer in determining the reference potential of class terms, I will 
present the case for two different kinds of intentionalist explanations 
i l 1 Any denotationist analysis of singular terms must eventually 
':,explain the reference potential of terms that occur in the predicate 
position. If the potential referents of 'the king' are defined as any 
individual who is a king, then it still remains to say what is poten-
tially referred to by 'king'. 
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of reference potential for these terms. I will then discuss the objec-
tions to and shortcomings of these explanations. 
Gricean Accounts of Reference Potential 
The first kind of intentionalist account of reference potential 
that I want to consider here tries to explain how the reference paten-
tial of expressions in a shared language (or semantic reference) is 
determined in terms of speaker's reference ·(or the reference potential 
of expressions in an idiolect). Speaker's reference is, in turn, 
explained in terms of occasion reference which involves a speaker's 
intending to get another person to identify a certain object. This 
account is based on a Gricean account of meaning, supplemented by an 
account of convention along the lines developed by David Lewis. 2 
Grice proposes that we base our analysis of conventional or time-
less meani~g on an analysis of occasion meaning and speaker's meaning. 3 
If we can elucidate the meaning of 
'x meant something (on a particular occasion)' and 
'x meant so-and-so (on a particular occasion)' 
and of 
'A meant something by x (on a particular occasion)' and 
'A meant by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)' 
this might reasonably be expected to help us with 
'x means (timeless) something (that so-and-so)'. 
Grice suggests that we analyze what a sentence in a language 
2 See H.P. Grice, "Meaning, The Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), pp. 
377-388 and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning, Foun-
dations of Language, 4 (1968), pp. 225-242, and David Lewis, Convention 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
3 
"Meaning, QE. cit., p. 43. Grice is talking only about non-natural 
meaning here. 
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conventionally means in terms of what some group of speakers intend 
to effect by that sentence. 
'! means (timeless) that so-and-so' might as a first shot be 
equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about 
what people (vague) intend (with qualifications about 'recogni-
tion') to effect by x. 4 
The qualifications about recognition are supposed to tell us how 
non-natural meaning differs from natural meaning. ~ naturally means 
that E if ! is intention-free evidence that E· For example, spots 
naturally mean that the person on whom these spots appear has mea-
sles. The spots are intention-free evidence that this person has 
measles. Non-natural meaning is a species of meaning which is such 
that the meaningful item, !• is evidence that E only because the 
person who hears or sees ! recognizes that ! was produced with the 
intention of effecting some change in the audience by means of the 
audience's recognition of this intention. 
Grice has revised and refined his position since the publica-
tion of "Meaning," but its general lines remain the same. In a more 
recent paper, Grice proposed that we explain timeless meaning for a 
group in terms of timeless meaning within an idiolect. Grice would 
define the timeless conventional meaning of the assertion 'It is 
raining' as follows: For group G, utterance-type X means the asser-
tion 'It is raining' equals, by definition, "At least some (? many) 
members of group G have in their repertoires the procedure of utter-
4 Ibid., p. 46. Grice adds the further qualification that "the 
intended effect must be something which in some sense is within the con-
trol of the audience, or that in some sense of 'reason' the recognition 
of the intention behind ! is for the audience a reason and not merely a 
cause." 
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ing a token of X if, for some A, they want A to think that U 
believes that it is raining; the retention of this procedure being 
for them conditional on the assumption that at least some (other) 
members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their reper-
toires." 5 
Grice incorporates an element from David Lewis' analysis of 
convention into this definition in the clause that retention of the 
procedure should be conditional on the assumption that other members 
of the group also have this procedure in their repertoire. This 
clause is supposed to "get in the idea of aiming at conformity, and 
so perhaps (derivatively) also that of correct and incorrect use of 
X, as distinct from merely usual or unusual use of X. 116 
Most theorists who take this approach to semantic meaning try 
to explain the meaning of sub-sentential units in terms of a grammar 
which specifies how sub-sentential parts are to be put together to 
form meaningful sentences. The analysis of meaning remains, essen-
tially, an analysis of sentence meaning. 7 Robert Cummins, however, 
has proposed a Gricean analysis of the meaning of sub-sentential 
5 This definition is taken from Grice's paper, "Utterer's Meaning, 
Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," .QE. cit., p. 233. Grice's defini-
tion is more general. It is formulated in terms of mood indicators and 
propositional attitude signs which would cover any kind of English sen-
tence. I have giv~n only a sample definition, derived from Grice's gen-
eral one, in order to avoid complicating the exposition with an explana-
tion of the technical symbols Grice uses. The overall thrust of his 
definition should be clear from this example. 
6 Ibid., p. 233. 
7 See for example David Lewis, Ibid., pp. 197-200; Jonathan Bennett, 
Linguistic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976·), and 
Grice, Ibid., pp. 235-241. Grice attempts to give an analysis of adjec-
tival meaning, (pp. 237-241), so in this respect he is an exception. 
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parts. 8 Cummins defines conventional reference and meaning relative 
to an idiolect in this way: 
There is a convention whereby N refers to x in U's language if 
(a) in the past U has uttered N only when he intended to iden-
tify ~' and (b) this fact is mutually known by u and his hear-
ers, and (c), because of this mutual knowledge it continues to 
happen that when Y utters N he identifies x. 
There is a convention whereby P means 'red' -in y' s language if 
(a) in the pasty uttered f only when he meant 'red', and (b) 
this fact is mutually known to y and his hearers, and (c) 
because of this mutual knowledge it continues to happen that 
when U utters P he means (and is understood to mean) 'red' . 9 
These definitions are formulated in terms of occasion refer-
ence and occasion meaning. Cummins defines both of these in terms 
of intentions to refer. For example, y identifies x for ~' on a 
particular occasion if 
U intends to get ~ to believe that y intends to predicate some-
thing of ~. and ~ recognizes this intention (i.e., comes to 
believe of x that U intends to predicate something of~), 
and U predicates P of x and means 'red' by f (on some occasion) if 
U identifies x for A and utters P intending thereby to get A to 
consider (of ~) whether x is red; relying on the Gricean Mecha-
nism. 10 
The Gricean Mechanism tells us how U's intention is supposed to be 
effected. Cummins explains the mechanism as follows: 
~ recognizes Y's intention to get ~ to believe that f, and is 
led by that recognition--through trust in y--to believe that P. 
l l 
8 
"Intention, Meaning, and Truth-Conditions," Philosophical Studies, 
35 (1979), pp. 345-360. 
9 Ibid. p. 352. 
10 Ibid., p. 351. 
11 Ibid., p. 346. 
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Although Cummins does not define the conventional reference of 
x or the meaning of f for a group, we would expect his definition to 
follow the general·lines of Grice's analysis of sentence meaning for 
a group. The members of a group would have a procedure for getting 
an audience to do certain things (e.g. , to identify !) and the 
retention of this procedure would be conditional on whether other 
members of the group have this procedure in their repertoires as 
well. 
A Gricean account of reference has these features: (a) it 
explains conventional reference in a language in terms of reference 
in an idiolect (the speaker's language); (b) reference in the speak-
er's language is explained in terms of a uniformity in the speaker's 
reference in the past and of the audience's knowledge of this regu-
larity; and (c) the references the speaker made in the past are 
explained in terms of her intentions to get her audience to identify 
some object by means of the audience's recognition of her intention. 
To evaluate this type of theory I will first consider whether 
it is possible to explain conventional reference in terms of occa-
sion reference. I will later, in connection with the second kind of 
intentionalist account 9 raise some questions about the possibility 
of explaining conventional reference in a shared language in terms 
of conventional reference in an idiolect. 
The move from the occasion reference of an expression to the 
conventional reference of that expression in the speaker's idiolect 
requires that the speaker has used this expression consistently in 
the past when she wanted to identify the referent for her audience. 
This follows from clause (a) of Cummins' analysis of the conven-
• 
220 
tional reference of ~ in .Q's idiolect which says "in the past .Q has 
uttered ~only when he intended to identify x." I want to consider 
whether it is possible to explain the reference of N in U's idio-
lect in terms of consistent past intentions concerning the use of 
N. In particular, I will ask whether it is possible for .Q consis-
tently to use N in this way if~ does not already refer to~ in .Q's 
idiolect. If this is not possible, then Cummins' explanation of 
reference in an idiolect is circular. 
Clause (b) says that for an expression to have a conventional 
reference in U's idiolect, it must be mutual knowledge between U and 
his hearers that .Q has consistently used this expression in the past 
whenever he wanted them to identify a certain object. For this to 
be mutual knowledge, .Q must have successfully carried out his inten-
tion a number of times in the past. U would know that his hearers 
knew that he only used N in the past whenever he wanted them to 
identify ~ only if he knew that his hearers had actually identified 
~ in the past when he uttered ~. intending thereby to get them to 
identify~ (and to believe something of it). 
The project of explaining semantic reference in terms of idio-
lect reference and idiolect reference in terms of a speaker's refer-
ence on a particular occasion will be successful only if we can 
explain how .Q could successfully refer on a number of occasions with 
some expression without presupposing that any expression has a ref-
erence either in U's idiolect or in a shared language. Somehow it 
must be possible for .Q successfully to refer without the benefit of 
a language and for .Q and his audience to have beliefs about one 
another's intentions and knowledge without the benefit of a Ian-
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guage. 
Let us assume, then, that neither U nor his audience has a 
language and ask under what conditions ~ could successful!y refer to 
x with N on just one occasion. A sufficient condition for U' s 
referring to ! on a particular occasion is that 
U identifies x for A and utters P intending thereby to get ~ to 
consider (of !) whether ! is red; relying on the Gricean Mecha-
nism. 
I will argue that this condition could not be fulfilled unless 
(a) x already refers to N in U's idiolect and (b} ! already refers 
to N in a shared language. 12 If these arguments succeed, then 
unless we accept some non-intentionalist account of occasion mean-
ing, we will not be able to explain semantic reference (or semantic 
meaning) with a Gricean theory. 
Suppose we try to explain occasion reference in terms of the 
speaker's intention to get her hearers to believe that she intends 
to predicate something of ! and she intends to get them to believe 
this by means of their recognizing her intention. If the speaker 
utters some expression, then she will successfully refer with that 
expression only if her audience recognizes the intention with which 
that expression was uttered. It could recognize this intention 
either by guessing that the speaker must have intended something and 
guessing what this was or by reasoning that the speaker must have 
intended something and this is what the speaker intended. If the 
audience is to reason to this conclusion, then it must have some 
12 Note that these arguments apply to a Gricean analysis of sentence 
meaning as well as to a Gricean account of reference. 
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grounds for believing that the speaker intended it to do something 
(namely, to identify~). The odds against an audience's correctly 
guessing what I intend for them to do when I make a certain noise 
are staggering. Suppose I say 'Glug gluck' intending that· you 
should identify the table I am now writing at (and to believe of it 
that it is brown) but I do not make my intention known in any way 
other than by uttering 'Glug gluck'. I am not likely to effect what 
I intended. If I am going to have some chance of getting you to 
identify the table I am now writing at, you will have to have some 
reason for thinking that this is part of what I intend when I say 
'Glug gluck'. What reason might you have for believing that this is 
what I intend? 
I might tell you that this is what I intend, but to do so I 
would have to rely on a shared language. However, if we want to 
explain a shared language in terms of particular instances of suc-
cessful communication, then we cannot presuppose that there is a 
shared language in order to explain instances of successful communi-
cation. If we do, our account will be circular. 
The basis for your recognition of my intention that you should 
identify a table when I say 'Glug gluck' might be that I have, in 
the past, regularly used 'glug' in certain contexts involving 
tables. If you could recognize the similarity between what I am 
doing now (namely, uttering 'glug') and what I have done in the past 
(namely, uttered 'glug'), and recognize the similarity between the 
present context and the past contexts where I did the same thing, 
then you might have some reason for thinking that I intended"you to 
identify the table. But this would involve two things: (1) I must 
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have uttered the sound 'glug' regularly in the past in contexts 
where a table was involved and (2) you must recognize the relevant 
similarity between ·my past actions and my present ones, and the rel-
evant similarity between the present context and the past ones. So 
in order to account for successful occasion reference such that we 
could explain idiolect reference and reference in a language in 
terms of occasion reference, we shall have to explain, in non-lin-
guistic terms, both the basis for the regularity of the speaker's 
behavior and the basis for the audience's recognition of regulari-
ties in the speaker's behavior in contexts which the audience can 
recognize as similar in the relevant respect. This will have to be 
explained in order for us to understand how the speaker could sue-
cessfully communicate her intention on even one occasion. 
To explain how a speaker could consistently use a word to 
refer to certain objects, we can either assume that this consistent 
use is accidental, in which case the odds are against it, or we must 
provide some bas is for the consistency. One plausible basis for 
consistent use of a word is the speaker's intention to use the word 
in a certain way. 13 Let us suppose that the basis for a speaker's 
regular behavior is her intention to use the word 'glug' in a cer-
tain way. The speaker sets up a correlation between the word and 
13 If we hold that the speaker's consistent use of a word depends on 
an intention of this kind, then it would seem that the word already has 
a reference in the speaker's idiolect. If Cummins' definition of idio-
lect reference is correct, then this would not be the case. Cummins 
requires an external justification for the speaker's continuing use of 
the word in the intended way in order for a word to have a conventional 
meaning in the speaker's idiolect. This justification is formulated in 
terms of successful communication. 
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objects via her intention to refer to these objects. 14 
If the speaker's consistent use of the word 'glug' depends on 
what she intends to refer to with the word 'glug', then she must 
have an intention with the general form: 
I intend to refer to objects that have feature Q, and only to 
those objects, with the word 'glug'. 
What we expect from a speaker's intention concerning the use 
of the word 'glug' is that it should enable her to use the word con-
sistently. For the speaker to be able to do this, she must be able 
to identify and re-identify tables. Feature Q provides the basis 
for her re-identifications. It is that feature of the objects by 
which the speaker is able to identify and re-identify the object(s). 
Exactly what feature Q is is a matter of dispute even among 
advocates of intentionalist theories. It might be a set of charac-
teristics which are necessary and sufficient for an object's being a 
table. For example, a person may intend to refer to objects that 
have a relatively smooth extended surface elevated parallel to the 
ground by a structure that supports the surface from below, and only 
to those objects, with the word 'glug'. Another possibility is that 
the feature which objects must share in order to be called tables is 
less well-defined. For example, a person may intend to refer with 
the word 'glug' to anything that resembles a mental image she has of 
a table (this image may be a perceptual or memory image, or it may 
be one formed by imagination). The feature could also be: looks 
14 Grice suggests this approach when he attempts to explain the mean-
ing of sub-sentential units. (Ibid., p. 238f.) This is another role 
that intentions to refer might play in a theory of reference. 
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like (or is like) the thing that is now causing me to utter the word 
I glug 1 • 
It seems unlikely that the feature Q that figures in a speak-
er's intention to refer to certain things with the word 'glug' is a 
characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something's being a table. There are many class terms whose poten-
tial referents cannot be characterized in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. For example, Wittgenstein suggests that 
'game' is such a term. Moreover, most of the time, even if there 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for something' s being a 
table, a person who consistently uses the term 'table', for example, 
cannot say what they are. Since she has such difficulty formulating 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for something' s being a 
table and yet uses the term consistently and with ease, it is 
unlikely that the basis of her consistent use is an intention to 
refer with the word 'table' to all and only those things that sat-
isfy these conditions. 
Moreover, even if the speaker did intend to refer only to 
things satisfying certain necessary and sufficient conditions, the 
theory of semantic reference would be circular if occasion reference. 
presupposed either speaker's reference or semantic reference. If 
the necessary and sufficient conditions are specified in the words 
of the speaker's idiolect or in a shared language, then occasion 
meaning would be explained (partly) in terms of reference in a lan-
guage. To explain occasion reference without circularity, we have 
to find some more basic relation between the speaker's uses of· words 
and the objects the words refer to in order to say what a speaker 
226 
would refer to with the word 'table'. To understand what a speaker 
would refer to with the word 'table' without appealing to other lin-
guistic items whose reference potential must, in turn, be explained, 
we posit a more basic relation between the speaker's use of a word 
to refer to certain objects and those objects. Two different rela-
tions have been proposed as probable candidates: a relation of sat-
isfaction (or, with respect to mental images--resemblance) and a 
causal relation. 
Suppose that a speaker formulates her intention to use the 
term 'glug' in terms of the similarities between an image she has of 
a table and other objects. Her intention to refer might then be as· 
follows: 
I intend to refer with the word 'glug' to all and only those 
objects which resemble the image I have of this table. 
Putnam has argued that such an intention cannot be the ulti-
mate basis for a speaker's ability to use a word consistently. 15 In 
his argument Putnam considers whether it is possible for someone to 
invent a language which refers to his own sensations as they are 
given to him. Suppose such a person is given a sensation X and 
tries to give a name to sensations of that kind. 
In effect, he intends that ~ should apply to all and only those 
entities which are similar to X. 
If this is all he intends - - if he does not specify the 
respect in which something has to be similar to X ... --then this 
intention is empty ... For everything is similar to X in some 
respect. 16 
15 Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp. 6Sf. 
16 Ibid., p. 65. 
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This same point can be made with respect to tables and images 
of them. 17 Suppose that the person wanted to make up a language that 
referred to physical objects. He sees a table and forms the inten-
tion to refer with the word 'glug' to all and only those things that 
are similar to (or resemble) the perceptual image he has of a table. 
Here also, if this is all he intends, if he does not specify the 
respect in which the things must be similar, then his intention is 
empty, for everything is similar to the image in some respect. Sup-
pose that the table he perceives is brown and has round legs. It 
would follow that anything that is brown is similar to the image, 
and anything that has round legs is similar. Given all the ways in 
which something can be similar to something else, one will not be 
able consistently to use the word 'glug' on the basis of an inten-
tion to refer to all and only those things that are similar to, or 
resemble, the image one has of a table. 
The mere intention to refer to all and only those objects that 
are similar to ~ will not provide a basis for consistently using a 
term to refer to things of the same kind as X. However, if one 
could, in one's intention to refer to things that are similar to ~' 
specify the respect in which something has to be similar to ~' then 
the intention might provide a basis for consistently using that 
term. But then, Putnam argues, being able to specify the respect in 
which two things must be similar requires either that the person 
17 Putnam might not agree. At one point he argues, with Berkeley, 
that physical objects cannot be similar to mental entitites such as 
images. If physical objects cannot be similar to mental entities, I 
should have to intend to refer to all and only those things whose image 
is similar to the image I now have of a table. 
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forming the intention already is able to refer to the objects for 
which he is trying to introduce a new term or his ability must be 
based on another intention to refer to a similarity that certain 
things have. 
If, on the other hand, he specifies the respect ... then, 
since he is able to think this thought, he is already able to 
refer to the sensations for which he is trying to introduce a 
new term §, and to the relevant property of those sensations! 
But how did he get to be able to do this? (If we answer 'By 
focussing his attention on two other sensations, ~, ~, and 
thinking that those two sensations are similar in respect B if 
and only if they are similar to Z, W', then we are involved in 
a regress to infinity.) 18 - -
Suppose, for example, that with the word 'dot' I intended to 
refer to any and all objects that are similar to this, '. ', with 
respect to size and shape, etc. If I can specify these respects, 
Putnam claims, then I can already refer to dots and to their rele-
vant properties (though not necessarily with the word 'dot'). If we 
try to explain how I am able to refer to dots and their properties 
in terms of other dot tokens, then we are involved in a regress to 
infinity. For example, if I say that this token, ' ' is similar to 
the original one with respect to size, shape, etc., only if they are 
similar to <., .>, then we must be able to specify the respect in 
which<.,.> is similar to<.,.>. If we try to specify the respect 
in which they are similar in terms of other ordered pairs of dots, 
then we have the same problem. We can say<.,.> is similar to<.,.> 
only if they are similar to < .. , .. >. But then we would have to 
specify the conditions under which< .. , .. > is similar to< .. , .. >, 
and so forth. 
18 Ibid. 
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Of course the same thing can be said with respect to introduc-
ing a term for tables. The conclusion is that the intention to 
refer with 'glug' t'o all and only those things which are similar to 
or resemble a mental image of a table is either useless in guiding 
linguistic behavior, if the respect in which they must be similar 
to, or resemble, the image is not specified, or else one's ability 
consistently to refer to certain objects with the word 'glug' rests 
on something more basic than an intention of this kind. A person's 
ability consistently to use the word 'glug' to refer to tables can-
not ultimately be explained in terms of her intentions to refer to 
all and only those objects that are similar to some image she has of 
a table. 
An argument of the kind that purports to show that consistent 
use of a class term such as 'glug' cannot ultimately be based on a 
speaker's intention to refer to things that are similar to or resem-
ble a mental image, can also be advanced to show that consistent use 
cannot ultimately be based on intentions to refer to all and only 
those things that stand in the same causal relation to some act of 
the speaker (her uttering a word or pointing at something). Putnam 
argues as follows. 
Just as there are too many similarities for reference to be 
merely a matter of similarities, so there are too many causal 
chains for reference to be merely a matter of causal chains. 
On the other hand, if I say 'the word "horse" refers to 
objects which have a property which is connected with my produc-
tion of the utterance "There is a horse in front of me" on cer-
tain occasions by~ causal chain of the appropriate~.' then 
I have the problem that, if I am able to specify what is the 
appropriate type of causal chain, I must already be able to 
refer to the kinds of things and properties that make up that 
kind of causal chain. But how did I get to be able , to do 
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this? 19 
Any way of specifying the speaker's intentions to refer to things 
which are alike in respect g (including causal chains) is going to 
have to answer Putnam's objection. If one can intend to refer to a 
class of things (without presupposing any existing language or con-
nections between words and objects), then one must be able to spec-
ify the relevant respect in which the potential referents are like 
the thing which serves as a prototype for the term. To specify the 
relevant respect (whether it be the respect in which two things 
resemble each other or the respect in which two things are causally 
related), one must be able to refer to that respect. But referring 
to that respect would again depend on being able to use the expres-
sion for referring to that respect consistently. If the basis for 
doing this is an intention to refer to all and only those similari-
ties that are like the one that obtains between two other things, 
then this intention will require that she specify the relevant simi-
larity between the respects in which these things are similar, and 
so on ad infinitum. 
The point of Putnam's argument is that if a person is going to 
be able consistently to refer to some object(s) with some word, she 
must already be able to refer to that object (though not necessarily 
with that word). So for .a Gricean account of semantic reference to 
succeed, we must postulate a reference relation more basic than 
occasion reference. At the very least we can conclude that a Gri-
cean account of reference is not complete. But this does not mean 
19 Ibid, p. 66. 
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that the project is fundamentally misguided. 
For a speaker to be able to use a word consistently to refer 
to some object or kind of object, she must either have a representa-
tional system rich enough to enable her to recognize respects in 
which things are similar (e.g., mentalese), or her representational 
system must be so limited that, given any two items, she can only 
recognize one respect in which they are similar. Consistent use of 
a word would be possible under the second condition as well as the 
first. For suppose there is a person whose mental abilities are 
very limited. The only similarity that this person is capable of 
recognizing is similarity in size. Now suppose she has the inten-
tion to refer with the word 'small' to all and only those things 
whose image is similar to the image she has now. I suggest that, on 
the basis of this intention, she could consistently use the word 
'small' (as long as she can remember the image). 20 She could do this 
because, even though there may be an infinite number of ways in 
which two things may be similar, this person can only recognize one: 
similarity in size. She need not even specify the respect in which 
two things must be similar when she intends to refer with 'small' to 
all and only those things which resemble the image she now has, 
because for her there is only one possible way. 
Actual human beings have much richer mental abilities than the 
person we were imagining. We can recognize many possible similari-
ties between things (and we recognize many possible causal rela-
20 Her use of the term would strike us as bizarre (and inconsistent) 
because she would call a large object that was far away, 'small', and 
the same object, when it was close, she would not be call small. 
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tions). For any actual human being to be able to use a word consis-
tently, she must be able to tell when something is related to some-
thing else in the appropriate way. For example, to use the word 
'blue' consistently to refer to things which are like some blue cir-
cle image with respect to color, a person must be able to recognize 
which things are similar, and which are not similar in this respect. 
This may be a biologically based ability. Notice, however, that for 
consistent use of 'blue' to refer to blue things, she need not be 
able to specify the respect in which, for example, one blue circle 
with a radius of one inch is similar to another blue circle with the 
same radius and not similar to a third black circle of the same 
size. She need only recognize that the first and second circles are 
similar in a way that the first and third are not. If she can do 
this, then she can intend to use the word 'blue' to refer to things 
that are similar to some blue thing in the way that the first circle 
is similar to the second circle and not to the third. On the basis 
of this intention, given that she is able to recognize when things 
have the relevant similarity, this person could consistently use 
'blue' to refer to blue things. 
It is possible, then, for an isolated speaker to use a certain 
term consistently whenever she wants to refer to certain items. But 
this is just one condition for her to be able successfully to refer 
to that item on a particular occasion. Recall that semantic refer-
ence is to be explained in terms of speaker's reference (or refer-
ence in the speaker's idiolect), and this, in turn, was to be 
explained in terms of successful occasion reference. For a speaker 
successfully to refer on a particular occasion, her intention to 
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refer to a particular object with a certain word must be successful. 
This intention is spelled out as an intention that her audience 
should identify a particular object (e.g., a table) on the basis of 
their recognizing that she uttered a particular sound (e.g., 'glug') 
intending thereby to get them to recognize that this was what she 
intended (the Gricean mechanism). 
One condition that seemed to be necessary for successful occa-
sion reference was that the speaker consistently used a word to 
refer to the same thing(s). This was necessary if the audience was 
to have anything to go on in interpreting the speaker's utterance, 
that is, in recognizing the content of the speaker's intention. In 
addition, for successful occasion reference, the audience would have 
to recognize the relevant similarities between what the speaker did 
in the past and what she is doing now and between the context in 
which the speaker acted in the past and the context in which she is 
now acting. If the audience can recognize these similarities, it 
will have a reasonable chance of recognizing that the speaker 
intends to get them to identify a certain object by means of its 
recognizing that this is what she intended when she uttered the 
word. 
The audience may go through a reasoning process like this: 
There is S. She is uttering 'glug' again right in my face. 
Every time there is a table around S does that. But S would not 
go around saying 'glug' in my face for no reason. She must be 
trying to do something. Since she couldn't believe that saying 
'glug' in my face would have any effect save the effect it has 
on me, she must be trying to get me to do something. Since she 
always says 'glug' when there is a table around, she must want 
me to do something with a table. There is a table here. She 
must want me to notice (or identify) the table. 
There are a couple of problems with this explanation. First, 
• 
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there is a problem concerning the audience's ability to pick out the 
relevant similarities between past and present episodes in which the 
speaker utters 'glug'. Secondly, even if the audience does recog-· 
nize the relevant similarities, it is not clear that the audience 
would be able to reason that the speaker intended him to recognize 
her intention. 
Let us begin with the first problem. Here, again, the problem 
of recognizing relevant similarities appears. There are two simi-
larities that the audience must recognize in order to infer that 
'glug' refers to tables on this occasion: (1) the similarity between 
what the speaker is doing now and what she has done in the past 
(namely, uttered 'glug') and (b) the similarity between the contexts 
in which the speaker has uttered 'glug'. We already had to assume 
that speakers have an ability to recognize when things are similar 
and when they are not in order to explain how a speaker could use a 
word consistently to refer to some object(s), so we may as well 
assume that the hearers have such abilities as well. Thus, we can 
assume that a hearer could recognize that an utterance of 'glug' is 
similar to another utterance of 'glug' and different from an utter-
ance of 'gleek'. We can also assume that the hearer can recognize 
that one table is similar to another table and different from an 
antelope. However, the hearer must not only recognize similarities 
and differences between things, he must also recognize the relevant 
similarities, as distinct from irrelevant similarities and differ-
ences. A loud utterance of 'glug' is different from a soft utter-
ance of 'glug'; a high-pitched utterance of 'glug' is different from 
a low-pitched utterance. If volume and pitch are irrelevant to what 
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the speaker intends to effect when she utters the word 'glug', then 
the hearer must ignore these differences and pay attention only to 
similarities of a certain type. But on what basis? The same thing 
holds for contexts. The hearer may be able to recognize that two 
contexts are alike, but these contexts may be alike in any number of 
ways. The hearer must be able to distinguish the relevant respects 
in which one context is like another from the irrelevant respects in 
which one context is like another. If all the audience has to go on 
is her observation of similar actions on the part of S in similar 
contexts, then given the number of ways in which any two things are 
similar (as well as different), the audience will have trouble iden-
tifying the relevant respects in which things are similar. 
It may be objected that we are making matters too difficult by 
restricting our attention to meaningful utterances of words. It is 
much easier to see how a hearer could recognize the important simi-
larities and differences in the speaker's behavior in different con-
texts when the speaker uses gestures to get across his message. For 
example, Bennett suggests hand-wriggling as a gesture for referring 
to fish. 21 Suppose whenever a speaker wants the audience to identify 
fish, he makes a waving motion with his hands that imitates the way 
a fish moves. When the 'utterance' resembles the thing it is refer-
ring to, the hearer has more to go on. He can recongize not only 
the similarity between the gesture that is being performed now and 
the gesture which was made in the past, and the similarity between 
the context in which the gesture occurs now and the contexts in 
21 
_Q£. cit., p. 272-273. 
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which it occurred in the past, he can also recognize a similarity 
between the gesture and the thing(s) it refers to (namely, fish). 
This greatly increases the probability that he will recognize the 
important similarity between the contexts in which the gesture was 
performed (namely, the fact that they all involved fish). In fact, 
when_ the speaker uses an iconic gesture of this type, the hearer may 
be able to recognize, on the first encounter with the gesture, what 
the speaker intends him to identify. If the hearer is able to rec-
ognize the similarity between the gesture and fish, then he will be 
in a position to guess correctly what the speaker wants him to iden-
tify. (Pointing gestures may also help the hearer to recognize what 
the speaker is trying to get him to identify.) 
If words (or proto-words) are us~d in conjunction with iconic 
gestures, the audience may be able successfully to recognize the 
speaker's intention that it should identify a certain object the 
very first time it is used. The basis for recognizing this inten-
tion, when the word alone is used, could be the constant conjunction 
of word and gesture in the past. However, even when iconic gestures 
are used, recognizing the important similarities (the ones the 
speaker is trying to exploit) is not easy. Anyone who has played 
charades knows that any given gesture can look like a number of 
things. Which one is the correct one (the one the speaker intended) 
is not obvious just from the gesture. Similarly, when someone 
points, there are always a number of things (and aspects of things) 
that she might be pointing at. Discovering which of those things is 
the one she intended is quite difficult especially if one cannot ask 
the speaker which one she intended. 
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Nonetheless, when gestures are used the range of possible 
objects the hearer may recognize as similar to the object to be 
identified is greatly reduced (at least in comparison to when just 
sounds are uttered). The audience may successfully guess what the 
intended referent is, and so successful occasion reference would not 
be prohibitively unlikely. 
Thus far, then, we have argued that the hearer may be able to 
identify what the speaker is trying to get him to identify by doing 
certain things. Now we turn to the next problem. How do we get 
from the hearer's recognition of the important similarities in the 
speaker's behavior over time and the contexts in which this behavior 
has occurred to the hearer's recognition that the speaker is doing 
these things in order to get the audience to do something? 
Suppose an audience sees someone gesturing fishily and saying 
'The fish are biting.' The audience recognizes the similarity 
between the fish gesture and fish. If the speaker is to success-
fully refer, then her audience must identify fish on the basis of 
their recognition that the speaker is uttering the gesture-sound 
combination with the intention that they should identify fish, and 
their recognition is supposed to be based on the recognition that 
this is what the speaker intended. Supposedly they recognize this 
intention behind the speaker's action by trying to figure out why 
the speaker did what she did and inferring that she did it in order 
to get them to do something (namely, to identify fish). 
Bennett argues that knowledge of the speaker could lead the 
audience to believe that she intended to produce some effect-in the 
audience by means of the audience's recognizing that this is what 
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she intended to effect. 22 Bennett considers the following case: 
[O]ne day we observe a tribesman, U, stand in full view of 
another, ~. an~ emit a snake-like hi~ing sound while also mak-
ing with his hand a smooth, undulating, horizontal motion that 
resembles the movement of a snake. 23 
Bennett aruges that on the basis of what we know about U we could 
conclude that U intended "to affect something other than himself," 
since "whenever U engages in protracted, apparently connected 
sequences of behavior he intends to affect something outside him-
self. We can also conclude that U intended "to affect A" since "it 
would be out of character for U to think he was affecting anything 
other than ~. and we can conclude that he intended "to affect A 
auditorially and/or visually, or in some way arising from the audio-
visual effect" since it would also be out of character for U to 
think that he was having any immediate effect on A other than an 
audio-visual one. Further, because "whenever Q deliberately pro-
duces a sensory change in another tribesman it is in order to get 
him to believe something" we can conclude that Q intended "to get ~ 
to believe something." In addition, 
the nature of the performance--the fact that it naturally 
induces the thought of a snake--forces us to conclude that if U 
is trying to make ~ believe something, it is something about a 
snake. 
This supports the conclusion that U intended "to get ~ to believe 
something about a snake." We could also conclude that U intended 
"to get ~ to believe that there is a snake nearby." The basis for 
this inference is that no other plausible alternative is available. 
22 Ibid., pp. 138-140. 
23 Ibid., p. 138. 
239 
A cannot think of anything else that ~ might be trying to get him to 
believe about snakes. What is more, we can conclude that~ expected 
that A would go through this reasoning process and intended that A 
should think that he expected this in order for A to realize that U 
intended him to believe that P. This last step makes it clear that 
it is not just we who are supposed to go through the reasoning pro-
cess. Both A and U also draw these conclusions. 24 
To suppose that two pre-linguistic tribesman (or even one) 
could actually go through this line of reasoning seems rather impro-
bable. Not only are some of the steps in the reasoning process 
unlikely steps that a primitive tribesman would take, but the very 
idea that a person with no shared language or idiolect would be able 
to formulate an argument of this sort seems far-fetched. 
Let us first go through the reasoning process step by step to 
identify particular inferences that are questionable. The first 
inference is: 
Whenever U engages in protracted, apparently connected sequences 
of behavior he intends to affect something outside himself. 
Therefore when he engages in the snake pantomime he must intend 
to affect something outside himself. 
The inference is valid, but not sound. It is difficult to imagine a 
person, primitive or sophisticated, whose protracted, apparently 
connected sequences of behavior are always directed towards affect-
ing something outside himself. I perform such a sequence of behav-
ior everyday when I brush my teeth, and I do not want to affect any-
24 The quotes from Bennet are all taken from Linguistic Behavior, QE. 
cit.' pp. 138£. 
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thing outside myself. 25 Having watched National Geographic specials 
on television, I find it quite plausible that primitive tribesmen 
would go through sequences of behavior aimed only at affecting them-
selves, for example, inspecting their bodies for lice. It also 
seems likely that, without the help of words, they might go through 
sequences of behavior in order to remember episodes in the past by 
re-enacting them, or aspects of them, physically. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that ~ would know that whenever !:! engages in protracted, 
apparently connected sequences of behavior he intends to affect 
something other than himself, or that he would reach this conclu-
sion, because the statement is most likely false and ~ most likely 
has no reason to believe it is true. The premise has to be weakened 
if it is to be true. Let us say, instead, that ~ would be justified 
in inferring that since, ) often, when U engages in a protracted, 
apparently connected sequence of behavior he intends to affect some-
thing outside of himself, it may be that when he performs the snake 
pantomime he intends to affect something outside of himself. This 
inference may be enough for ~ to go on to the next step. 
The second conclusion ~ is supposed to be justified in reach-
ing is that U intended to affect A. His reason for thinking this is 
that "it would be out of character for U to think that he was 
affecting anything other than A." We should ask whether A would 
think that it would be out of character for U to think he was 
2 5 It might be argued that my teeth are something outside myself 
(assuming that my self is not identical with my body). But ta· ask a 
primitive tribesman to see that I am trying to affect something outside 
of myself when I brush my teeth would be going too far. 
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affecting anything other than A. First, why would this be out of 
character? and secondly, why would A think that this was out of 
character? Bennett. argues that the members of the tribe, being lim-
ited. in what they can believe, for the most part, to those proposi-
tions which are easily falsified, are likely to have mostly true 
beliefs. This is an important assumption, for in order for A to 
think it would be out of character for U to think he was affecting 
anything other than A, A must have noticed something about U's typi-
- -
cal patterns of thought (or at least of thought-guided behavior). 
The reason A would think it unlikely that U should think he was 
affecting something other than A would be that A does not have any 
evidence that U has mistaken beliefs about the efficacy of pantom-
ime. His evidence for this belief might be that U does not pantom-
ime except when he wants to affect some audience. But how does A 
know this? If we answer, by observing ~'s past pantomiming behav-
ior, we will not get any further because then we must explain how ~ 
is supposed to know what U intended to affect with his past pantom-
imes. We cannot explain this by saying that A noticed that in the 
past U only pantomimed when he intended to affect some audience. 
It might be that ~ believes that it would be out of character 
for U to try to affect something other than ~ with his pantomime 
because A knows that U has generally correct beliefs about cause and 
effect. A could conclude this on the basis of observations of ·u's 
behavior in non-communicative contexts. But in order for A to know 
~ has generally correct beliefs about cause and effect, ~ must have 
generally correct beliefs about cause and effect, and A must b~lieve 
that he has these beliefs and that they are correct. We would have 
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to suppose, then, that two pre-linguistic, primitive tribesmen have 
generally correct beliefs about cause and effect. (Is there any 
reason to suppose that only later, when they have developed a suffi-
ciently rich language, that they would start to hold false beliefs 
about the magical efficacy of incantations and ritual dances.) We 
will have to suppose that, before language developed, primitive 
tribesman had beliefs about cause and effect pretty much like our 
own (though perhaps fewer of them). Given the number of mistaken 
beliefs that more sophisticated tribesmen have about cause and 
effect, this does not seem very likely. 
The same presumption of developed rationality and theory seems 
necessary to reach the conclusion that U must have intended to 
affect ~ auditorially or visually or in some way arising from the 
audio-visual effect. Bennett argues that A would believe it was 
"out of character for !;! to think he was having any effect on A other 
than an audio-visual one." This is just presuming too much of a 
primitive tribesman's knowledge of nature and natural processes. 
Bennett cites a different kind of rationale for ~'s concluding 
that !;! wants him to believe something. ~ is supposed to know that 
whenever !;! deliberately produces a sensory change in another tribes-
man it is in order to get him to believe something. A believes that 
~ is deliberately trying to produce a sensory change in him. There-
fore, ~ concludes that ~ must be trying to get ~ to believe some-
thing. But what kind of evidence is ~ supposed to have for his gen-
eral statement. Even if A could tell that U was deliberately trying 
to produce a sensory change in another tribesman (a dubious hypothe-
sis), and even if~ was successful in doing so, how, just by observ-
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ing the proceedings, would ~ know what Q intended to do? He cannot 
observe that a belief has been produced. He cannot observe U' s 
intention. Since there is no language, he cannot be told what the 
third tribesman believed nor what U intended. Even if the third 
tribesman acted on his newly acquired belief, how would~ be able to 
tell (or even to guess) that his action proceeded from a belief 
which he acquired on the basis of U's action and that U had intended 
the whole process to occur? All A sees is Q making gestures and 
noises and the third tribesman going off and doing something. Why 
should A even think those occurrences were connected by intentions 
and beliefs? 
A concludes that Q is trying to get him to believe something 
about a snake because he notices that the performance naturally 
induces the thought of a snake and reasons that U must be aware of 
this fact and able to use his knowledge to get A to think about a 
snake. I might agree, with some reservations, that the pantomime 
could naturally induce~ to think about a snake. 26 But it is another 
matter to hold that ~ is, or could be, psychologically sophisticated 
enough to realize that the pantomime naturally induces the thou'ght 
of a snake and is also sophisticated enough to think that someone 
else would believe the same thing and would try to exploit this nat-
ural fact. It seems highly problematic to suppose that they under-
stand natural physical processes as well as natural psychological 
processes without the benefit of a shared language which would 
2 6 There are some problems with this suggestion because there ·are a 
number of things the pantomime could 'naturally' induce someone to think 
of. 
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enable them to pool their observations and to test their psychologi-
cal hypotheses. 
The beliefs about human psychology which justify ~'s conclu-
sion that "U realized that A would go through these steps and he 
realized that A would realize that U intended that A realize that U 
intended that A should have a belief about a snake, and A would 
trust _g enough for this to be a reason for A to have a certain 
belief about a snake and ~ expected his intention to be successful 
for this very reason," are complex and subtle. Here we have A mak-
ing sophisticated hypotheses about what U must have reasoned and we 
have U making sophisticated hypotheses about what A would think U 
thinks. These tribemen will have to believe (1) that they reason, 
(2) that others reason in much the same way, and (3) that others 
also believe (1) and (2). They are supposed to believe this on the 
basi3 of non-linguistic behavioral evidence. 
Every step in the reasoning process a tribesman is supposed to 
go through either to effect some change in another by means of ges-
tures or sounds or to be affected by someone's gestures or sounds 
involves knowledge that a primitive tribesman cannot reasonably be 
expected to have. Moreover, the chain of inferences is one that a 
primitive tribesman is not likely to formulate. It is even less 
plausible to suppose that primitive people would be aware of their 
reasoning processes.· It is one thing to make inferences; it is 
quite another to recognize that this is what you are doing. It is 
assuming too much to suppose that a person, without the benefit of a 
shared language, can go through a complicated chain of inferences of 
the type required in Bennett's story. I do not object, on princi-
245 
ple, to assuming that pre-linguistic people (or animals) have some 
cognitive abilities. It may be reasonable to assume that human 
beings are naturaliy endowed with a representational system which 
enables them to see similarities and differences and to classify 
objects, events or sensations into general groupings. It is not 
reasonable to assume that human beings are by nature endowed with 
the ability to follow (much less to construct) fairly complicated 
and correct chains of inferences and to recognize that this is what 
we are doing. 27 
The explanation of occasion meaning would be much simpler and 
much more plausible if we assumed that there already was something 
like semantic reference (or meaning), prior to occasion meaning. 
Rather than trying to explain semantic (and speaker's) reference in 
terms of intentions to effect some change in an audience (namely, to 
get the audience to identify some object) on a particular occasion, 
we should explain the speaker's intention to effect some change in 
an audience on a particular occasion by uttering particular sounds 
or making certain gestures, in terms of the semantic reference of 
those sounds and gestures. What we need in order to get the speaker 
into a position to use expressions and gestures for certain purposes 
and to get the audience to recognize that this is what the speaker 
is up to (in other words, the conditions for successful occasion 
reference) are expressions and gestures which already have a refer-
ence for both the audience and the speaker. We should explain, 
first, how gestures and expressions come to be apt means for carry-
27 I know of human beings who find this quite difficult. 
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ing out certain intentions, then we can explain how people use them 
for communicative purposes. 
Although such. an explanation is not within the scope of this 
dissertation, I would suggest that the basic mechanism by which 
words and gestures become apt means for carrying out communicative 
intentions is conditioning and imitation. We can use Bennett's sug-
gestion that some gestures (and perhaps even sounds) naturally 
induce certain thoughts and also suppose that some stimuli naturally 
induce certain sounds in order to account for the first pairings of 
sounds and gestures with objects in the world. These associations 
would be reinforced through use and perhaps also through their 
effects. After a while, a primitive tribesman might notice that 
certain sounds and gestures have an effect on his fellows and on 
himself and on the basis of this observation try to exploit the con-
nection. When he wants to produce certain effects, he might use the 
words and gestures that have produced that effect in the past. His 
belief that they will produce this effect need not be based on any 
hypotheses he entertains about what others will think he is trying 
to do. Nor will their efficacy depend on what others believe he is 
doing. No one in the tribe need believe anything about the mental 
states or intentions of others. They need not even believe anything 
about their own mental states and intentions. They could still suc-
cessfully communicate their intentions to an audience. 
Such an account would be preferable to a Gricean account of 
occasion reference because it does not require that we presuppose 
that primitive pre-linguistic people have true beliefs about cause 
and effect and about the mental processes of others. It is quite 
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possible that language arose before anyone had any beliefs, true or 
false, about mental entities and processes of any kind. 28 
Once a basic· stock of referring expressions has been estab-
lished in the language of the group, we can explain speaker's refer-
ence in terms of intentions to refer with a certain expression. 
Eventually it will be possible to introduce new expressions into the 
language simply by using them in conjunction with expressions and 
gestures in the already established language. Here the speaker's 
intentions to get the audience to identify some object when she 
utters some heretofore unheard of expression may determine the ref-
erence of that expression. However, she can reasonably expect her 
audience to figure out what her expression refers to by relying on 
their ability to understand the rest of the sentence and their 
knowledge of the context alone. She need not expect them to recog-
nize that she intends them to identify a certain object and depends 
on their recognizing that this is what she intends in order to get 
them to do it. 
In a developed language, there are institutionally recognized 
means for introducing referring expressions into a the language. 
Once language is sufficiently developed, reliance on speaker's 
intentions to determine reference potential is greatly diminished. 
I have already, in connection with proper names, discussed one 
institutional means for changing reference potential. 2 9 There are 
2 8 This seems to be Sellars' point in "The Sellars-Chisholm Corre-
spondence on Intentionality," in H. Feig!, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell 
(eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II (Minne-
apolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 529-539. 
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procedures in English for introducing and changing names. These 
procedures are clearly specified and publicly recognized. They say 
who can give a name to whom under what conditions by doing what. 
When the properly qualified person does the specified things under 
the proper conditions his action is a name-giving, and it is recog-
nized as such by the community in which this procedure is in force. 
Institutionalized procedures also exist for introducing other 
kinds of terms into a language. Persons with the right credentials 
under the right circumstances can introduce new terms into the lan-
guage by doing certain things. A physicist who discovers a new 
sub-atomic particle may introduce a new term into the English lan-
guage by calling the new particle something in her report of the 
finding. What she calls this particle in this context becomes the 
English word that potentially refers to particles of that type. 
Similarly, an inventor may refer to his invention with a certain 
word when he applies for a patent or otherwise publicly reports his 
invention. That word then becomes the English word which poten-
tially refers to his invention. 
I argued earlier that what a name that is given by institu-
tional means refers to does not depend on what the name-giver 
intended it to refer to. This also holds true for class terms that 
are introduced by institutional means. What the name or word refers 
to depends bn what the person who fulfills the instituional require-
ments, and is thus entitled to give the name, does, not on what she 
intends. In other words, the reference potential of the term is 
29 See Chapter Five. 
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determined by the institutional procedures. 
Whether a term could have a determinate reference potential 
independently of any particular speaker's intention without some-
one's having intended to refer with that term to some particular 
thing or kind of thing, is a different matter. It could be argued 
that the term would not have a determinate reference potential in 
English unless the person who gave the term to something did certain 
things, but that she would not have done these things, had she not 
intended to refer to a particular thing or kind of thing with the 
term. It would follow that her intention was necessary for the term 
to have a determinate reference potential in English. This argument 
will not work. The speaker's motivations for doing what she did are 
irrelevant. 
What does seem to be relevant is the fact that as a result of 
what the term-giver did, the community recognizes the term as having 
a certain reference potential, and that they accept the term as 
referring to a particular thing or kind of thing, even if the person 
who coined the term or gave the name should now intend to use the 
term or name differently. The community's acceptance of the term 
seems to rest on a general intehtion to refer with a term that is 
introduced by an institutional procedure to the thing(s) to which 
the term was given. This intent ion to refer with a term to the 
thing(s) to which it was given seems to be the important one. 
Whether a term introduced by means of an institutional procedure has 
a certain determinate reference potential in English (which includes 
the thing that the term was given to), may well depend on ieneral 
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intentions of this kind. 30 
Intentions to Refer and Intensions 
In this section I will discuss theories of reference potential 
that attempt to explain how the reference potential of class terms in a 
language is determined in terms of speakers' intentions to refer to 
things with certain features shared by all and only those things which 
will be referred to with that term. 
We have rejected a Gricean account of semantic reference which 
tries to explain semantic reference in terms of occasion reference, but 
there is another kind of intentionalist account of semantic reference. 
According to this account, the semantic reference of class terms is 
determined by what some group of people intend to refer to with the 
term. This group may be ei'ther the majority of people who speak the 
same language (in which case the account is a majoritarian one), or it 
may be the group of experts. The basic idea is that people have inten-
tions to use a word to refer to certain objects which have feature G. 
(We have already discussed such intentions above.) The word refers, in 
a language, to all and only those things that have feature G if some 
group of people have this intention. The reference rules for expres-
sions in a language could be formulated either in terms of the inten-
3 0 Note that such intentions are general in two ways. First, they 
concern terms in general. It is not necessary to formulate the inten-
tion for each term that is introduced by institutional means. Secondly, 
it is a general intention in the sense that the general commun.ity of 
speakers has such an intention. It is not the intention of any particu-
lar person. 
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tions of this group of people: 
In 1, ~ refers to all and only those objects to which the relevant 
group of-people in~end to use~ to refer; 
or, since their intentions are formulated in terms of feature Q. the 
reference rule can be formulated in terms of that feature: 
In 1, x refers to all and only those objects which have feature §, 
where feature G is that feature which enables speakers to identify and 
re-identify objects belonging to the class named by x. 
I will consider two accounts that attempt to explain how semantic 
reference is determined in terms of speakers' reference. Both accounts 
try to explain semantic reference in terms of what some group of speak-
ers would refer to with some term. What these people would refer to is 
determined by their intentions to use the word in a certain way. The 
first account says that what an English word can be used to refer to is 
determined by what the majority of speakers would refer to with that 
term. The second account tries to explain semantic reference in terms 
of what the experts would refer to with that term. These accounts are 
based on two observations: (1) that the reference of expressions in a 
language does not depend on the intentions of any particular speaker; 
and (2) that for words to have a reference potential someone must intend 
to use them in a certain way. 
What is significant about expressions in a language, what distin-
guishes them from expressions in an idiolect or other physical objects 
used on some occasion to refer, is that expressions in a language have a 
stable reference potential which is not dependent on any particular 
speaker's intentions regarding the word. The reference potential of 
English expressions does not depend on what I want it to be or on what 
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you want it to be. It is independent of our particular intentions. No 
matter how many times or with what intensity I intend to refer to keys 
with the word 'snow', the word 'snow' continues to refer, in English, to 
snow, and not to keys. 31 Furthermore, expressions in English can refer 
(in the right context) even when the thing that produces those expres-
s ions cannot . A parrot can say, "Polly wants a cracker," without 
intending to refer to anything. Nonetheless, the word 'Polly' in the 
sentence she produced does refer to Polly. The same thing can be said 
of computers that produce English sentences. The computer does not (and 
cannot) refer to anything, but referring expressions in the sentences 
the computer produces do refer. 
Although the reference potential of an_English expression does not 
depend on any particular person's intention to refer with that expres-
sion, it is obvious that this expression would fail to have a reference 
potential of its own if no one had ever intended to refer with it. So 
while it is true that the reference potential of these expressions does 
not depend on any particular person's intention to refer, it does seem 
to depend on intentions to refer. 
On the basis of considerations such as these, we conclude that a 
word can have a reference potential in a language only if someone 
intends to use that word to refer to something. This may be a necessary 
condition for a word's having a reference potential in a language, but 
it is not a sufficient condition. I can intend to refer to the kind of 
31 
'Snow' may come to refer to keys in my idiolect. Because of this 
you may interpret my sentences which contain the word 'snow as sen-
tences about keys. But this does not mean that 'snow' in English refers 
to keys. 
• 
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bugs I saw crawling above the sink last night with the word 'yuccuk'. 
But this is not sufficient for making 'yuccuk' an English expression 
that potentially refers to those bugs. In order for the word 'yuccuk' 
to refer to a certain kind of bug in English, it has to be accepted by 
the English-speaking community (or some portion thereof) as a word for 
referring to that bug. It if were, it would then become 'community 
property' and my intentions regarding its use would no longer be impor-
tant. 
Accounts that explain semantic reference in terms of speakers' 
intentions are also supported by the fact that the reference potential 
of expressions in a language sometimes changes. The mechanisms of 
change are often changes in the way that speakers use the word. 32 These 
changes are of several kinds. Perhaps the most radical change in refer-
ence potential occurs when an expression which previously had no refer-
ence potential in English, acquires one. Another kind of change occurs 
when an expresssion which already has a reference potential comes to 
have a different one; the set of potential referents may become larger 
or smaller or undergo a more drastic change in which some things that 
were potential referents of the expression no longer are, and other 
things that were not potential referents become potential referents. 
All of these kinds of changes occur in English. New words are added to 
the language, (e.g., 'quark).· Names which previously had only 17 poten-
tial referents (e.g., 'Kelly Mink') come to have 18 potential referents, 
or which previously had 17 potential referents come to have only 16 
potential referents (e.g., if one Kelly Mink changes her name). The 
32 Changes by institutional means would not count as evidence. 
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reference potential of class terms also changes. For example, 'rummage' 
at one time could be used in English only to refer to the arrangement of 
cargo in the hold of a ship or a stowage or storage place. Now it can 
be used to refer ta something completely different. 
Although one way for the reference potential of expressions Eng-
lish to change is by institutional means, this cannot be the fundamental 
way, since the existence of such institutional procedures requires a 
fairly developed community, which, in turn, would require a fairly 
developed language. The reference potential of an English expression 
can change even when there are no institutional procedures for changing 
it. There are no institutional procedures for introducing unofficial 
names, yet such names often become part of the language. Slang words 
also become English expressions after a period of time, 3 3 even though 
there is no institutional procedure for introducing such terms. Words 
become obsolete and no longer have a reference potential in English 
without the benefit of an institutional procedure. These kinds of 
change in reference potential seem to be the result of changing patterns 
of use within the community. The basis for these changing patterns of 
use seems to be changing patterns of intentions to refer. 
What seems to be important in these changes in reference potential 
is that the community comes to accept certain uses of words. When it 
does, the words become English expressions with determinate reference 
potential of their own. 
To explain how a word acquires a certain determinate reference 
33 The word 'chum', now a legitimate English expression, was a slang 
word in 17th century England. 
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potential in a language, we must explain how it happens that a certain 
way of using the term ceases to depend on any particular person's inten-
tion to use the term in that way. Our general answer will be that a 
term becomes a term in a language when the linguistic community accepts 
that use of the word. The accounts that I will discuss say that the 
linguistic community accepts a certain use of a word when some group of 
speakers (either a majority of them or the group of experts) intends to 
use the word to refer to objects which have a certain feature. Majorit-
arian accounts say that the majority of the speakers of English have an 
intention to refer to these things. 
Objections to majoritarian accounts of semantic reference are 
based on the claim that what the majority of English-speakers would (and 
sometimes do) refer to with a term is not always the same as what the 
English term can properly be applied to. This is especially obvious 
with respect to technical terms and with natural kind terms. For exam-
ple, consider the word 'gold'. Most English-speakers, it is claimed, 
would refer to a shiny, yellowish, rather stiff metal with the word 
'gold'. However, there are objects that fit this description but which 
are not gold at all (e.g., fool's gold). Further, there is gold which 
does not fit this description. Thus, the reference potential of 'gold' 
in English is not what the majority of English-speakers would call 
gold. 34 
We could formulate a more general argument against the claim that 
34 This argument is loosely based on Putnam's argument that extension 
is not determined by intention in "The Meaning of Meaning," Mind, Lan-
guage and Reality, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 
215-271. 
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the semantic reference of technical terms, including natural kind terms, 
is determined by what the majority of speakers would refer to. Let us 
consider what ordinary speakers would call gold. Suppose that the basis 
of each speaker's use of the word 'gold' is an intention to refer to 
things which bear relation ~ (either a causal relation or a similarity 
relation) to some prototype of gold. In order for the speaker to use 
the term consistently, she must be able to ascertain whether something 
bears this relation to the prototype. What most speakers must rely on 
to ascertain whether an object bears a certain relation to the prototype 
are surface features of the prototype and the objects in question. That 
is what they base their use of the term on. 3 5 However, the reference 
potential of words of this kind, in English, often has little to do with 
surface features that can easily be detected by the observant speaker. 
Thus, the kinds of intentions on which the majority of English-speakers 
can base their consister.t use of a term are often not the kinds of 
intentions on which correct usage of that term could be based. 
Because it does seem possible that the majority of English-speak-
ers could base their consistent use of a word on intentions to refer to 
certain things among which are included things to which the English word 
does not refer and also among which other things to which the English 
word does refer are not included, we can reject the claim that the 
semantic reference of English expressions is determined by what the 
majority of English-speakers would use the word to refer to. This 
35 For this reason, explaining consistent use on the basis of speak-
er's intentions to refer to everything which stands in the same causal 
relation to her utterance as some other thing, is less satisfactory than 
explaining consistent use in terms of resemblances. Seeing similarity 
of causal relation is much trickier than seeing similarities in images. 
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leaves the hypothesis that the reference potential of the terms is 
determined by what the experts intend to use the word to refer to. This 
hypothesis is more plausible than the majoritarian one. For although 
most of us cannot tell the difference between real gold and fool's gold, 
and so most of us would use the word 'gold' to refer to samples of both, 
the experts are supposed to be the people who do know the difference. 
What the English word 'gold' refers to could depend on what they intend 
to refer to with the term. 
What would disprove this hypothesis would be some case where not 
even the experts used the term correctly. At first glance it seems 
quite unlikely that there could be an English expression which no one, 
no even the experts, used correctly. But here again, the example of 
'gold' suggests such a case. Before there were adequate tests for gold, 
there already existed a word for gold. Although, in the absence of an 
adequate test, not even the experts would have used the word correctly 
(i.e., would have used to word to refer to all and only those things 
that were gold under the appropriate circumstances), the word for gold 
could have still referred only to gold. The discovery of an adequate 
test for gold would make it possible for some people (namely, the ones 
who could perform the test) to use the term correctly, but it need not 
change the reference potential of the word for gold. Before the test 
was invented, the word for gold could have referred to gold, and after 
the tesi was discovered the word for gold still could have referred to 
the same stuff. In fact, it is difficult to make sense of someone's 
looking for a more adequate test for gold if 'gold' only meant what the 
experts would identify as gold at a given time. 
Although the intentions to refer to certain things with the word 
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'gold' which guided competent speakers' use of the term did not deter-
mine the reference potential of that word in that language, an intention 
of a different kind may have. To explain how it is possible for a word 
to have a determinate reference potential even when no one is able to 
use the term correctly, we have to suppose that someone has some inten-
tion to use the term in a certain way (or else that there is some magi-
cal connection between the word and what it refers to). With natural 
kind terms, this intention cannot be a specific intention to refer to 
certain things that have an identifiable feature G with the word. I 
would propose, instead, that the kind of intention people have with 
respect to the word 'gold' is the intention to refer with that word to 
things that really are gold. If people had such an intention before 
they developed an adequate test for gold, and if the reference potential 
of the term in their language was determined by this intention, then we 
can understand how it was possible for all of them to use the term in 
that language incorrectly. The basis for their use may have involved 
incorrect beliefs about what real gold was like, so that their specific 
intentions concerning what to apply their word for gold to may have led 
to incorrect usages. Nonetheless these usages would still have been 
incorrect, even for these people, because the word for gold was used to 
refer to things that were not really gold and it was not used to refer 
to things that were really gold. Of course, before the test was devel-
oped they could not have said which of their uses were correct and which 
were incorrect. But they could have admitted the possibility that no 
one was able to use the term correctly (in the sense of being able to 
say of each thing whether it was gold or not under the appropriate cir-
cumstances). 
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To intend to refer with the word 'gold' to things that really are 
gold, one must presuppose that there is a natural order in which certain 
things are justifiably grouped together. This does not mean that one 
must presuppose an order independent of any human minds. The justifica-
tion for grouping certain things into kinds may be that by grouping 
things this way we can make sense of all our experiences. It may be 
that we impose an order on nature (or on experiences) and that we are 
constrained in doing so only by those constraints which follow from our 
desire to predict future occurences effectively. If we hold this kind 
of intentionalist theory of how the reference of natural kind terms is 
determined, then we cannot at the same time say that the reference 
potential (or extension) of these terms is what either the majority of 
speakers or the experts would call gold, unless we interpret 'experts' 
very strictly. Only if we restrict the class of experts to those who 
know what gold really is, will it be true that gold can be used in Eng-
lish to refer to all 'and only those things that the experts would refer 
to. But this means that if no one knows what gold really is, then we 
will not be able to discover what the potential referents of 'gold' are 
by observing how people use the word. 36 
What natural kind terms can properly be used to refer to depends, 
then, to some extent on what the world is like, not just on what speak-
ers think the world is like. 
36 This implication should recommend my account over any other which 
entails that we could discover the potential referent~ of gold in that 
way. Another important implication of this intentionalist account is 
that no important truths about gold will be discovered by observing how 
people use the word 'gold'. We cannot assume that people are any less 
in the dark about gold (or about good) than we are. 
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We should reject intentionalist accounts of semantic reference 
which say that the reference of class terms is determined by what either 
the majority of speakers or what the experts would use the term to refer 
to. More precisely, we should reject such accounts if they say that 
what the relevant group of speakers would use a term to refer to depends 
on their intentions to use the word to refer to all and only those 
things that they identify on the basis of the presence or absence of a 
certain feature. 
The kinds of facts that support an intentionalist account of ref-
erence potential do support the conclusion that speakers' intentions to 
refer determine reference potential. But the intentions that determine 
reference potential need not be specific intention~ to refer to objects 
which have certain identifiable features, they can instead be general 
intentions to refer to the real things. Specific intentions to refer to 
objects that have certain identifiable features may sometirnes be the 
basis for each speaker's consistent use of a word. But the basis for 
speakers' consistent use of a word, even of the experts' use, need not 
be the basis for correct use of the word. 
What we have in English, and most likely in many other languages 
as well, are intentions to refer which presuppose a natural order or at 
least an ideally justified theory of nature. What we intend to refer to 
with natural-kind terms, for example, are the actual members of actual 
natural kinds--even if we do not know exactly who these members are and 
could not recognize them if we saw them. What we intend to refer to 
with terms for properties are similarly actual properties. 
Our intention to refer to the real things, not just to the things 
we may think are. the real things, explains our deference to the experts. 
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It is the experts who are supposed to know about these things. It also 
explains how the reference potential of, for example, scientific terms, 
does not change whenever theories change. As we learn more about real-
ity we are better able to tell what things are potential referents of 
our terms, so our beliefs about which objects are potential referents of 
our terms may change. Nonetheless, the potential referents remain the 
same. 
Our intentions to refer, even our general ones, do not always pre-
suppose a natural order or ideal theory of nature. At an even more gen-
eral level, however, we can say that our general intentions are to use 
words correctly. For natural-kind terms, the standards of correctness 
are the natural order or the ideal theory. For other kinds of terms, 
the general intentions may be intentions to use the word the way it has 
always been used or an intention to use the word as the linguistic elite 
uses it. Our intentions concerning the use of names seems to be just to 
respect the naming institution. 
To be able to carry out these intentions, one must formulate 
hypotheses about how one identifies the correct referents (feature G). 
These hypotheses are continually revised. We ask "Would you call that 
blue or green?", and "Would that be called a table or a desk?" It is 
(usually) not important that we all have the same hypotheses, or the 
same means of re-identifying the correct referents. What is important 
for correct usage is a history of usage and standards of correct usage 
that have stood the test of time. 37 On the basis of these past usages 
37 It is no accident that dictionaries cite usages by famous men and 
women of letters as justification for a usage. The question "What makes 
some uses of language correct and others incorrect?" deserves more seri-
• 
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which we accept as correct, we formulate and test our hypotheses. 
We could summarize our discussion of theories which try to explain 
the reference potential of English expressions in terms of what some 
group of speakers intends to refer to with the expression as follows. 
If the intentions of the group are supposed to be the intentions which 
are the basis for their consistent use of the term, then these accounts 
are wrong. We should make a distinction between these specific inten-
tions by which we guide our own linguistic behavior and the general 
intentions which set the standards for correct usage. Of course there 
will be some relation between the two. Examples of correct usage which 
are known to be correct provide the basis for each speaker's hypotheses 
about how to use the term, what items to apply it to. The hypotheses of 
most people have to lead to behavior which is more or less similar so 
that people can understand each other. It is through the hypotheses 
that individual speakers use the language (more or less correctly). It 
is through something else that the standards of correct and incorrect 
usage are set. 
The intentions that matter, then, are not specific intentions con-
cerning the use of a word to refer, they are more general intentions to 
use the word properly. Sometimes the intention to use a word properly 
is an intention to use the word as it has been used by speakers whose 
linguistic competence is not a matter of dispute. Sometimes this inten-
tion is formulated in terms of an ideal theory of nature or a belief in 
ous study. I suspect that there are many factors involved. Only some-
times does a usae become acceptable when a sufficient number of people 
use it over a sufficiently long time. 'Chum', for example, was slang in 
the 1600's. It has now made it to the status of a colloquialism. What 
would it take to make it a correct usage? Surely not more time. 
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a natural order. These intentions to use words properly help to explain 
the normative force of language. Actual linguistic behavior is guided 
by these intentions indirectly. Speakers of a language form hypotheses 
about how a word should be used. Their linguistic behavior may be (and 
often is) guided by these hypotheses. But these hypotheses are formu-
lated because speakers have a more general intention to use the word 
correctly, and they are rejected if they do not enable the speaker to 
conform to the recognized standards of correct usage. 
Conclusion 
My primary goal in this dissertation was to see to what extent 
intentions to refer determine reference. My strategy was to divide 
theories of reference into theories. of disambiguation and theories of 
reference potential. This strategy has been successful, for it enabled 
us to evaluate intentionalist theories by looking only at that evidence 
which was appropriate to the particular intentionalist claim. Through-
out this dissertation we saw that certain intuitions supported one 
intentionalist claim, but were irrelevant to others. My distinction 
between theories of disambiguation and theories of reference potential 
is, in itself, an important contribution to the study of reference. 
On the basis of intuitions about when determinate reference has 
been made, I argued that a particular speaker's intentions to refer do 
determine (in part) the reference of her ambiguous referring expres-
sions. The speaker's intention to refer was spelled out as an intention 
to refer to the object she had in mind. This object is not the one that 
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satisfies or resembles her representations of the object; it is, 
instead, the one that caused her to have this representation, either 
directly or indirectly. 
With respect to the ~heory of reference potential, I discussed 
both the role that a particular speaker's intentions play in determining 
reference potential and the role that the intentions of some group of 
speakers play in a theory of reference potential. The claim that a par-
ticular speaker's intentions determine the reference potential of the 
English expressions she uses was dismissed. The claim that a group of 
speakers' intentions determine the reference potential of English 
expressions was more plausible. Despite its initial plausibility, I 
rejected this claim. I argued that the sum of individual intentions to 
refer does not determine the reference potential of English expressions. 
I noted that the speakers of a language could all be mistaken about the 
referents of some of their terms. 
The conclusions I have reached are important for the philosophy of 
language in general and for theories of reference in particular, but 
they also have implications for other fields of philosophical inquiry. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to develop these 
implications fully, I will suggest at least some of them. The general 
conclusion reached, especially in the discussion of reference potential, 
was that, however they originated, once languages are established they 
take on a life of their own. They are no longer within the control of 
individual speakers or even of groups of speakers. Further, it is pos-
sible that no one in a linguistic community has a co~plete mastery of 
the words they use. For complete mastery requires knowledge not only of 
what is in one's mind, but also knowledge of what the world is really 
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like or at least knowledge of what the ideal theory says the world is 
like. 
Once we see that mastery of a language requires this type of 
knowledge, certain projects become untenable. For example, to discover 
what goodness is, it will not do simply to analyze our shared concept of 
goodness. For while this shared concept may guide our use of the term, 
it need not be what determines the extension of our word 'goodness'. To 
find out what goodness is we must investigate the world (or at least the 
human world). Investigations of language alone cannot help us. 
In addition, inasmuch as our thoughts and beliefs are shaped by 
and formulated in a language (and I think they are to a great extent), 
the contents of these thoughts and beliefs can always be beyond our com-
prehension of them. This conclusion undermines attempts to ground 
knowledge in the immediately given. The foundations of knowledge are 
not to be found in the immediate evidentness of thoughts and beliefs, 
since the contents of these thoughts and beliefs are not immediately 
apprehended by minds. 
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